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East Asia

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Thursday

4 February 1988

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East Asia ANNEX

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Japan

MITI To Give U.S. Chip User Information OW031443 Tokyo JIJI English 1355 GMT 3 Feb 87—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 3 (JIJI PRESS)—The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) will provide U.S. computer chip manufacturers with detailed information on chip (?users).

It will also encourage Japanese chip users to develop computer chips for them along with American chipmakers, MITI officials said Wednesday.

These measures, which will be presented at Japan-U.S. talks on semiconductor chip trade starting next Monday, are designed to help increase American concerns' share of the Japanese chip market and prompt the United States to lift its punitive tariffs on certain Japanese products, the officials said.

The U.S. Government invoked the 100 pct punitive duties last April in retaliation against Japan's alleged chip dumping and failure to increase a foreign share of the Japanese chip market.

It later lifted part of the punitive duties, but has left those for the failure. [sentence as received] The share, mostly American, has been rising from 10.8 pct for the August-October period of 1986, but is still far lower than the 20 pct the United States has sought for 1991.

The U.S. Government is expected to seek measures for increased U.S. chip sales in Japan, including the establishment of targets for chip purchases from abroad, tax incentives for chip imports and publishing of chip testing standards, at next week's talks, MITI officials said.

They said they doubt the effect of the purchase targets or tax incentives.

But they said American chipmakers are greatly interested in information about Japanese chip users and joint chip development with them.

The officials said MITI will compile books on information such as Japanese firms' plans, employees and terms for chip purchases and will distribute them to foreign chipmakers.

They also said U.S. chipmakers, if hoping to increase their share of the Japanese market, should cooperate with Japanese users in development of products for them and establish a setup for long-term supply to Japan.

MITI will guide Japanese chip users into such cooperation with American suppliers, they said.

The officials noted the ministry has also established the international semiconductor exchange center and plans a Japan-U.S. conference in Hawaii March 24-25 for promotion of such Japan-U.S. industrial cooperation.

Report on House Budget Committee Session OW031451 Tokyo JIJI in English 1423 GMT 3 Feb 88—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 3 (JIJI PRESS)—Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita Wednesday voiced his willingness to visit Britain, France, West Germany and Italy in early May.

He told a House of Representatives Budget Committee session that he hopes to visit the European countries participating in the annual seven-nation summit before this year's summit in Toronto in June.

Takeshita, who took office last November, visited the two other summit participants of the United States and Canada in January.

Takeshita also said he is considering attending a special session on disarmament of the U.N. General assembly which will start in New York in late May.

Takeshita's overseas tours in the first half of this year will also include his attendance at new South Korean President No Tae-u's installation ceremony in Seoul Feb. 25 and a visit to Toronto for the annual summit.

The prime minister said he is preparing to visit China as well within this year.

Takeshita, who was answering questions by Liberal-Democrat Tokuo Yamashita, said his government must improve its official development assistance (ODA) to developing countries in both quality and quantity.

Specifically, he said, he will try to expand ODA's ratio to Japan's gross national product.

The lower house budget committee resumed its session Wednesday evening after a suspension since Tuesday.

Until the early afternoon, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) had boycotted the session in protest against Prime Minister Takeshita's rejection of the party's request to withdraw a government comment made Tuesday on consultations under the Japan-U.S. security treaty.

The comment indicated Japan is not designed to request any consultation with the United States to discuss suspected U.S. introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan under the treaty.

The JSP sought withdrawal of the government stance which it said departs from earlier government comments in the Diet (parliament).

II



Daily Report

East Asia

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III

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Japan

U.S. Opposition to South Africa Trade Cited *OW040609 Tokyo KYODO in English 0547 GMT* 4 Feb 88

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 4 KYODO—Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita said Thursday the government is concerned about moves in the United States Congress to take sanctions against Japan over its increasing trade with South Africa.

Takeshita made the comment in response to questions at a forum of representatives of the government, business and labor.

Several members of the U.S. House of Representatives were reported earlier this week to be seeking the inclusion of sanctions in an omnibus trade bill to pressure Japan to reduce trade with South Africa because of its policy of apartheid, or racial segregation.

Japan's trade with South Africa amounted 3.6 billion dollars in 1986, outpacing the United States' 3.5 billion dollars to become the largest trading partner for Pretoria.

Takeshita, in a speech to the forum, said he is sure that labor and employers will join forces to help develop Japan's economy and society further.

He said the inauguration of Japan's largest private-sector labor body, Rengo, will help promote business-labor dialogue.

Takeshita on Developing Economy *OW040247 Tokyo KYODO in English 0156 GMT* 4 Feb 88

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 4 KYODO—Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita said Thursday he is sure that labor and employers will join forces to help further develop the country's economy and society.

Takeshita, speaking at a trilateral forum comprising government, management and organized labor, said the inauguration of Japan's largest private-sector labor body Rengo will help promote business-labor dialogue.

Rengo, the Japanese private-sector trade union confederation, was formed last November and is composed of an estimated 5.3 million workers making it the largest organized labor federation.

Takeshita said the government will make efforts to protect workers adversely affected by ongoing government efforts to restructure the export-oriented economy into one relying more on domestic demand.

Takeshita, Labor Minister Taro Nakamura and Chief Cabinet Secretary Keizo Obuchi attended the trilateral forum, a government-sponsored gathering.

Among the 14 top labor leaders attending were Rengo president Toshifumi Tateyama and Takeshi Kurokawa, head of the 4 million-strong general council of trade unions of Japan (Sohyo) which comprises mainly public-sector workers.

Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry president Rokuro Ishikawa and NTT [Nippon Telephone and Telegraph] president Hisashi Shinto were among the eight management representatives.

The forum was also attended by many officials of the Labor Ministry, Cabinet Secretariat and Economic Planning Agency as well as seven academicians and senior journalists.

Diet 'Stalled Again' Over U.S. Bases Upkeep *OW041221 Tokyo KYODO in English 1200 GMT* 4 Feb 88

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 4 KYODO—Diet business was stalled again Thursday afternoon after the government rejected an opposition demand to set a limit to Japan's financial contribution to maintaining U.S. military forces in Japan.

Naohiko Okubo, secretary general of the No. 2 opposition party Komeito, said at a session of the Budget Committee of the lower house that there is no legal basis for the Japanese Government's expenditures, provided to help ease the financial burden of the United States in maintaining its forces in Japan, and called on the government to set a limit to expenditure since the amount is increasing year by year.

Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita rejected Okubo's call and told the session that his government will independently make its own decision on the matter so that the Japan-U.S. security system will continue to function efficiently.

Okubo halted his interpellation after the government failed to respond to his request to reveal the nature of consultations between the governments of Japan and the United States on the issue.

Since fiscal 1978, Japan has shared the costs for welfare, retirement payments and certain allowances for Japanese workers on U.S. bases in Japan. Japan's share has been rising every year since then.

The cabinet of then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone decided last October that Japan would consult with the U.S. on ways to share the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in Japan as part of Japan's efforts to help secure safe navigation in the Persian Gulf.

The fiscal 1988 budget allocates 120.3 billion yen toward the keeping of U.S. forces in Japan, up 9.8 percent over the current fiscal year.

The government decided in January that Japan will pay all allowances for the 21,000 Japanese employees on U.S. bases in Japan by 1990.

The Komeito leader said a U.S. military document obtained by the party says military materials which could be supplied to U.S. forces stationed in South Korea and the South Korean Army in the event of hostilities are stockpiled at the 9th Corps Headquarters of the U.S. Army Japan in Zama, Kanagawa Prefecture.

Okubo questioned the government on whether or not the stockpiling of military materials for the South Korean Army at U.S. military facilities in Japan violates the Constitution, which prohibits the right of collective defense.

Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno replied that it is compatible with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which allows U.S. forces to use facilities and areas in Japan for the purpose of contributing to the security of the Far East.

Takeshita on Possible Gorbachev Meeting
OW040355 Tokyo KYODO in English 0347 GMT
4 Feb 88

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 4 KYODO—Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita told the Diet Thursday he hopes to meet Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev while attending a United Nations special session on disarmament scheduled for May 31 to June 25 in New York.

Takeshita, replying to questions at a House of Representatives Budget Committee session, said he would like to have a summit meeting with Gorbachev if there is a chance to do so.

The prime minister reaffirmed his intention of attending the U.N. disarmament session, the third of its kind.

Moscow has not yet said officially whether Gorbachev will attend. However, both he and U.S. President Ronald Reagan are expected to do so, according to Foreign Ministry sources.

Takeshita was responding to Naohiko Okubo, secretary general of the No. 2 Opposition party Komeito, who urged the prime minister to attend the U.S. session and to spell out Japan's peace diplomacy.

Takeshita said he regretted that the Soviet Union has indicated no change in its policy over Japan's territorial claim on four small islands off Hokkaido, which the Soviets seized in the closing days of World War II.

JSP Leader Doi's Moscow Visit Postponed
OW041311 Tokyo KYODO in English 1246 GMT
4 Feb 88

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 4 KYODO—The planned Moscow visit by Takako Doi, chairwoman of the No. 1 opposition Japan Socialist Party, originally scheduled to begin on February 17, has been postponed to early May or later, JSP sources said Thursday.

Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo Nikolay N. Solovyev called on her at the JSP headquarters Thursday afternoon and requested the rescheduling because Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has to attend a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on February 18-19, the sources said.

Moscow is ready to reschedule a meeting between Doi and Gorbachev for May 6, the ambassador said.

Doi accepted the request for postponement and replied she would study the new Soviet offer, the JSP sources said.

According to Solovyev, the Soviet Communist Party will hold a National Party Congress from June 28 for the first time in about 50 years and the Central Committee plenary session has been scheduled for mid-February prior to the National Congress.

Originally, the JSP leader was to visit Moscow last December. But she had to postpone the visit because of the Washington summit between Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan and reschedule it to later this month.

Solovyev also told Doi that the Soviet party will send a delegation to an international symposium against nuclear weapons and for disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region which the JSP plans to sponsor around this summer, the sources said.

Top Miyazawa Aide To Visit ROK, Meet No
OW030926 Tokyo KYODO in English 0908 GMT
3 Feb 88

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 3 KYODO—Kunikichi Saito, a top aide to Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, will visit South Korea Thursday and Friday to meet President Elect No Tae-u, Liberal Democratic Party sources said Wednesday.

Saito, the leader of Miyazawa's faction within the LDP, will hand Miyazawa's private letter to No Friday, the sources said.

Authorities To Increase Flights To, From ROK
*OW011217 Tokyo KYODO in English 1148 GMT
1 Feb 88*

[Text] Seoul, Feb. 1 KYODO—Japanese and South Korean aviation authorities have agreed to increase the number of international flights between the two countries starting from July, officials said Monday.

The measure will help airlines handle the expected increase in air traffic stemming from the Seoul Olympic games this September, officials said.

According to the agreement, Japan's All-Nippon Airways (ANA) and TOA Domestic Airlines (TDA) will be allowed to operate five weekly flights each between Tokyo and Seoul from July.

The decision means that TDA, which is scheduled to change its name into Japan Air System (JAS) from April 1, will operate scheduled international flights for the first time.

JAL [Japan Airlines], which operates 16 weekly flights—including seven jumbo flights—on the busy Tokyo-Seoul route, was authorized to increase at least one jumbo flight a week.

Additional JAL flights on the Tokyo-Seoul route will be determined later, Ministry of Transport officials in Tokyo said.

The new agreement also allows JAL to increase the number of flights for the Osaka-Seoul and Nagoya-Seoul routes.

Japan's three airlines will also be allowed to inaugurate Nagoya-Pusan, Nagasaki-Seoul, and Sapporo-Seoul flights.

Meanwhile, Korean Air (KAL), the national flag carrier of South Korea, will be given the same treatment as the three Japanese airline firms and will be allowed to increase the number of its flights from South Korea to North America via Tokyo.

DPRK Ship Makes Port Call at Yokohama
*OW030831 Tokyo NHK General Television Network
in Japanese 0300 GMT 1 Feb 88*

[Text] A North Korean cargo-passenger ship sailed into Yokohama Port today for the first time since the Japanese government announced sanctions against North Korea, the DPRK, following the Korean Air jetliner incident, and no trouble has been reported thus far in this connection.

The ship, which made the port call today, is North Korea's 3,573 ton cargo-passenger ship the "Mangyong-bong." It left a North Korean port at the end of last month and sailed into Yokohama Port some time after

1000 today. Aboard the ship were 70 Korean residents of Japan, including students of primary and middle schools who visited their hometowns on a New Year singing tour. They were met at the pier by about 200 welcoming people carrying small flags. In connection with the ship's port call, the police had been put on alert in anticipation of protest actions, but no trouble has been reported thus far.

The government sanctions demand stiff control over the landing of crews of North Korean-registered ships. According to the Immigration Bureau's Yokohama Station, however, there have been no landing applications from the crew of the ship. The Justice Ministry will review applications if they are submitted. The "Mangyongbong" will berth at Yokohama Port until 4 February and then return to North Korea via Niigata Port.

MITI Task Force To Study Free Trade Zone
*OW040815 Tokyo KYODO in English 0629 GMT
4 Feb 88*

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 4 KYODO—Trade and development policies in the Asian and Pacific regions, including the establishment of a free trade zone, are to be studied by a task force set up by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), officials said Thursday.

Major themes to be discussed include the establishment of a new framework of regional trade in line with economic development and how a Japanese contribution could help the regions toward realizing their economic growth potential, the officials said.

The task force will focus on the feasibility of adopting a free trade zone which they said should exclude regionalism and elements characteristic of a "closed" market.

The regions cover the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan and other Asian countries, the officials said.

The task force was set up after a meeting January 27 between Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita and Japanese Ambassador to Washington Nobuo Matsunaga, who asked that Japan take up a proposal for a Japan-U.S. free trade zone, they said.

The scheme, aimed at eventual abolition of tariffs and nontariff barriers, was also proposed by a U.S. Congressional leader when Takeshita visited Washington last month, they said.

The scope of the study is beyond that of a Japan-U.S. free market due to fears that the U.S. proposal might bring Japan into bilateralism, they said. The task force plans to draw up a conclusion by this summer.

The U.S. signed a free trade pact with Canada last month and is attempting to sign similar agreements with Mexico and the six members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), they added.

GATT Rules Sought To Protect Farm Products
OW031119 Tokyo KYODO in English 1110 GMT
3 Feb 88

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 3 KYODO—Japan will seek the establishment of new rules governing farm trade in multilateral trade negotiations resuming on a full scale later this month, officials of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries said Wednesday.

Japan's request follows a finding by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that Japan violates its rules by imposing restrictions on imports of 12 farm products.

The ruling, adopted Tuesday, did not fully reflect Japan's arguments as a farm produce importing nation, the officials said.

They said Japan's request will include the application of GATT Article XI, which prohibits import restrictions on farm products and a list of products subjected to import controls by member nations of the GATT.

Under the Uruguay round of multilateral negotiations, 1990 has been set as the year to institute the new rules on farm trade.

The officials said, however, that the target may be moved ahead in view of strong U.S. demands for free trade.

They said the ministry is concerned that Japan may be barred from retaining import restrictions on such products as rice and beef, which are under government protection.

Japan will seek protection of key farm produce under new GATT rules, the officials said.

It also will seek a wider interpretation of "perishability" defined in Article XI, so that certain essential products can be placed under government protection, they said.

Abe Promises To Support Embassy Land Campaign
OW040831 Tokyo KYODO in English 0817 GMT
4 Feb 88

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 4 KYODO—Shintaro Abe, secretary general of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, promised support Thursday for an appeal by a group of more than 50 embassies for help to overcome problems caused by high property prices in Tokyo.

He made the pledge in a meeting with Nicaraguan Ambassador Jorge Huezo Castrillo at the party head office, party officials said.

Abe said that as a one-time foreign minister he will make his best efforts to assist the diplomatic corps in Tokyo, the officials said.

Huezo complained many diplomatic missions, particularly from developing countries, have suffered a double blow because of rising land prices and of the yen's rise in value, they said.

Some diplomatic establishments in Tokyo have threatened to move to neighboring countries and many have reduced their staffs because of rising costs, according to a voluntary group of over 50 embassies formed to seek land assistance.

Last week, Huezo joined ambassadors from Greece, the Ivory Coast and Lebanon in visiting Tokyo Governor Shuichi Suzuki and asking for reasonably priced land allotments for embassies.

Meanwhile, Huezo called for Japan's support for the Nicaraguan government's peace efforts with the contra guerrillas. Abe only replied that Japan welcomes any efforts toward peace, the officials said.

Abe, 63, was foreign minister for nearly four years starting November 1982 under then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone.

North Korea

KCNA Denies Rumor on Train Explosion
SK041534 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1510 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] Pyongyang February 4 (KCNA)—The South Korean puppets are now spreading rumours that a train was exploded recently in the area along the Korea-China border in the northern half of Korea.

This is a sheer lie and another malicious smear propaganda.

We resolutely denounce the South Korean puppets for making a vicious challenge by spreading false rumours about our society, not content with the anti-DPRK smear campaign they launched at the beginning of the new year, linking in a far-fetched way the KAL incident, their own make, with the North.

In the northern half of Korea, there has been no such explosion as that advertized by the puppets, nor any "anti-government force."

Why are the puppets in so reckless a hurry to cast a shadow on the image of the DPRK through a smear campaign with arguments on "explosion" query. It is as clear as noonday.

It is because they are so much uneasy.

The military fascist forces of South Korea, which rigged up No Tae-u's "victory" with frauds in the "presidential elections" towards the end of last year, are trying to justify their brigandish seizure of power and lay a foundation for the extension of the military dictatorship through the "transfer of power" due in the latter half of this month, later "National Assembly elections" and the singlehanded hosting of the Olympic games.

The Chon Yu-hwan-No Tae-u group has become a target of hatred and rejection of the South Korean people and democratic forces for having openly refused their demand for an end to the military government and the establishment of a democratic government after committing all sorts of [words indistinct] history and the nation.

The puppets are also bitterly denounced by the people at home and abroad as war-likers and traitors because they, together with the U.S. imperialist master, announced a plan of the extremely provocative "Team Spirit 88" joint military rehearsal to answer the DPRK's patriotic proposal for the convocation of a North-South joint conference. The puppets' fabrication and spread of the rumour of "train explosion" are no more than a convulsion to extricate themselves from such a difficult and awkward position.

As they have used the KAL incident in rigging up the "election of president" last year, they are planning to divert elsewhere the attention of the South Korean people full of discontent and grievances and bridge over the present crisis of their rule by means of such smear campaign and extend the military dictatorship without difficulty. They are also seeking to spread the false story as if any problem exists within our society so as to bar the longing for the northern half of the republic which is rising among the South Korean people and emasculate their spirit of independence and reunification. It has been known to the world that the puppets have shifted the blame for the "East Berlin case," "Kim Tae-chung kidnap case", "Kimp'o Airport explosion case" and many other "cases" faked up by themselves on to the DPRK and engaged themselves in the anti-DPRK smear campaign, prattling that the Wolmi Island soldiers riot, the Kwangju popular uprising and other struggle against them which took place within South Korea were directed by the DPRK.

Worse still, the present South Korean rulers did not hesitate to fabricate and report a most malicious lie called "abnormal situation in the DPRK" (firing case), in November, 1986.

Such habitual plotters will not hesitate to tell any kind of lies.

The South Korean puppet clique, however, will get nothing from fabrication or plot.

Availing ourselves of this opportunity, we would like to say a word to the editors of the Hong Kong paper "SING TAO JIH PAO."

Your paper, in league with the South Korean puppets, colonial stooges, blotted space by carrying a false report. Your behaviour is a disgraceful one selling conscience and insulting public opinion.

We remind you of the saying that a man who is circulating a lie is as good as its inventor.

We will not tolerate such act of the South Korean puppets as kicking off a smear campaign against us, circulating an outrageous lie, nor will the honest-minded public of the world will allow them.

The puppets must give up at once such a despicable anti-DPRK smear campaign.

MAC Secretary Declines To Discuss U.S. Remains
SK041053 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1045 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] Kaesong February 4 (KCNA)—The secretary of the DPRK side to the Military Armistice Commission sent a notice dated February 4, 1988, to the secretary of the U.S. side in connection with the offer of the secretary of the U.S. side on February 3 to hold a meeting of MAC secretaries for the delivery of the remains of two GI's killed during the Korean war.

Follows the content of the notice:

The problem of unearthing and returning remains of GI's does not belong to the function of the Military Armistice Commission. Therefore, the transfer of the unearthed remains is not a matter to be discussed at a secretaries' meeting.

It is entirely because of the unreasonable "sanctions" the U.S. Administration has taken against us that the issue of delivering the remains of dead American soldiers, which were unearthed by our organ concerned at the request of some U.S. congressmen, ex-servicemen's organizations and individual persons, has not been settled.

We cannot but pay a serious attention to the United States' efforts to mislead world public opinion, challenging our humanitarian stand.

We warn that the United States should no longer resort to foolish intrigues.

KCNA Cites XINHUA Report on 'Team Spirit'
SK040445 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0425 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] Pyongyang February 4 (KCNA)—The spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced on February 3 China's position towards the "Team Spirit 88" joint military rehearsal of the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppet clique, a XINHUA report said.

The spokesman said China hoped that the United States and South Korea would work for detente on the Korean peninsula and North-South reconciliation.

China has always regarded large-scale U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises as detrimental to detente and stability on the Korean peninsula, the spokesman stressed.

SKNDF Spokesman Denounces 'Team Spirit-88'
SK040857 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean
2300 GMT 1 Feb 88

[Text] According to the Voice of National Salvation [VNS], an SKNDF spokesman on 29 January issued a statement denouncing the criminal plan of conducting the large-scale "Team Spirit-88" joint military exercise, which the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppet clique announced despite strong opposition at home and abroad. Noting that the South Korean people are enraged by this announcement of the criminal plan by the United States and the Chon Tu-hwan-No Tae-u ring to conduct this lengthy large-scale exercise, the statement says:

Our masses desire not confrontation, but reconciliation and cohesion between the North and the South; not division, but the reunification of the country. Reflecting the consistent aspiration and yearning of the entire masses of the North and the South, the North has recently put forward a proposal for convening a North-South joint meeting to discuss and solve pending issues, such as halting such large-scale war exercises as the "Team Spirit" joint military exercise and holding multinational arms reduction talks and has been making serious efforts to realize this. The public sentiment and opinion in the South ardently look forward to the realization at an early date of the North's proposal, which will provide a new turning point for national reconciliation and cohesion. Despite this, the United States and the Chon Tu-hwan-No Tae-u ring have turned away from all this and announced a plan to conduct the "Team Spirit-88" joint military exercise, which will aggravate tensions and increase the danger of thermonuclear war, thereby totally challenging the aspirations and desires of our people. This eloquently shows that the United States and the Chon Tu-hwan-No Tae-u ring have never been interested in peace and peaceful reunification, but are occupied only with aggression and nuclear war provocation.

The United States and the Chon Tu-hwan-No Tae-u ring have turned away from the demands of our masses and the patriotic and nation-loving proposal of the North and are attempting to push ahead with the "Team Spirit-88" joint military exercise. Their ulterior motive is to complete the nuclear war posture to wage a pre-emptive strike against the North and dominate Asia and to ignite a new war of aggression whenever they choose.

Exposing the consistently aggressive scheme of the United States to swallow up the North, using South Korea as a bridgehead, and to expand its sphere of influence into the Asian continent, the statement continues:

In order to realize this aggressive ambition, the United States has seized the South as its colony and military base for over 40 years, made everything serve its war policy, and increased the scale and fierceness of the world's largest scale nuclear war exercise—"Team Spirit"—every year. "Team Spirit-88" is a large-scale nuclear war exercise which has been escalated and shows that the new war provocation maneuvers of the United States and its cat's paws have reached an extremely dangerous point.

Noting that the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppet clique are attempting to conduct this adventurous war exercise commotion with the 1988 Seoul Olympics approaching, the statement notes:

The Olympics, the ideals of which are cohesion, friendship, and peace, and this war commotion are incompatible. Nevertheless, the United States and the Chon Tu-hwan-No Tae-u ring are attempting to conduct a large scale war exercise in the South, where the Olympic games are supposed to be held. This shows well that they are attempting to use the Seoul Olympics as a means to wage a new war of aggression and to accelerate nuclear war preparations. In a word, they are attempting to make the 1988 Seoul Olympics a repeat version of Hitler's Berlin Olympics, which led to World War II.

The "Team Spirit-88" war exercise, which the United States is attempting to push forward together with the Chon Tu-hwan-No Tae-u ring also contains the ulterior motive of strangling our masses' anti-U.S. and antifascist struggle and desperately sustaining the colonial fascist rule which is in a catastrophic crisis. The United States and the Chon Tu-hwan-No Tae-u ring scheme this year as well to conduct the military exercise and drive the South into a wartime-like situation to weaken our masses' struggle for national sovereignty and democracy and to repress the mass struggle by mobilizing the armed forces in case of emergency. This shows that the peaceful transfer of power and democratic development which they rave about are the tactics designed to deceive the people, after all.

The "Team Spirit-88" exercise is a most reckless war exercise. It adds to the misfortune and suffering of our masses and threatens the existence of the entire nation. The statement stresses:

The SKNDF determines that the maneuvers of the United States and the Chon Tu-hwan-No Tae-u ring to push ahead with the criminal "Team Spirit-88" exercise are a treacherous challenge to our masses' aspiration for independence, democracy, and reunification, and strongly protests and denounces this with the just indignation of all the people. The United States should unconditionally cancel the plan to conduct the criminal "Team Spirit-88" joint military exercise and withdraw the U.S. forces and nuclear weapons from this land without delay.

The Chon Tu-hwan-No Tae-u ring should not engage in the treacherous act of attempting to push fellow countrymen into the calamity of a nuclear war, while attempting to provoke a war of northward invasion by following foreign forces. And it should step down from power as demanded by the masses.

The urgent situation today demands that all the masses resolutely launch into the struggle to defend our existence from the nuclear calamity and to rescue our nation and our country from crisis. All who love the country and the nation should unite themselves firmly under the anti-U.S. banner for national salvation and wage a vigorous struggle to resolutely check and frustrate the war maneuvers of the United States and the Chon Tu-hwan-No Tae-u ring and to expel the U.S. forces and nuclear weapons from this land.

Japanese Groups Oppose Government Sanctions
SK031022 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1014 GMT 3 Feb 88

[Text] Pyongyang February 3 (KCNA)—The Japan Socialist Party, the Komei Party and solidarity organizations of Japan criticized the Japanese Government for announcing "sanctions" against the DPRK over the KAL incident.

Yasui Yoshinori, chairman of the special committee for measures on the Korean affairs of the Japan Socialist Party and member of the House of Representatives, sent a petition to the foreign minister of Japan on January 27. It expresses regret at the "sanctions" taken by the Japanese Government against the DPRK and urges the government to refrain from hindering the exchanges between the Japan Socialist Party and the Workers' Party of Korea and take proper measures lest the human rights of Koreans in Japan should be violated on account of the KAL incident.

In his press statement issued earlier, Tadebayashi, director of the International Department of the JSP, said that the government should act with discretion till the truth of the KAL incident has been clarified.

Kanzaki, director of the International Department of the Komei Party of Japan, in his press statement said that the Japanese Government should not hastily comply with South Korea's "request" or follow the U.S. "sanctions" but should first have a correct understanding of the fact and make a thorough probe into the truth from an independent stand.

The Kyoto committee for support to the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea and the Kyoto prefectural people's council for Japan-Korea friendship and solidarity sent petitions to the prime minister and foreign minister of Japan on January 26, urging the Japanese government to immediately cancel the "sanctions" against the DPRK and take measures to prevent national discrimination and violation of human rights against Koreans in Japan on account of the KAL incident.

Preparatory Group for North-South Talks Meets
SK041105 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1049 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] Pyongyang February 4 (KCNA)—The second meeting of the preparatory committee of the North side to a North-South joint conference was held here today.

The meeting was attended by the chairman, vice-chairmen and members of the preparatory committee.

Leading functionaries of the DPRK Central People's Committee, Administration Council, all the political parties and social organizations were present as observers.

The meeting analysed developments since a letter which was adopted at a joint meeting of the DPRK Central People's Committee, Administration Council, all the political parties and social organizations held in Pyongyang on January 13 was handed over to the South side, and sincerely discussed concrete measures to carry into effect the proposal for the convocation of a North-South joint conference.

Before debate the meeting was informed that the letter to the South Korean authorities, all the political parties, social organizations and people of all social standings which was adopted at the joint meeting was handed over to the South Korean side at Panmunjom at 15:00 January 14.

Speakers pointed out that the unbiased public opinion of the world now unanimously hopes for earlier convocation of a North-South joint conference. Highly estimating this proposal of the DPRK as a "most reasonable one for peace and peaceful reunification of Korea," as a "timely save-the-nation measure."

Drawing attention to the fact that even South Korean publications "heartily welcomed the proposal of the North" for a "joint conference which would deal with the problems of easing the tensions between North and South and of co-hosting the Seoul Olympics," and sincerely hoped for a successful North-South joint conference at an early date to

make a new epoch for national reunification, the attendants of the meeting expressed regret at the fact that, on the contrary, the South Korean side has not yet replied some 20 days after it received the letter.

In particular, the meeting unanimously condemned the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean authorities for announcing "results of investigation" into the KAL incident and frantically conducting an anti-communist smear campaign right after they received our letter and for announcing on January 28 a plan for the "Team Spirit 88" joint military exercise aimed at attacking us. The meeting expressed deep concern over the fact that the South Korean ruler in an "interview" with foreign reporters at "Chongwadae" on January 29 claimed that South-North dialogue would be resumed in the early 90s, taking a negative attitude towards our proposal for convening a North-South joint conference this year to create an atmosphere of reconciliation, unity and reunification and the fact that the puppet National Unification Board on January 27 submitted to "National Assembly" a "report on situation" maliciously slandering our proposal as a "camouflaged peace offensive" to split "public opinion" and create "politico-social confusion". And the meeting decided to take appropriate steps to cope with the grave situation prevailing in Korea due to the South Korean ruling quarters' anti-dialogue, anti-peace attitude.

Under the situation where tension is being further aggravated in Korea and new obstacles are being laid in the way of national reunification, the meeting called once again upon political parties, public organisations, people of all social standings in the North and South of Korea and other entire Korean people, who desire for peace in Korea and her peaceful reunification, to turn out as one in the struggle for hewing out a new road of national reunification by thoroughly smashing the moves of splittists at home and abroad and convening a North-South joint conference.

The meeting examined preparations for the preliminary meeting of the North-South joint conference with its date approaching and, on this basis, discussed the composition of the delegation of our side to the preliminary meeting.

South's West Sea Firing Exercise Assailed
SK040118 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean
1150 GMT 2 Feb 88

[Commentary by station commentator Kim Kyong-pok:
"A Reckless Commotion of Playing With Fire"]

[Text] The South Korea puppets staged a firing exercise in the vast waters southeast of Ochoong Island in the West Sea on 1 February. This naval firing exercise reportedly will last for a full month, starting each day in the morning and running until late evening.

There is no need to explain more about this commotion of playing with fire staged to deliberately aggravate tension as part of their preparations to provoke a war of northward invasion.

As is known, from the outset of the New Year, the puppets have continuously stirred war commotion by preposterously provoking us. The so-called exercise to prepare for the 1-to-3 operation, the demonstration exercise for extreme cold weather, the recent mobile naval exercise, and the demonstration biochemical warfare exercise are the cases in point.

The puppets' naval firing exercise is an expression of their bellicose madness which has almost become their disposition. They cannot live even for a moment without firing guns or wreaking power.

Out of a desire to make this a historic year in which to provide a new phase of changes for national reconciliation and unity, we have put forward a proposal on convening a North-South joint conference and have been making serious efforts to realize it. However, the puppets, ignoring our peace initiative, have responded to it with reckless anticommunist war commotion.

Considering this in relation to the fact that the puppets recently have become more provocative against us, their motive becomes clearer.

As has been reported, the puppets have openly challenged us by viciously provoking us, referring to our proposal for the convocation of the North-South joint conference a few days ago as a ploy aimed at dividing national opinion and at creating a state of flux, or as a disguised peace offensive. At the same time, they declared a full confrontation with us by announcing, together with the U.S. imperialists, the plans for "Team Spirit-88," a preliminary war of northward invasion and a nuclear test war. Following this, the puppets began a provocative firing exercise in the West Sea, fully indicating that they take no notice of such things as reconciliation and unity with their fellow countrymen or the relaxation of tension and that the only things that fill their mind are confrontation and wild ambitions for war.

It is clear why the puppets plan to extend the naval firing exercise until the end of February. In the latter half of February, there will be a farce called a change of government in South Korea, in which traitor Chon Tu-Hwan will hand the presidency over to traitor No Tae-u. This farce called the change of government has encountered strong opposition in South Korea because it is a political farce designed to prolong the military dictatorship after the fabricated election returns were an established fact running counter to the will of the absolute majority of the South Korean people who are against the prolonging of military rule and who call for the establishment of a civilian government.

The South Korean youths, students, and people are now about to join more vigorously in the struggle against the military dictatorship and its behind-the-scenes controller, the U.S. imperialists, by branding traitor No Tae-u as the brigand who has usurped power.

By staging the naval firing exercise in addition to the "Team Spirit" military exercise, which will enter the movement and deployment operation stage beginning in February, the puppets seek to suppress the South Korean people's spirit of struggle through military threats. Going one step further, the puppets are now scheming to find a way out by lighting the torch of a war of northward invasion if they arrive at a blind alley.

However, the game of playing with fire and war adventurism will never provide a way out for the puppets. Those who enjoy playing with fire are destined to die in flames.

We are vigilantly watching the puppets' mad game of playing with fire and will respond to their indiscreet provocation with well-earned punishment.

The puppets should cool down their brain, which is now stirred with war fever, and abandon their commotion of playing with fire.

KCNA Reports South's 2 February Exercise
SK040439 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0419 GMT
4 Feb 88

[Text] Pyongyang February 4 (KCNA)—The South Korean military fascist clique was reported to have staged one more war exercise called "demonstration exercise of chemical, biological and radioactive warfare" at a unit of the puppet Air Force on February 2.

At the military racket, the fascist clique frantically incited a war fever, clamoring about "acquirement of the capacity of executing a long aerial operation" and "establishment of a perfect defence posture in chemical, biological and radioactive warfare."

This exercise coincided with the announcement of the plan of the "Team Spirit 88" war exercise, a test nuclear war. This shows what a reckless stage the U.S. imperialists and the puppets reached in their criminal acts to threaten the northern half of Korea with nuclear, chemical and other destruction weapons.

Daily Denounces U.S for Commending South
SK040155 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean
2148 GMT 2 Feb 88

[NODONG SINMUN 3 February commentary: "Does the United States Take Military Dictatorship for Democracy?"

[Text] The U.S. ruling bunch is making absurd outbursts these days in connection with the South Korean situation. They are now loudly publicizing traitor No Tae-u's election as president as victory of democracy in South Korea. They say that the election of the puppet traitor was a wise choice in the sense that it will ensure stability, openly raving that they will actively cooperate with him. They went so far as to say that the South Korean people

should know that they have won, through the election, most of the democracy which they have sought. This is a shameless fabrication of reality and an open mockery at and defilement of the South Korean people who call for an end to the military rule and the establishment of a civilian government.

The election farce in South Korea did not bring about democracy, as claimed by the United States, but again completely trampled on the bud of democracy. Although the election was held, the pro-U.S. military dictatorial regime remains intact and nothing seems to have changed.

As for traitor No Tae-u, whom the United States describes as a standard-bearer of democracy, he is a trained stooge of the U.S. imperialists, a military hooligan, and a fascist murderer who committed the 12 December army purge coup d'etat in conspiracy with traitor Chon Tu-hwan, immersed Kwangju in the sea of blood, and set up a military dictatorial regime. If there is any change, it is the change of the name from the Chon Tu-hwan military dictatorship to the No Tae-u military dictatorship.

The election which was enforced under the signboard of a direct election system was a new form of coup d'etat designed to fabricate traitor No Tae-u's election. Therefore, the South Korean people consistently claim that they do not find any difference between Chon Tu-hwan and No Tae-u and that they see no change in the nature of the military fascist dictatorial regime even if No Tae-u's regime comes into power. How nonsensical, therefore, it is for the United States, from far away across the ocean, to make absurd publicity describing the military dictatorship, branded as such by the South Korean people, as democracy!

Seeing that the United States insists that the military dictatorship, which the South Korean people, the masters of South Korea, consistently denounce as such, as democracy, we can understand the nature of the democracy raved about by the United States.

In view of the fact that the United States is the international military police and the biggest terrorist state that invariably interferes in the affairs, large and small, of other countries and regions, it is not strange that the U.S. ruling bunch should interpret the developments in South Korea, their colony, one way or another. We, however, should say that what they are doing is extremely shameless.

There is a saying that he who sets fire cries out, "Fire!" The United States cunningly attempts to describe the prolonged military dictatorship as a democratic development because the last election was perpetrated thoroughly by the behind-the-scenes manipulation of the United States. There are much data to prove this. Although the United States have always pretended in recent years that they favor democratic development in South Korea, they, in fact, sought to prolong the pro-U.S. military dictatorship.

It has been known that when the demand for constitutional revision arose as part of the heightened anti-U.S. and antidictatorship struggle among the South Korean people in the wake of the developments in the Philippines, the United States gave the deceptive strategy of compromise between the ruling and opposition parties and attempted to prolong the military dictatorship by means of a parliamentary cabinet system.

When it became impossible, due to the strong resistance of the democratic forces, to prolong the military dictatorship by means of a parliamentary cabinet system, the United States, together with the puppets, divided the opposition party and had the puppets announce the traitorous 13 April measure of suspending negotiations for constitutional revision.

What did the United States do when the people, enraged by the maneuvers of prolonging the military dictatorship by the 13 April measure and the farce of recommending traitor No Tae-u as a presidential candidate, launched into the June resistance? The United States had the puppets announce the so-called democratization commitment referred to as the 29 June declaration and chose the way to maintain and prolong the pro-U.S. military fascist dictatorship under the deceptive direct election system. The United States then provided support for traitor No Tae-u in various ways and enabled him to fabricate his election by means of the power of public authority and fraud.

It is a chronic bad habit of the United States, which it itself finds unable to get rid of, to unhesitatingly reverse black and white for its interests. It is very clear why the United States so persistently publicizes the soon to-be-instituted No Tae-u military fascist dictatorship as democracy.

It is an unchangeable scheme of the United States to maintain a pro-U.S. military dictatorial regime in South Korea. South Korea is the last U.S. colony on the threshold of and military stronghold for aggression against the Asian Continent. The United States thinks that it should maintain the pro-U.S. military fascist dictatorship to perpetually hold on to and occupy South Korea, which is comparable to a piece of pig fat. Furthermore, now that South Korea has been turned from an anti-Americanism-free zone into a tempestuous anti-Americanism zone, it is in the vital interests of the United States to prolong the military dictatorship.

The United States embellishes the prolonged military government by traitor No Tae-u as democracy to calm down the South Korean people's struggle and to smoothly realize the colonial rule by giving a label of democracy to the pro-U.S. military regime which they fabricated by fraud, irregularities, and machinations. However, no matter how loudly the leaders in the White House publicize it, a pro-U.S. military fascist regime cannot become a democratic regime, nor will there be anyone who believes in such publicity.

The South Korean people, through their past experience of not being able to find a way out of the predicament despite the blood they shed for democracy, have clearly witnessed the true nature of the United States. They have learned a serious lesson once again that as long as the U.S. imperialists remain in South Korea, they cannot realize their demands for the establishment of a civilian government or the aspiration for any social change.

The South Korean people have raised a torchlight of the anti-U.S. struggle for independence. The acts of the United States shamelessly engaging in the publicity of reversing black and white, making little of the South Korean people, and instituting the military rule will only touch off an even more powerful tempestuous anti-U.S. struggle in South Korea.

South Korea

Finance Minister Meets U.S. Official on Trade
SK040159 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
4 Feb 88 p 1

[Text] A high-ranking U.S. official yesterday demanded the "faster" appreciation of the Korean currency against the U.S. dollar.

Charles Dallara, U.S. deputy assistant finance secretary [title as published], told Finance Minister Sakong Il that the Korean government must make further efforts to reduce the trade surplus with the United States, according to a spokesman for the Finance Ministry.

In a one-hour meeting at Sakong's office, Dallara explained that the U.S. administration is under strong pressure from the Congress to take tougher protectionist measures against trading partners registering huge surpluses with the United States.

The U.S. official also expressed great dissatisfaction with the appreciation margin of the Korean currency against the U.S. dollar last year, the spokesman said.

Dallara was also quoted as saying that the Korean currency appreciated a meager 8.7 percent against the dollar last year. He compared that appreciation with the 24.6 percent in the new Taiwan dollar and 29.8 percent in the Japanese yen.

Dallara flew into Seoul Tuesday evening for the talks with Finance Minister Sakong and Deputy Prime Minister Chong In-yong concerning pending issues, mainly the exchange rate, on his way to Taiwan.

Minister Sakong replied that the Korean government is making continuous efforts to maintain the current account surplus at the "proper" level and to correct the trade imbalance with the United States through comprehensive economic restructuring measures.

He indicated the restructuring measures to be tariffs cuts, appropriate appreciation of the Korean currency and opening of domestic markets wider.

He also explained that the won currency had appreciated 1.5 percent to 780.5 won per dollar as of yesterday this year.

He compared this figure with the 2.2 percent rise during the second half of last year, arguing that steady appreciation at this rate will result in a figure of about 16 percent for the whole year.

He also explained to Dallara that the Korean economic environment is quite different from that of other rival countries such as Taiwan, saying that Korea has earned a current account surplus only for two years and is still burdened with a huge external debt.

The country started to register a current account surplus in April, 1986, and owes \$35.5 billion in debts to foreign countries.

Meanwhile, domestic enterprises are preparing for appreciation through renovation of management structures on the assumption that the value of the U.S. dollar will reach the 690-700 won level by the end of this year.

Dallara is scheduled to go to Taiwan around the weekend for similar talks with Taiwanese government officials.

Negotiations Begin With U.S. on Beef Imports
SK040211 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English
4 Feb 88 p 6

[Text] Trade officials from Korea and the United States began negotiations in Geneva Tuesday to iron out their differences over imports of U.S. beef.

The United States is threatening to file a suit with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) charging Korea with denying market access to U.S. beef.

Ministry of Trade and Industry officials said yesterday that if the Geneva negotiations end in failure, the United States is expected to bring the beef case to the GATT to stir up international criticism of Korea's unwillingness to open its markets.

As it stands now, they said, a tug-of-war is going on over trade concessions.

If the U.S. complaint is filed, the GATT secretariat will organize a "panel" of three or four GATT member countries that have no direct interest in the bilateral beef issue.

The panel will discuss the validity of the U.S. suit and recommend possible countermeasures to a GATT council if it is deemed necessary.

Chances are that the U.S. administration will invoke Section 301 of its Trade Act after the GATT ruling comes out. The United States has urged Korea to open its market to American beef of all kinds. Korea insists that it will import high-quality U.S. beef for use only by tourist hotels after the general elections, to be held in March or April.

Meantime, Korea is set to bring the recent U.S. scrapping of GSP favors for Korea to GATT.

The U.S. government has decided to remove Korea from its GSP list effective Jan. 2 next year.

Korean officials describe the move as a symptom of rising U.S. protectionist sentiments.

"By U.S. standards," trade officials here say, "a country is automatically graduated out of GSP eligibility when its per-capita income surpasses \$8,500."

Noting that Korea is still a developing country with its per-capita GNP of less than \$1,000, they said the U.S. move is an apparent deviation from the original purpose of GSP.

The GSP program, which has 140 beneficiaries, seeks to help developing countries promote exports to the United States by allowing them certain duty-free privileges.

Letter to U.S. Ambassador Discusses Trade
SK040521 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean
4 Feb 88 p 3

["Desk Column" article by economic desk editor Choe Chun-myong: "A Letter to Ambassador Lilley"]

[Text] The Role of a Salesman [subhead]

Esteemed Ambassador James Lilley:

It was on 14 November 1986, close to the end of the year, when you arrived in Korea to assume your post as U.S. ambassador to Korea. For some time, soon after your arrival, you did not make any appearance in public gatherings. However, you appeared in succession at meetings of industrialists and businessmen beginning from February of the following year. At these meetings, you drew the attention of the Korean people by explaining the U.S. economic policy and by stating your own opinion on economic issues as a whole.

Although your speeches at those meetings, entitled "A Review of Korean-U.S. Relations" and "Korean-U.S. Economic Relations," were comprehensive ones, you discussed in considerable detail such things as "why does Korea prevent the import of American beer by building a high tariff barrier to American beer?" Also, you complained that Korea's restrictions on the import of U.S.-manufactured personal computers was unfair.

After hearing your complaints, many Koreans profoundly pondered the points you made. Many people also tried to understand the situation the United States was in. In other words, they tried to understand the extent to which the United States has accumulated trade and fiscal deficits, the so-called twin deficits, which must have goaded the U.S. ambassador to Korea to talk about soon after he arrived. After seeing you, a diplomat, go to such lengths as playing the role of a salesman regarding such particular matters as beer and computers, many people in Korea shuddered at the thought of the seriousness of the global trade war. Above all, we wondered whether our diplomats abroad were as devoted to their national interests as you appeared to be.

At any rate, in about a year since you came to Korea, you, Mr Ambassador, have witnessed the worst Korea-U.S. trade feuds since the two countries established diplomatic relations. We can easily imagine how you must have agonized over and taken trouble in defending U.S. interests and in easing trade frictions between Korea and the United States. However, in about a year since you came to Korea, the Korean people have enormously agonized over and suffered from trade feuds with the United States as in the past.

In some cases, their agony and suffering have developed to the point of terror. No wonder. As often as it could, the United States threatened to invoke Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act and not a day went by without the United States coming up with new demands.

Moreover, a U.S. company is now lobbying to join in the supply of food service on passenger planes, while the U.S. poultry industrial sector is raising voices calling on Korea to open its market.

Is Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act a Cure-All? [subhead]

News on new U.S. demands that Korea collect all American books and burn them and that an investigation should be conducted to determine whether or not the sales of Korean automobiles in the United States are a dumping act reached our ear the next day. The U.S. pressure on Korea is making it impossible to explore the sale of U.S. goods in Korea and it is making it impossible to stop worrying about the settlement of one issue because the next day the United States would come up with another demand. As a result, Korea is now filled with frustration and helplessness, with the Korean people believing that "Korea has no choice but to meet the U.S. demands in full in the end."

Many among the U.S. demands are just and fair, while some are unjust, unreasonable, and excessive. Let us leave this for a while. The continuing U.S. demands of and pressure on Korea over the past few years force us to ask a question: What is the United States to us?

The United States is a great country. Whatever people may say about it, the United States is still the strongest in the world in terms of its GNP and economic strength. On top of this, the United States maintains a powerful military. It is not because of this that the United States is considered a great nation. Its greatness, we believe, lies in that it is a country that defends freedom and democracy, the common value of mankind, and because it has the excellent self-purifying and self-healing capability with which it can keep itself healthy at all times by accommodating criticism, the preservatives of democracy, and through checks and balances. I presume that you, Mr Ambassador, would know about Prof (C. Wright Mills) who is a well-known American idealist.

In the early sixties, by publishing the book "Listen, Yankees!," he conveyed the voice of Cuba to Americans. The content of the book was the denunciation of Yankee imperialism, which made the Americans uneasy and unhappy to hear. Criticizing the United States and U.S. policies, Prof (Mills) said "Yankees, you are really unaware of the situation of the hungry nations. The story about today's Cuba will become the story about another South American country of tomorrow." Reading "Listen, Yankees!," I felt a new shock. I felt that the United States could not but remain a great country, as long as it had such an intellectual as Prof (Mills), who did not hesitate to give bitter advice and criticism for his beloved country, instead of resisting against the condemnation of "Yankee imperialism."

Nonetheless, these days, I cannot but have an impression that I hear only one American voice in the U.S. trade policy, particularly in its trade issues with the developing countries.

Gephardt, representative from Missouri, who is trying to run in the U.S. presidential election, has reportedly enhanced his popularity and become a forerunner among the seven rivals by appearing in a 1-minute television advertisement emotionally attacking the status of South Korea's market opening; in other words, by using South Korea as a scapegoat.

According to a poll of American businessmen, 70% of the respondents have reportedly suggested that "pressure for the opening of overseas markets," should be used as a means to reduce the U.S. trade deficit.

Persistence in the Logic of the Strong [subhead]

There is concern that the United States, the richest country in the world, may become the No 1 debtor nation in the world. So, Koreans understand the desperate efforts of the United States such as the pressure for the opening of overseas markets, which is designed to reduce its financial and trade deficits. This is because Korea itself has long remained as a heavy debtor. However, Korea has neither faced a moratorium nor lost its overseas credibility. It has continued to steadily pay its debts with interests, to its creditors, most of which are

American banks. Korea has now come to have a surplus in its international balance of payments and, as a result, has reached a stage where it can assume its duties and responsibilities in the international community. It has also become a society mature enough to know that trade should be conducted reciprocally.

It understands what the United States desires, and is making preparations to accommodate it. Nonetheless, there are many things which ceaseless pressure or demands alone cannot settle. Under these circumstances, I think it is not the storm of pressure but the warm sunshine that undresses the overcoat.

We will not respond emotionally to the United States for complaining of its trade deficit with Korea, though we did not complain over our deficit with the United States in the past. For our national interests, both sides should work with heart-warming efforts but we know it is desirable to have cool-headedness for mutual business. I hope that Koreans will not come to have an impression that the United States doggedly persists in the logic of the strong and seeks an emotional countermeasure. Korea knows that it should cherish and understand the United States, and that trade should be conducted reciprocally.

I wish you good luck.

Commission To Study Trade With Bloc Countries
SK031258 Seoul YONHAP in English
1252 GMT 3 Feb 88

[Text] Seoul, Feb. 3 (YONHAP)—A special trade commission which will study ways to promote economic exchanges with communist countries will be established in April this year, officials at the Korea Foreign Trade Association said Wednesday.

People from the academic circle, journalism and business world across the nation will participate in the commission, association officials said.

Hungary and South Korea have recently set up trade offices in the other country, respectively, and it was the first time that South Korea has ever changed trade offices with a communist country.

The 50-member commission will include scholars studying communist world affairs, journalists, and businessmen who have traded with communist nations.

The commission will have four sessions a year to discuss ways to gather and analyze information about trade exchanges with China, the Soviet Union, and Eastern European nations and to promote trade with those countries.

The commission will also make recommendations to the government for its support for private businesses trading with the communist world.

Talks on Meeting Japanese Foreign Minister
SK031253 Seoul YONHAP in English
1245 GMT 3 Feb 88

[Text] Seoul, Feb. 3 (YONHAP)—With the inauguration of a new Korean Government scheduled later this month, South Korean and Japanese officials are under negotiations for an earlier opening of the annual binational foreign ministers' meeting, a source at the Korean Foreign Ministry said Wednesday.

The third regular foreign ministers' meeting, which will follow the summit talks between heads of state of the two countries, is expected to be held around March 20 or in April at the latest, the source said, adding that Japan has offered to hold the meeting at an early date.

No Tae-u is scheduled to take office on Feb. 25 as the 13th president of South Korea, succeeding incumbent President Chon Tu-hwan.

The source said the place of meeting is yet to be decided on.

If the foreign ministers' meeting takes place in Seoul, according to the source, the 15th annual meeting of the two countries' cabinet members would be held in Tokyo.

In the meeting, foreign ministers of the two countries are expected to focus on future direction of the bilateral relationship following the inauguration of new governments of the two countries.

Other major agenda items of the meeting will be a mid- and long-term ranged plan to improve Seoul's chronic deficits in trade with Tokyo and bilateral cooperation in diplomatic sanctions against Pyongyang in connection with North Korea's bombing blast of a South Korean jetliner last November near Burma.

Interview With President-elect No Tae-u
SK031101 Seoul WOLGAN CHOSON in Korean
1 Feb 88 pp 142-157

[Interview with President-elect No Tae-u by Yu Chong-hyon, director of the WOLGAN CHOSON Department of CHOSON ILBO, at the DJP presidential office in Seoul on 16 January] [Text] Solving the Aftermath of the Election from the Viewpoint of Reconciliation [subhead]

An interview with President-Elect No Tae-u was finally held on 16 January shortly before the time limit for copies after repeated postponement due to his busy schedule. Coincidentally, it was the day when talks between President-elect No and New Democratic Republican Party [NDRP] President Kim Chong-pil were scheduled to be held. As usual, he was busy with his tight schedule.

At 11 am, an hour before the talks with President Kim, I met President-elect No at the DJP presidential office on the fifth floor of the DJP headquarters. President-elect No was talking with lawmaker Chae Mun-sik, the new DJP chairman, when I visited his office. Upon receiving congratulations on his victory in the election, he said "I will do my best."

[Yu Chong-hyon] It seems that your activities since the end of the election, which have been reported by newspapers and broadcasters, are very affirmatively accessible to the people. Many people show favorable feelings toward you, saying with expectation that "now it appears that genuine democracy is being practiced." Just as some people make blunders in a "real game" though they have done well during "rehearsals"; however, we are worried about whether you will manage state affairs well after inauguration.

[No Tae-u] What I think at this moment is that because I have many competent people, I will work hard with their assistance. I hope the press will also give me good advice.

[Yu] Almost 10 minutes passed while we talked about the bombing of the Korean Airliner, of which the investigation results were announced on the previous day. President-elect No had to leave for the National Assembly building in order to arrive there on time for the scheduled talks. Because of insufficient time, I had no other way but to conduct a written interview.

The following are the contents of the written interview with him:

[Yu] There were more than just a few aftereffects of the election because it was the first held under the direct presidential election system in 16 years. Are you mapping out any concrete measures to remedy the aftereffects of the direct election, such as aggravated regionalism, and develop the country into a democratic society?

[No] I think it regrettable that the election, which should have served as a forum for national concord, seemed to result in causing national discord and expanding conflict. However, this conflict must be overcome without fail and the aftereffects of the election must be remedied as early as possible. Only then will it be feasible to develop the nation into a society of national reconciliation, which all people desire, and to usher in an advanced country. Because I was solicitous over this situation after the election and I deeply thought of the future of the country, I made public, at the final stage of the election campaign, the "conception for a new era of democratic reconciliation" designed to achieve democratic development and national harmony. According to this commitment, I hurriedly accelerated preparations to achieve this goal shortly after the election and launched the "Council for Promoting Democracy and Reconciliation [CPDR]" which includes representatives of all walks of life.

I expect the CPDR to present good solutions by freely and broadly discussing and studying all pending issues—such as democratic development, national reconciliation, and social reforms—reflecting public opinion. I intend to actively accept and realize all opinions and advice to be presented by the CPDR to seek to develop the country into a mature democratic society.

Democratization of Power Is an Important Key [sub-head]

[Yu] Will you talk about the basic direction of the management of state affairs? Many people still doubt the will to realize the 29 June declaration.

[No] I intend to pool all forces and opinions to firmly embody and sincerely realize national reconciliation. It is believed that only then can localism be alleviated, the emotional knot of the Kwangju incident be disentangled, and conflict between strata and between generations be mitigated. To this end, the CPDR will indicate the basic direction for the management of state affairs, which a new republic will seek, and present tasks it should discharge by gathering public opinion from all walks of life. I intend to reflect views and ways to be presented by the council and and to carry them into practice on a step-by-step basis. Along with this, I am steadily realizing the 29 June declaration. If there is anything that has been insufficiently carried into effect, I will supplement it and double efforts to realize the declaration even by accepting the demands of the opposition parties.

[Yu] Would you discuss the basic direction for the promotion of democratization?

[No] First of all, I think it very significant that CHOSON ILBO has put forth a "society led by democratic citizens" as this year's theme. I remember that I attentively read its New Year editorial entitled "When Citizens Are Democratized, Power Practices Democracy" and particularly, the phrase reading "democracy is not something like benefaction, but should be achieved by citizens for themselves." That is true. The essence of democratization is "democratization of power" and "democratization of citizens"—an important key to the political development of the country. Therefore, I plan to dynamically push ahead with eradicating authoritarianism and decentralizing power. Also, I intend to embody the "politics of coexistence" by scratching off the logic of monopoly and by managing state affairs in a suprapartisan way. Along with this, I will voluntarily play the role of a bridge leading to civilian politics, realize it, and actively develop the party into a democratic party. At the same time, I will expand the scope of the people's political participation by enforcing the local autonomy system for their democratization and increase their democratic capabilities by securing their rights. Furthermore, I will make efforts to create social circumstances and conditions, in which the people can display the

consciousness of being masters by fulfilling their duties and by exercising their rights, through reliably guaranteeing the rights of individual citizens and promoting basic human rights.

Listening to Those Involved in the Kwangju Incident
[subhead]

[Yu] In my view President-elect No should preferentially solve the problem concerning the Kwangju incident. Would you discuss ways to solve the problem?

[No] As I have mentioned on many occasions, the Kwangju incident is the great pain of our people as well as of Kwangju citizens. I believe that the problem should be solved from the viewpoint of pardoning and reconciling with each other. When the CPDR presents concrete ways for solving the problem by collecting opinions from those directly involved in the incident, Kwangju citizens, and people of all walks of life, I will follow and carry them into practice. Since those directly involved in the Kwangju incident are also taking part in the council, I expect that good ways reflecting their opinions will be explored.

[Yu] In addition, there are some people who do not believe that the truth of the 12 December incident has been completely brought to light. In particular, the opposition parties demanded during the election campaign period and have demanded since then that there must be a manifest clarification of the truth of the 12 December incident. Can't you reveal the truth of the 12 December incident before the people for an accurate historical record?

[No] As far as that question is concerned, everything was clarified at a "panel discussion at the Kwanhun Club" on 12 November. I believe that history will ultimately evaluate it. "Big Brother" Policy Will Be Implemented Toward North Korea [subhead]

[Yu] You, President-elect No, many times during your election campaign expressed the intention to reinvestigate the suspicious incidents and irregularities of the Fifth Republic. How are you going to deal with suspicious incidents and irregularities of the Fifth Republic including the incidents of Chang Yong-cha-Yi Chol, the Pomyang Shipping Company, and the operation of the Headquarters of the Saemaoul Movement? Do you intend to investigate the figures close to President Chon Tu-hwan and his relatives? What cases do you think are worth investigation?

[No] I think that the investigation should be conducted again if new facts in the so-called large-scale incidents of the past are found.

[Yu] Do you have any plan to make public the data and material of the investigations of irregularities committed during the Fifth Republic?

[No] I think that the detailed contents have already been made known to the world through various mass media in the past. In any event, I have no intention of concealing the truth.

[Yu] Please tell us about the basic direction in foreign policy, in particular, the North-South issues and northward diplomacy.

[No] Before answering these questions, I would like to point out that we should now change our consciousness of international politics and external relations. Today our Republic of Korea is no longer a desolate state which is being dragged in here and there by neighboring countries or big powers. Our country is now taking its root as one of the central states in the international community. I think we should now become a good member of the international community while maintaining an "open democracy." Based on this, we should deepen the existing friendship and cooperative relations with our allies including the United States and Japan. However, we should broaden the scale of understanding and cooperation with unity based on equal positions and stances.

We should also implement the policy toward North Korea and the issue of reunification positively and in a forward-moving manner. Thus, I think that I might as well apply the "big brother policy" that West Germany is implementing toward East Germany to our own situation. We may take the attitude of accepting and tolerating the minor problems committed by North Korea while teaching it strictly what is necessary even to the point of moving it to tears.

Proceeding from this stance, I will positively push ahead with national reunification by resuming the North-South dialogue based on the principles of peace, democracy, and independence. I will create the foundation for peaceful reunification without fail during my term of office. I believe that the direction of North-South dialogue and reunification policy which we should implement is to actively push ahead with mutual exchanges between the North and the South based on the success of the Seoul Olympics, on national strength superior to that of the North, and on a sense of confidence.

The next task is to relax tension on the Korean peninsula and to attain durable peace by concluding a "provisional agreement on the basic relations between the North and the South" including a nonaggression agreement. I will strive to expand the exchanges and cooperation between the North and the South in all the economic, social, cultural, sports, science, technological, educational, and art domains and to form and operate a common body for North-South cooperation by regularly holding North-South cabinet meetings. Thus, I will expand peaceful exchanges and cooperation between North and South Korea.

I think that a unified democratic republic should be established in accordance with a unified constitution formulated on the basis of the fair, free, and democratic will of the citizens of the North and the South and on the homogeneous nature of the people recovered through mutual trust and cooperation.

I will exert all my efforts to achieve the peaceful reunification of the nation. I intend to develop and supplement the measures for reunification according to the advice of the experts in this field and according to the common will of the people.

In the meantime, the policy toward the North that I will pursue can be summarized in three stages. In the first stage, we will promote exchanges in such nonpolitical and noneconomic fields as culture and sports; in the second, we will increase economic exchange and cooperation; and in the third, we will establish political and diplomatic relations. In this way, I believe we can ultimately establish friendly and neighborly relations not only with the Soviet Union and Communist China, but also with East European countries. I am also convinced that the Seoul Olympics scheduled for this year will bring to flower our diplomatic efforts in various forms that we have exerted with regard to the communist bloc and it will also create a significant turning point in our policy toward the North.

Security-related Issues Should be Tackled with Suprapartisan Efforts [subhead]

[Yu] Would you please tell us your idea about improving relations with Communist China and economic cooperation?

[No] In a geopolitical and historical point of view, nobody can deny the fact that our country has a very close relationship with the PRC [as published]. In addition, we have had experiences of having successfully settled various negotiations, large and small, with the PRC, including economic and sports exchanges. This being the case, if our two countries begin exchanges in sectors that merit mutual cooperation, on a routine basis, I believe that relations between the two countries can be improved faster than expected. At any rate, after the Seoul Olympics the issue of normalizing relations between the two countries will emerge as something natural and I am convinced that it will result in creating something good for both sides, whatever form it may take. However, since diplomatic relations are conditioned on the two sides, they must be promoted deliberately and reasonably after taking into consideration all factors and, therefore, it is imperative not to jump to rash conclusions.

[Yu] According to a poll, what our people fear most is an extreme standoff between the rival parties. Many say that the opposition's extreme form of struggle should be discontinued along with the ruling party's political

maneuvering style based on a combat conception. Could you outline what you would do to turn relations between the rival parties into favorable ones?

[No] It is true that to date the relations between the rival parties have been, from start to finish, driven by struggle and standoff, an expression of an "all or nothing" perception. Now, I think, is the time when the rival parties should open a new horizon for their mutual relations to stay in step with the dictates of the times—democracy and reconciliation. The rival parties should redefine their relationship to make it a relationship of good natured competition and a genuine partnership needed to discuss state affairs rather than the relationship of struggle and standoff. Only in this way can political stability, something that is crucial to national development, be achieved.

I will do my best to create an epochal change in relations between the rival parties. In particular, I intend to see to it that the opposition leaders are often briefed on such things as national security, diplomatic developments, and other state affairs. I also intend to have a large number of opposition leaders participate in the meeting of the senior statesmen's advisory council so that they can make their good opinions available, making efforts to reflect their opinions in running state affairs by meeting with them as often as possible. I find it desirable to continue discussing with them suprapartisan measures concerning the Olympics and national security affairs.

[Yu] Do you have a comment on what must be done to establish a desirable relationship between the National Assembly and the government in the era of moving toward democratization and to render the National Assembly more active in order to realize this goal?

[No] The new Constitution has substantially strengthened the power of the National Assembly by stripping the president of his right to dissolve the National Assembly and by keeping the National Assembly's right to impeach cabinet ministers in place. I believe that making parliamentary democracy become stable by enlivening party politics is a short cut to embodying a new era of democratic development and new politics. So, I plan to run state affairs based on the principle of checks and balances in a way that keeps relations between the administration and the National Assembly moving smoothly. Moreover, since I had earlier promised that I would play the role of a stepping stone toward a civilian-run government, I will respect the National Assembly, the forum of the people. I also plan to listen to public voices and make my opinion understood at the National Assembly as often as possible.

[Yu] Would you discuss your plan to set relations with the opposition parties? Some people say that you can hold party membership, but you should transfer the party presidency to another person and coordinate state affairs from an unbiased standpoint.

[No] It should be understood that the question of managing overall state affairs in a suprapartisan manner, which I have emphasized, is different from the question of whether I hold the presidency of the ruling party or not. I am of the opinion that suprapartisan management of state affairs can be embodied through the eradication of authoritarianism, the decentralization of power, the recruitment of capable men, the reestablishment of partnership and good natured rivalry between the ruling and opposition parties while realizing the opposition parties' participation in managing state affairs, and the promotion of autonomy in all social fields. Because I have entrusted the new chairman of our party with party affairs and other political affairs, I am convinced that he will take the initiative to lead the work of attaining victory in the forthcoming 13th general elections and discharging important tasks for intraparty democratization and national reconciliation.

[Yu] Will you permit cross voting and other autonomous judgments by the ruling party's lawmakers?

[No] As I have told you, I have left the authority and responsibility for dealing with general political affairs, including party affairs, to our party's new chairman. In particular, I have asked him to make efforts to manage party affairs so that the party can be enhanced and intraparty democracy can be vitalized. Therefore, I expect that the question of cross voting will be solved by pooling the general opinions of our party's lawmakers.

Constant Adherence to the 29 June Declaration [sub-head]

[Yu] Some people contend that the right to nominate parliamentary candidates should be exercised in a democratic way as intraparty democratization proceeds, not in a way where those in the upper echelons exclusively decide nominees. How will you exercise the right of nomination? Would you discuss the rumor about President Chon Tu-hwan's involvement in nominating parliamentary candidates?

[No] To prepare for the 13th general elections, our party has openly received applications for candidacy. Therefore, the party's candidacy screening committee will examine applications in accordance with the most fair and objective criteria and procedures without any interference, while watching progress in negotiations over the election law, and then decide our party's candidates. Along with efforts to enforce the free competition system, the nomination system will be improved and supplemented for the democratization of the party.

[Yu] Would you discuss the criteria that will affect nominating military retirees? There is a possibility that if those figures who are fingered as politics-oriented soldiers or as chief culprits of military rebellions by the

RDP and the PPD [Party for Peace and Democracy] are nominated as parliamentary candidates, arguments over the extension of the military rule will follow. Would you discuss this question?

[No] Our party's nomination of candidates will be conducted under fair criteria and procedures that everyone can accept. In particular, our party will fill, reinvigorate, and strengthen the party with younger persons and show its different traits by initiating fresh and capable figures who are able to actively realize the will of a new era of democracy and reconciliation and to speak for the people's interests and opinions in stride with them.

[Yu] The opposition parties contended that the television stations perpetrated fundamental election frauds through their "biased news reports in terms of content." Do you have any way to make television, which most greatly affects modern election campaigns, neutral in the forthcoming parliamentary elections?

[No] In what election campaigns in the past were opposition forces able to show up on television screens and indiscriminately attack the ruling party and make personal invectives using crude terms? I will continue to adhere to the spirit of the 29 June declaration clarifying that "The government cannot grasp the press nor should it try to do." If there still exists any device or practice for interference and regulation that runs counter to unbiased news reporting in the mass media, I will obviously rectify it. I believe that prior to improving and supplementing the system, those involved in the mass media will autonomously make efforts to enjoy trust and love among the people.

[Yu] Would you discuss what steps you will take if the DJP fails to obtain the majority of assembly seats?

[No] I think that even under the presidential constitutional system, the effective politics of democracy and harmony can be faithfully practised through the assembly, the main stage of politics, only when the ruling party secures a stable number of floor seats. I am convinced that the people's aspirations for achieving the genuine democratic development of the country through the embodiment of parliamentary democracy along with the vitalization of party-oriented politics will be realized through the people's wise judgment.

Electing 1-4 Lawmakers in One Constituency and Holding Elections in February Are the DJP's Formula [sub-head]

[Yu] Would you discuss your views on the question concerning electoral districts and the timing of the general elections?

[No] Since the parliamentary election law is a basis for realizing new politics in a new era, I think it a principle that as in negotiations over constitutional revision, the matters concerning electoral constituencies, the timing

of the elections, and the number of lawmakers should be solved by agreement between the ruling and opposition parties. To this end, I intend to fully follow the decisions agreed upon between the representatives of the ruling and opposition parties at their formal negotiations through multifaceted channels. I expect that if the ruling and opposition parties wholeheartedly discuss the pending issue with the national viewpoint in mind, transcending differences in any individual and factional interests, concrete progress will be made sooner or later. In connection with the timing of the general elections, I think it desirable to hold them in the middle of February because forming a new National Assembly before a new government is inaugurated is a reasonable order and the people's wish. Since electing 1-4 lawmakers in one constituency makes sense in view of the present political situation, we adopt this as our party's formula.

[Yu] What do you think of the historical significance of the forthcoming 13th parliamentary election?

[No] I think that the result of the presidential election was the wise judgment and determination of the people who chose "development of the country without chaos" and "reform amid stability," and the forthcoming 13th general elections will be of significance in that on this basis, the spirit of a new era—democracy and reconciliation—will be further solidified through parliamentary politics. I expect the people to enable our party to surely secure a stable majority of floor seats so that it can dynamically push ahead with democratization and the prosperity of the fatherland.

[Yu] It is judged that with the last presidential election as an occasion, our country has now reached the stage where it should unfold a new political culture. Would you discuss what plan, if any, you have to render political assistance to create a new political culture concerning the organization of political parties, political funds, and the freedom of activities of political parties?

[No] I believe that the vitalization of party-based politics is the outset and precondition of parliamentary politics. Proceeding from this view, I stressed, in the 29 June declaration, that "a new political atmosphere of dialogue and compromise should be created along with guaranteeing the sound activities of political parties." Therefore, political parties should be democratic organizations that formulate and reflect the people's political views by presenting responsible assertions for the people's welfare and by pushing ahead with them. As long as political parties conduct sound activities that do not run counter to this principle, the state will do its best to protect and develop them. I think that if there are any matters for discussion and consultation, the ruling and opposition parties can discuss them and find good systems and methods through negotiations.

[Yu] People expect that the new government will be different from the Fifth Republic in various ways. They are particularly interested in the plan you might have in

mind concerning the selection of people to appoint to cabinet posts such as prime minister. What qualifications do you have in mind for selecting the prime minister? And what kind of people will you select as cabinet ministers?

[No] First of all, let me emphasize once again that I will rule out anything that might be interpreted as being impartial and unfair when it comes to selecting the prime minister or cabinet ministers. In other words, I am clearly against selecting people on the basis of their personal connections or circumstances. So, my plan is to boldly select people from all sectors of society, taking into consideration their ability and the trust people have in them, casting aside such things as political parties, provinces, sexes, and generations. I believe there are many yardsticks in our society to measure ability and the public trust people enjoy. In this context, is the mass media not a wonderful yardstick? I would like you to introduce and recommend wonderful people. If they are in fact wonderful people, I will not hesitate visiting them as many times as necessary until they are persuaded.

[Yu] Are you not inclined to drastically expand the prime minister's power by delegating a large part of your authority to him and by lightening your own heavy workload? If you are, please tell us your views on this.

[No] The president, I believe, should go deeper among the people to understand what they want and to reflect their opinion in running state affairs without distortion. This is why I promised that I would play the role of a mobile Chongwadae. Toward this end, I plan to see to it that the offices of the prime minister and cabinet ministers fulfill their functions and allow the cabinet to carry out the general affairs of state as much as possible in order to heighten the effectiveness of the administration. How to do this is being mapped out by a committee formed to prepare for the presidential inauguration.

[Yu] Would you please tell us how you will run the office of secretaries to the president and what particular plan you might have to keep the so-called human wall from being formed around the president?

[No] Given the intrinsic character of a government led by a president, it is undeniable that to date Chongwadae has appeared to have run every single aspect of the affairs of state. However, from now on the function of the office of secretaries to the president should be confined only to correctly grasping public opinion and to faithfully communicating voices from below to the president—the role of a channel of public opinion. By charging the prime minister and cabinet ministers with a larger part of authority and responsibility for the general affairs of state, I think I can devote myself to charting a correct political course for such important state affairs as national reconciliation. I will do this by going deeper among the people to listen to their unfiltered opinion. Therefore, I would allow a human wall made up of common people to surround me, not the one that is

made up of a few trusted people. I will try to keep away from such things as self-righteousness and egotism or being unfair in formulating major policies.

[Yu] In addition, you, President-elect No, gave a promised that you would keep Chongwadae open to the public. Do you mean to allow common people free entrance into Chongwadae? Also, do you have a detailed plan to allow the common people to meet you, that is, as president, person to person?

[No] Do you still doubt my promises? I intend to be faithful not only to this promise, but also to all the other promises I have made. I will see to it that the promises I have made are translated into action without a hitch. Toward this, I will exert efforts to see whether they are carried out without any hitch with a check list.

[Yu] During the election campaign, you said that you would reduce the functions of such national security institutions as the Agency for National Security Planning and Defense Security Command and make them return to their normal duty. Some people even say that these intelligence offices should be deprived of their right to investigate. Could you please tell us what you will do concerning the reorganization of these security offices and in what way you will change and readjust the relations between the police and the prosecutor's office and their respective functions?

[No] We are studying ways to reorganize their functions and mutual working relationship in line with the reform of the administration and social reforms in a desirable way;

[Yu] The combat policemen who disappeared for a while following your 29 June declaration have now furtively returned to the streets. Given its chief mission, that is to say, putting down demonstrations, if the new government still retains combat police, it would be a disservice, in many ways, to its claim that it will promote great national reconciliation. Do you plan to keep the combat police in place?

[No] As students, workers, and combat policemen are all young men and our contemporaries, seeing each group chase and being chased by the other pains our hearts. Never again should such a thing be allowed to occur. I will exert efforts to prevent the young men from suffering or being sacrificed by tenaciously promoting democracy and public welfare and by steadily redressing problems and contradictory aspects of our society. When this happens, the government's ability to maintain law and order in society will be enhanced in a way that keeps society in order and guarantees stability for the common people and this in turn will provide peaceful living for all the people.

[Yu] Tell us what approach do you have to remove regional animosity.

[No] Many people saw the regional strife grow unprecedently through the recent presidential election and they are seriously concerned about it. We should crush open the old shell called regional animosity, at all costs and without fail. At this juncture when our country is just a few steps away from entering the ranks of the advanced countries and when our country is scheduled to host the Olympics, the peace festival of mankind, it is one of the things we have to eliminate without fail. Viewed in this light, putting into practice autonomous local government is one of the best ways to solve it. At the same time, it is necessary to be fair in personnel management in a way that does not favor people hailing from certain provinces and to promote balanced regional development, including the effort to narrow the gap between urban and rural communities. This, too, is one of the issues that the CPDR is assigned to handle and I am convinced that the committee will come up with a good solution to it. I will do my best to put it into practice. I also find the idea of moving some government offices to local cities worthwhile in that it will help curb the monstrous growth of the metropolitan city, evenly scatter the population, and develop the national territory in a balanced way.

[Yu] The autonomous local government has long been discussed. We believe that the autonomous local government will be put into practice before too long. We also understand that the heads of the autonomous local governments, including the mayors of Seoul and Pusan, will have to be chosen by direct vote. When do you think the autonomous local government system, with the heads of such autonomous local governments elected by direct vote, will be completely put into practice?

[No] Power should be decentralized in terms of functions as well as in terms of regions. In other words, it can be achieved only through practicing autonomous local government. In order to effectively run the autonomous local government system, I will see to it that the mayors of Seoul and other cities as well as the governors of provinces are elected by direct vote during my term of office. When the new National Assembly is formed, the rival parties will start negotiations over it.

[Yu] What method do you have to deal with left-leaning procommunist forces?

[No] I will boldly accommodate even progressive and radical calls and ideas in response to the spirit of the times, democracy, and national reconciliation, while placing a premium on healing the general political and social problems as well as on improving political and social conditions based on such a principle. Also, I will first try to reason with the left-leaning violence-oriented revolutionary forces bent on negating and subverting liberal democracy, the framework of our community, based on the spirit of dialogue and generosity. If they still remain the same without showing any change in their

stand, I make it clear that I will sternly deal with them according to the opinion of the people who hope for social stability and who aspire to defend and develop the liberal democratic system.

[Yu] Some members of the public hold the opinion that in order to accept into the political sphere the trend of socialism, which has tended to win considerable support from our young people, it is desirable to allow the advent of ideological political parties. Please comment on this.

[No] I think that in order to settle the structural contradictions and problems existing in a diversified and pluralistic industrial society, all progressive views and assertions with a new outlook on the world should be accommodated into the political establishments. I have emphasized many times that if progressive political parties which seek such a progressive ideology appear in our society, I will not spare assistance for them. However, my opinion is that the problem of such progressive forces should be settled through the advent of new progressive political parties or through the reorganization of the present opposition camp. However, there should be some discrimination between such progressive forces and the leftist forces which seek violence and revolutionary logic under all circumstances.

[Yu] There has been an assertion in our political circles that in order to allow political parties seeking socialist democracy to be active in political circles, the National Security Law and the Social Security Law should be revised or abolished. Please comment on this.

[No] During the presidential election campaign last December, an opposition presidential candidate, calling for the establishment of a democratic government, asserted that he would defend the interests of specific classes. However, there has been no change in my opinion that all progressive voices, regardless of whether they seek democratic socialism or socialist democracy, should be accommodated in the current political establishments, if they respect the principles of parliamentary democracy. However, considering our reality of national division, which is different from the situation of other countries, I think it is not desirable to abolish the National Security Law, which is a minimum device to defend "myself and ourselves" and "our society and country." If elements infringing upon the basic rights of the citizens and their freedom and dignity are found in the Social Security Law, I think it is possible to revise the law through discussions between the ruling and opposition parties and based on recommendations from the human rights organizations, including the Korean Lawyers' Association.

[Yu] As for the Social Security Law, there have been strong voices asserting that the law is not only against the spirit of the Constitution, but also damages the dignity of the constitutional state. Do you see any possibility of revising or abolishing the law?

[No] The new Constitution has emphasized more thoroughly than ever before the basic rights of individuals, including the freedom of the physical body of an individual, by reflecting the agreement reached between the ruling and opposition parties when the law was revised. Therefore, if such laws or systems which run counter to the provisions of the basic rights stipulated in the new Constitution are found, they should be rectified for the embodiment of the dignity of the constitutional state and for the thorough guarantee of human rights.

[Yu] Would you tell me about your plan, if any, to prevent the military from intervening in politics?

[No] Political intervention by the military is an unfortunate situation in a democratic country. Politics should be entrusted to politicians. This is my firm conviction.

In particular, at a time when our society, a diversified and internationalized society, is now looking forward to an advanced, democratic industrial society, the duty of the military is to defend the country, and politics should be entrusted to politicians. Therefore, the only way of preventing the military from intervening in politics is for our political leaders, including myself, to make efforts to ensure correct and clean politics with a strong sense of responsibility. By so doing our politicians can thoroughly prevent in advance social chaos, the division of national consensus, and other factors that may invite the military's intervention in politics. This is, I think, precisely the way for the achievement of the military's political neutrality and a democratic, civilian government. I myself will do my best for this and, at the same time, I, as a man well aware of the military, will make all possible efforts to foster and develop our Army, the Army of our people.

[Yun] Do you have any idea of filling the post of defense minister with a civilian, and not with a former military man?

[No] The basic principle of my personnel management policy is to appoint anyone who has ability and is competent in that field and who enjoys the confidence of the people, regardless of whether he is a civilian or a former military man. However, taking into consideration our specific national security, I think the defense minister should be a man who possesses special knowledge and rich experience in that post, because otherwise he cannot properly carry out the mission of defense minister. However, as I have mentioned, any person who possesses these requirements can be appointed defense minister, regardless of whether he is a civilian or a former military man.

[Yu] Some people say that there is a private organization in our military that has reportedly tended to make the military politically oriented, in violation of military discipline. If this is true, what steps will you take?

[No] There is no private organization in the military. There should not be such an organization in the military. The *raison d'être* of the military lies in its defense of our country and protection of our free democratic system. The military exists for this purpose. Along with this, the military should not forget its duty.

[Yu] Many people say that the posting of former military men in government offices, business enterprises, and state-run firms has tended to lower the morale of civilian experts in these organs. How will you rectify this problem in the future?

[No] I have volunteered to become the stepping-stone on the road toward building a civilian, democratic society. As we cross the stepping-stones one by one, the destination toward which we are advancing comes nearer. We will liquidate all sorts of authoritarianism through reforms in the upper echelons and through the accommodation of all public opinions from the lower echelons. We will make all efforts to improve, rectify, or eliminate all problems which arise in the implementation of our policies by attaching greater importance to the process of policies, rather than their goals and results. We will make greater efforts so that autonomy can be guaranteed in every field of society. We will also make efforts to give the people hope and expectations for the future.

[Yu] How will you maintain, in the future, relations with President Chon Tu-hwan who will retire soon?

[No] I am going to receive much advice from him, as he is someone who has had many and rich experiences in running the broad-ranging affairs of state and has registered many achievements therefrom. The new Constitution also stipulates that the outgoing president becomes chairman of the Elder Statesmen's Advisory Council. I expect much advice from him.

No Urges Revision of Laws Hampering Democracy
SK040249 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English
4 Feb 88 p 2

[Text] President-elect No Tae-u yesterday ordered statutes and ordinances hampering democratic progress to be rewritten at an early date.

After receiving a briefing from the prime minister's office, No said new laws required to enforce the new Constitution should be enacted at an early date.

Legislative steps should be taken to implement his presidential election campaign promises, No said.

Ministries and other government offices concerned are asked to cooperate closely in drafting new laws and revisions to existing ones, he said.

The president-elect ordered the prime minister's office to study ways to effectively operate cabinet conferences and report the study's outcome.

Security, economic and social issues can be separated for discussion by ministers concerned prior to their review by the whole cabinet, No suggested.

The prime minister's office was also told to study what subjects deserve discussion at cabinet conferences presided over by the president.

Cabinet conferences should be made a more democratic forum where all cabinet members can freely express their opinions on state affairs, No said.

He told the prime minister's office to develop policy on youth and women, and work out measures for traffic safety.

Yi Kyu-song, director for administrative coordination at the prime minister's office, said drunken and reckless drivers will be punished severely.

He also said the government will improve public transportation.

Election Law Talks May End by Unilateral Vote
SK040233 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
4 Feb 88 p 1

[Text] The stop-and-go interpartisan talks on a new parliamentary election law hardly will be able to produce a unified bill and the revision issue is most likely to be settled by vote.

Rival parties resumed bipartisan negotiations yesterday but the opposition would not move closer to a compromise.

Kim Yong-sam's Reunification Democratic Party and Kim Chong-pil's New Democratic Republican Party [NDRP] called for a further slash in the number of small constituencies electing one lawmaker from each district.

The Party for Peace and Democracy [PPD], led by Kim Tae-chung, appeared more adamant for its preference of a wholly small-district formula following the joining of 97 dissidents Tuesday.

The ruling Democratic Justice Party termed it a "final bid" in reducing the number of small electoral zones by 30 to about 131 and increasing medium-sized districts to 70.

Yet it is highly possible to raise the number of medium-scale districts to 100, just 10 less than that of small constituencies, in the coming talks this weekend, DJP insiders said.

If the unique DJP idea, a mixture of small and medium districts, is rejected by the RDP and the NDRP, the government party will take the alternative of a pure small district system and refer it to a plenary parliamentary session, to open Wednesday.

DJP secretary general Sim Myong-bo, who acts as chief negotiator, renewed a long-held party stand to put the tough revision issue through the National Assembly in a unilateral vote.

He strongly hinted that in that case the last card would be a small district formula in an attempt to decrease backwash of the railroading of the bill.

RDP, PPD Ideological Dispute Seen Emerging
SK040129 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
4 Feb 88 pp 1, 2

[By staff reporter Yi Chang-sop]

[Text] An ideological dispute is emerging between the two rival opposition groups as the Party for Peace and Democracy [PPD] adds a progressive touch to its professed moderate reformist line with the recruiting of 97 dissidents yesterday.

PPD president Kim Tae-chung emphasized that the joining of the extraparlimentary figures will have no effect on the moderate reformist line the party has been pursuing but the backgrounds of the new entrants are painted in a somewhat different color.

Kim Yong-sam's Reunification Democratic Party alleged that the PPD has changed its political color as the new entrants were assured of a "50 percent share" in the party.

The spokesman for the RDP said yesterday that opposition integration is an all-but-hopeless cause now that Kim Tae-chung has exposed his true political colors.

Indications are that the rival opposition parties—the RDP and the PPD—are likely to embroil themselves in a round of futile ideological controversy just before the general elections.

The PPD president stressed that the dissident politicians, most of whom stood in the vanguard of the democratization movement in the 1970s and 1980s, are seeking to make the PPD a policy-oriented national party commanding the wide support of the people.

He tried hard to deny speculation that the PPD is transforming itself into a radical reformist group by accommodating progressive dissidents.

Kim compared the policy line of his party with that of the Democratic Party in the United States.

He said U.S. Democrats advocate the promotion of the interests of labor organizations, blacks, the urban poor, and the progressive middle class.

Like the U.S. Democrats, the PPD will promote the interests of workers, farmers, the alienated and the progressive middle class, the PPD president added.

To downplay public interest in and worry over a possible PPD tilt toward a radical reformist line, Kim emphasized that his party is a staunch advocate of the free market economic system, anti-Communism and social stability.

He explained that the PPD is broadening the gamut of interest groups in the party by absorbing reform-minded progressives into it.

The 97 new entrants consist of professors, lawyers, human rights activists, dismissed student leaders, representatives of the urban poor, farmers and workers.

The RDP termed them radical reformists who do not represent true dissident groups in Korea.

Kim Tae-chung countered the allegation by saying that those democratic dissidents joined the party because they followed the policy line of the party, and were not attempting to make drastic changes in the party line.

Most PPD seniors and members hailed their entry, saying that they should serve to give great momentum to the refurbishment of the image of the party now in confusion. But they are worried that the new entrants may seek too much change in the party in too short a time.

It is the first time in the history of Korean politics for an opposition party to join hands with figures advocating a progressive line en masse.

PPD insiders hope that the progressive nature of the dissidents will be tamed into the moderate reformist line the PPD has been espousing.

However, there is also fear that the moderate reformists may be outranked by the progressive in the future.

At an initial stage, progressive dissidents and conservative PPD members are likely to clash from time to time in the course of decision-making;

Thus, Kim Tae-chung's prime task will be coordinating the opinions of the two political factions in the party, observers said.

They said as a coordinator, Kim must maintain strong leadership and guardianship.

Kim also charted a new course for his own political career and his two-and-half month old party by adopting a collective leadership.

His switch to the group leadership is seen as an attempt to save himself from internal and external pressures to retire and to bolster his embittered party.

Under collective leadership, Kim is certain to become the chief representative of the seven-member decision-making body. The top decision-making body will consist of Kim, three existing PPD seniors and the three dissident recruits.

The dissident entrants will be assured 50 percent of party nominations for House elections, as they demanded before their entry.

PPD seniors complained Tuesday in a meeting that Kim made too many concessions to the dissidents by allowing them 50 percent control of the party.

PPD floor leader Ho Kyong-nam said, "It is premature to promise them a 50 percent share as we do not know the real character and political weight of the 97 dissidents."

Kim made the decision to adopt the collective leadership, not out of his own volition, but by demands from the dissidents, other officials noted.

Kim emphasized that there should be no internal discord and disarray in the future in the party with the entry of the dissidents.

He asserted that the entry of the dissidents is expected to give a great boost to the PPD seeking to gear up for the forthcoming legislative elections and for full implementation of the local autonomy system.

Kim indicated yesterday his party would conditionally accept the election result of No Tae-u, although the ruling party candidate won just 36.6 percent of the votes.

For No to lead national politics in a stable manner, Kim said, the president-elect must implement his campaign commitments and democratic reform proposals including the adoption of the small constituency system and full implementation of the local autonomy system.

He said the RDP move is against the spirit of true opposition moves toward an ultimate integration.

Brunei, Malaysia & Singapore

Malaysia

Court Declares UMNO 'Illegal Society'

BK041240 Kuala Lumpur RTM Television Network 1
in Malay 1200 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text]The Kuala Lumpur High Court Judge Datuk Harun Hashim this afternoon ruled the United Malays National Organization [UMNO] an illegal society and declared that the UMNO General Assembly last April was unlawful. Judge Datuk Harun's decision was based on the Societies Act that considers a society illegal when there are branches that have not been approved by the registrar of societies.

The ruling was made on a suit filed by 11 UMNO members on the validity of the poll in the party general assembly last April.

According to BERNAMA, UMNO is examining the provisions in the law to see whether or not it can appeal in Supreme Court against the High Court decision.

Dismisses Suit Filed by Members

BK041401 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English
1337 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Feb 4 (BERNAMA)—The High Court here Thursday dismissed a suit brought by 11 UMNO members against the party and in its decision said UMNO was an illegal society and its general assembly and elections on April 24 last year a nullity.

The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) is the dominant partner of the ruling Barisan Nasional (National Front) coalition and its president becomes the prime minister of the country. Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamed was elected UMNO president at its 38th general assembly on April 24 last year.

Justice Harun Hashim said he could not grant the remedies sought for by the 11 because at that material time, UMNO was an unlawful society under the Societies Act.

The act deems a society to be unlawful if branches are established without the prior approval of the Registrar of Societies, according to him.

Very sadly...I have to make a finding in law that at that material time, UMNO is an unlawful society. Therefore the remedies sought for by the 11 UMNO members (who have sued the party secretary-general and six others) could not be granted, he added.

In giving judgment on the suit, Justice Harun said: What had happened in 1987 was a nullity and the claim is dismissed.

The 11, who through their counsel Raja Aziz Addruse, had brought up the question of UMNO being an illegal society, are challenging the validity of the party's 38th general assembly and elections and seeking a court order for a fresh general assembly and party elections.

They filed their action last June 25 naming as defendants UMNO Secretary-General Sanusi Junid and the secretaries of the Jelutong, Nibong Tebal, Pasir Puteh, Machang, Rantau Panjang and Pekan divisions.

They claimed, among other things, that 30 unregistered branches had sent delegates to the divisional-level elections and that the election of the divisional delegates to the assembly was invalid.

Justice Harun said as far as he understood the law, UMNO was an illegal society and there were no elections and so I don't even have to declare the general assembly and party elections last year null and void.

That would be an odd decision to make, he said, adding that the law was made by Parliament itself.

In saying UMNO was an unlawful society, Justice Harun said he did not have to decide on other issues raised by the 11.

In his judgment, Justice Harun also said the provision of the Societies Act was a no nonsense provision and I do not see how I could give any other reasonable and benevolent construction.

He said Parliament, in order to insure strict adherence to the law, had made this provision to be strictly complied with by everybody.

The judge said when the Societies Act was first enacted, it was actually concerned with secret societies, adding that it was quite obvious there should be a special separate law for political parties just as there were special laws for trade unions and cooperative societies.

I think political parties are really special ...on their own. You need to have a special law...maybe the time is right now... He added.

On the question of unapproved branches, the judge said there were complaints about such irregularities to the UMNO headquarters and certainly to the party's secretary-general...Nobody could plead ignorance...

He said because of the Societies Act, UMNO had been deemed by law to be an unlawful society right from April 24 last year when it held its general assembly.

In applying this provision, he said the decision has been taken out of my hands. Parliament had decided beforehand what in fact is the answer.

He said he did not think he could grant the 11 the remedies asked for because UMNO was an illegal society. The law was clear and unambiguous and if on the fact UMNO had established branches without approval from the registrar, it seems to me that UMNO itself is an unlawful society.

Justice Harun made no order on costs, saying that in a way the 11 plaintiffs have succeeded. They said there were irregularities and wanted the elections to be declared null and void.

They got the answers but not in the way they wanted, the judge added.

During the six-day hearing which started last Tuesday, counsel for the 11, Raja Aziz Addruse, had brought up the issue of whether UMNO could be deemed an unlawful society because of the existence of unapproved branches.

He gave the the court two alternatives to decide on the issue.

The court, he said, could either grant the reliefs asked by his clients and not declare UMNO itself an unlawful society or if the 11 were to be held not to be entitled to the reliefs it could only be for the reason that they were members of an unlawful society.

In which event, he said, the party elections would also be invalid.

But he had said the court could choose only to concentrate on unapproved branches and not declare the party itself unlawful.

On this, G. Sri Ram for Sanusi and the six secretaries of the Jelutong, Nibong Tebal, Pasir Puteh, Machang, Rantau Panjang and Pekan Tumno divisions had said any registered society which established a branch without approval was deemed to be an unlawful one and so was the branch, but the moment the branch was approved, then the society became lawful.

Former MCA Chief Receives Jail Sentence, Fine
BK040821 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English
0807 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Feb 4 (BERNAMA)—Former Malaysian Chinese Association [MCA] President Tan Koon Swan was Thursday sentenced to two-and-a-half years' jail and fined M \$1 million (about U.S. \$400,000), in default nine months' jail, by the sessions court here for committing criminal breach of trust involving \$23.2 million (about U.S. \$9.28 million) belonging to Multi-Purpose Holdings Berhad (MPHB).

Sessions court Judge Zura Yahaya rejected an application for a stay of execution of sentence pending appeal.

Hassan Says Mokhtar To Visit Sihanouk
BK040822 Hong Kong AFP in English 0810 GMT
4 Feb 88

[Excerpts] Kuala Lumpur, Feb 4 (AFP)—Indonesian Foreign Minister Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja will meet Prince Norodom Sihanouk in China for talks on his decision to quit the Cambodian resistance coalition, a top official said Thursday.

Malaysian Foreign Minister Abu Hassan told a press conference here that Mr. Mokhtar would visit Prince Sihanouk in China, after his current trip to Moscow, to outline the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) position on the Cambodian resistance leader's surprise resignation.

Mr. Abu Hassan, who appeared at the press conference with Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila, did not say when Mr. Mokhtar would be returning from the Soviet Union.

Prince Sihanouk announced in Beijing Saturday that he was resigning permanently as head of the UN-recognised Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), which groups his forces with Son Sann's nationalists and the Khmer Rouge. [passage omitted]

The Malaysian and Thai foreign ministers said their governments would continue to support Prince Sihanouk's efforts at seeking an end to the Cambodian conflict.

Mr. Sitthi, who is chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, said the regional group would offer any facility to enable Prince Sihanouk to continue his dialogue for peace.

He said that Mr. Mokhtar would reaffirm this. ASEAN, which groups Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, is a staunch supporter of the CGDK.

Sitthi Reiterates ASEAN's Cambodia Stand
BK041033 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English
1005 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Feb 4 (OANA-BERNAMA)—The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Thursday reiterated its full support for and confidence in efforts by Prince Norodom Sihanouk to bring about a political solution to the nine-year-old Kampuchean issue.

ASEAN countries are also offering their facilities for Prince Sihanouk to conduct talks or dialogue with the parties involved in the issue, Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila told newsmen at the end of the two-day Malaysia-Thailand Joint Commission meeting here.

When asked whether ASEAN would make any appeal to Prince Sihanouk to reconsider his resignation last week as president of the UN-recognised Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, he said Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja would do the talking.

Sitthi, who is also current chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, said: He (Dr Mokhtar) told me that when he comes back from Moscow, he will communicate with us.

Sitthi said he met Dr Mokhtar in Bangkok before the Indonesian minister left for Moscow on Tuesday.

Malaysian Foreign Minister Abu Hassan Omar said ASEAN foreign ministers had yet to sit down and get the overall view, based on Dr Mokhtar's appraisal, of the situation.

Let Dr Mokhtar do the initial findings, he said.

He said ASEAN missions, particularly in Paris and Beijing, were constantly being informed on developments and that Prince Sihanouk and his officials had stated that Dr Mokhtar, as ASEAN's interlocutor with Vietnam, was in constant touch with the prince.

Abu Hassan, who concurred with Sitthi's views, said Malaysia would respect any decision taken by the prince that would encourage and promote the peace process.

Station Comments on Sihanouk's Resignation

*BK041130 Kuala Lumpur International Service
in English 0800 GMT 4 Feb 88*

[Station commentary]

[Text] The sudden announcement by Prince Norodom Sihanouk of his intention to resign as president of the tripartite Coalition of Democratic Kampuchea had inevitably given rise to much comment and speculation. ASEAN is deeply concerned as the prince has always played an influential role in the politics and diplomacy of his country. It is of course quite reassuring to note that he'll continue fighting for the emergence of a sovereign, independent Kampuchean nation.

The Thai foreign minister has attributed Prince Sihanouk's decision to some internal problems in the tripartite coalition. The prince had held talks in France with Mr Hun Sen—the head of the pro-Vietnam regime in Phnom Penh. The other two factions, namely the Khmer Rouge, and Mr Son Sann's Khmer People's National Liberation Front did not participate in those talks. It is well known that some differences will crop up in the situation in which different political ideologies are involved. In the case of Kampuchea, the three factions represent the communists, the neutralists, and the anti-communists headed by Khieu Samphan, Prince Sihanouk, and Son Sann respectively. The Khmer Rouge is

the strongest group and it receives much support from China. The Chinese Government holds the Khmer Rouge a good agent through whom to check Vietnamese power. But probably, that policy may change if and when Vietnam pulls its troops out of Kampuchea. It has always been ASEAN's hope that Hanoi leaders will see the value of ending their involvement in Kampuchea and concentrate on internal economic reconstruction. If that were to be done, perhaps the People's Republic of China would adopt a different posture toward its communist neighbor—Vietnam.

A similar relationship has now developed between the Soviet Union and China. As long as Vietnam maintains a large force in Kampuchea, China is bound to react with a view to containing Vietnam's hegemony. Apparently, Mr Hun Sen had expressed views on the political future of Kampuchea that were well received by Prince Sihanouk. There have been other reports that the Khmer Rouge would not be accepted by Hun Sen because of the notorious Pol Pot regime. There may be some elements of truth in this. But Kampuchean leaders of all political ideologies should seize the present opportunity to expel the Vietnamese and plan for the future of Kampuchea. The Soviets will, most probably, withdraw from Afghanistan. The top Russian leadership is quite preoccupied with economic matters rather than with winning glory through intervention elsewhere. This is the best time for Kampuchean factions to try to find areas of common understanding. Their country and their people have suffered enough. If they can come together and later enter into negotiations with the Vietnamese, as ASEAN has always recommended, they will win even greater international support.

The Malaysian community looks forward to the return of Prince Sihanouk to lead his people into independence and the ending of Vietnamese domination in Kampuchea.

Details of New Trade Agreement With PRC

*BK031357 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English
1328 GMT 3 Feb 88*

[By Ong Saw Lay]

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Feb 3 (BERNAMA)—The trade agreement due to be signed between Malaysia and China before the Chinese new year (Feb 17) will benefit Malaysia in more than one way.

Malaysian Deputy Trade and Industry Minister Kok Wee Kiat said the agreement will benefit particularly commodity exports as import tariff rates will be lower.

We will be able to see not only lower tariff rates for our exports, but also a gradual reduction of Malaysian exports being shipped through third countries and thus, a greater flow of bilateral trade.

This, we hope, will reduce the trade imbalance currently in China's favour, he told BERNAMA.

He said if Malaysia can do away with third countries we will also be able to reduce the incidences of Malaysia being blamed for adulteration of our palm oil or latex.

China imports from Malaysia mainly rubber, palm oil, timber and wood products.

Kok said once the agreement becomes effective, Malaysia's palm oil export will stand to benefit as its tariff rate will be reduced by 10 percent to 20 percent.

China has become a significant buyer of Malaysian palm oil. Its imports of palm oil rose from less than 10,000 tonnes in 1983 when it started to use the oil to 14,754 tonnes in 1984, 60,000 tonnes in 1985 and 120,000 tonnes in 1986. He said the agreement will also enable Malaysia's wood furniture and woodware to enjoy a hefty 50 percent reduction in the tariff rates to 100 percent from the present 150 percent.

For plywood and wood splints, the rate will be reduced to 15 percent from 20 percent currently.

Kok said Malaysia needs to have direct trade with China, a non-member of the 95-nation General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as China currently imposes preferential tariff rates under which different treatments are accorded for different trading countries.

It imposes a minimum tariff rate for imports from countries with which it has entered into trade treaties or agreements for reciprocal favourable trade treatment and a higher general rate for those without, he explained.

He said the agreement will gradually reduce the volume of Malaysia's China-bound export going through third countries such as Singapore and Hong Kong, which enjoy minimum import duty because they have trade treaties with China.

China has practised the preferential tariff system on 939 items classified under 89 classes since May 16, 1951.

On other major exports which will enjoy considerable reduction in tariff rates, Kok said coconut oil and cocoa butter will have a tariff cut of 20 percent to 60 percent from the present 80 percent.

Rubber, crude rubber including synthetic and latex, crude rubber sheets and crepe rubber will have their import tariff rates reduced to 7.5 percent from the present 10 percent.

Prepared or treated rubber sheets, pipes and tubes will enjoy a five per cent reduction to 25 percent from the present 30 percent.

Reclaimed or old waste rubber, which sees great demand in the Chinese market, will be down to 15 percent from 17.5 percent.

The tariff rate for rubber tyres and inner tubes for vehicles will be reduced by 20 percent to 40 percent from the present 60 percent while that for bicycles will enjoy a hefty 40 percent cut to 80 percent from the present 120 percent.

Rubber shoes and boots are classified in two categories: soles and heels, currently subject to 150 percent duty, will have their rates cut to 100 percent while those for shoes and boots are down by 40 percent to 80 percent.

Other general rubber manufactures will have their rates cut by 40 percent to 80 percent from 120 percent.

For soyabean and groundnut oil, import duty will be reduced to 6 percent from 11 percent, sesame or rapeseed oil to 9 percent from 14 percent and olive oil to 20 percent from 30 percent.

Tariffs for other types of vegetable oils are generally cut by 20 percent to 50 percent from 70 percent.

Bilateral trade between Malaysia and China rose to 1.15 billion ringgit (about U.S.\$460 million) in 1986, representing 1.8 percent of Malaysia's global trade, from 1.02 billion ringgit (about U.S.\$408 million) in 1985.

This was made up of 422.1 million ringgit (about U.S.\$168.84 million) in exports and 727.7 million ringgit (about U.S.\$291.08 million) in imports, resulting in a deficit of 305.6 million ringgit (about U.S.\$122.24 million) for Malaysia.

(Malaysia's 1985 export was 398.5 million ringgit (U.S.\$159.4 million) and import was 621.4 million ringgit (about U.S.\$248.56 million).)

Natural rubber is still Malaysia's largest export, making up 53 percent of her total exports to China in 1986.

It was followed by sawn logs (31 percent), palm oil (7 percent) and cocoa beans (4 percent), all of which made up 74 percent of her total export against 81 percent in 1985.

China, the world's third largest natural rubber consumer, is an important market for Malaysia, taking 119,456 tonnes of her rubber valued at 237.7 million ringgit (about U.S.\$95.08 million) in 1986.

China's rubber consumption is estimated to go up to one million tonnes by the end of 1988 from 680,000 tonnes last year.

Kok said apart from these four major items, manufactured and semi-manufactured goods are also exported to China but they make up less than 20 percent of Malaysia's total exports to China.

These are mainly textile yarns, air-conditioners and parts, aluminium foils and refrigerators.

Deputy Prime Minister Ghafar Baba, who visited China in September last year, had said for the first seven months of last year, bilateral trade amounted to 760 million ringgit (about U.S.\$304 million).

Malaysia began active negotiations for a trade agreement following Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamed's visit to China in November 1985. Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang visited Malaysia in 1981. Prior to 1971, Malaysia had no diplomatic ties with China.

The negotiations lasted three years. The delay in finalising the agreement is believed to be due to technical hitches related to the common currency for denominating trade, arbitration in case of trade disputes and licensing requirements for companies that seek direct trade with China.

Kok said the cabinet had on Jan 6 directed that the licensing requirements be abolished to pave the way for the signing of the agreement.

Cambodia

Chea Sim Opens National Assembly Session

BK040958 Phnom Penh Domestic Service
in Cambodian 1300 GMT 3 Feb 88

[Speech by National Assembly Chairman Chea Sim at 3 February opening of First National Assembly's 14th session—recorded]

[Text] Dear Comrades and friends: 1988 is the key year of the 5-Year Plan to implement the resolutions of the fifth party congress. [Words indistinct] armed forces, both quantity and quality, the position of strength and of being master along the border and inside the country, and firmly defending and building the country. As for the enemies, their forces are deteriorating, their morale and fighting spirit are weakening and are moving toward disintegration. At many places, our combatants have become masters of the situation and have firmly defended their localities through resolute will and lofty sacrifice. Our masses and people have further acquired a correct view concerning the progress of the revolution and, through clear analysis, have expanded their lofty patriotic spirit [words indistinct] the national unity spirit and socialist international solidarity. They have further clearly understood the right of being masters of society and the role of being responsible for the their country's destiny. This is why achievements in defending major bases have been further strengthened everywhere. Many youths have volunteered and are putting down their names ready to serve and carry out the task of defending the fatherland.

In the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, in particular in the four economic spearheads [words indistinct], although results are not yet in accordance with the plan, the thrust of these economic spearheads has essentially been good. Workers, administrative

personnel, and the masses throughout the country, in factories, enterprises [words indistinct], and solidarity production groups have spared no efforts in resolutely striving to fight with a lofty sense of responsibility.

[Words indistinct] of building real revolutionary forces, [words indistinct] front, revolutionary mass organizations, and the armed forces have been strengthened and expanded from central to grass-roots levels, particularly in the [words indistinct].

The political situation both inside and outside the country is being improved in combination with the six-point lenient policy and the PRK's national reconciliation policy for a solution to the Cambodian problem aimed at ending our protracted conflict of many years [words indistinct] have been welcomed and supported by national and international opinions. The recent talks between Comrade Chairman of the Council of Ministers Hun Sen and Samdech Norodom Sihanouk was a step forward toward a real political solution to the Cambodian problem.

The PRK National Assembly wholeheartedly welcomes and supports the results of these talks and considers that this is a step toward finding a real political solution to the Cambodian problem and a contribution to peace in Southeast Asia.

At the same time, the PRK National Assembly, together with peace-loving people the world over, acclaims the results of the summit meeting in Washington between Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and the President of the United States on the elimination of short and medium-range nuclear weapons. This is the victory of reason [words indistinct] an important contribution to the cause of peace and security in the world. The PRK National Assembly considers that the results [passage indistinct].

Presidium, Comrades, and Friends, since the 13th National Assembly session [words indistinct] have been directing their efforts toward localities and [words indistinct] their tasks to serve the revolution and the people [words indistinct].

[Words indistinct] our Cambodian revolution has reached a new stage of development. However, these results have not yet fully answered the needs of the revolution. [Words indistinct] requires that the comrades and members of our National Assembly continue to further vigorously strive to contribute to fulfilling the strategic tasks and revolutionary goals set by the party's fifth congress. [applause]

It is in this sense that the First National Assembly's 14th session opens. At this session our National Assembly members will hear discussions and reports by the National Assembly and the Council of State between the 13th and 14th sessions, comments by the National Assembly's four commissions, a report by the Council of

the Ministers on the implementation of the state plan and budget in 1987 and the targets for 1988, a report by the Council of Ministers on foreign affairs, a number of other reports, and addresses by various delegates. At the same time, the National Assembly will hear answers of the Council of Ministers to various questions.

Through all this, all the comrade members of the National Assembly will [words indistinct] effect new changes [words indistinct] our country, both inside and in the international arena. Therefore, all Assembly members should use their full democratic rights with a spirit of lofty sense of responsibility to take measures for the benefit of the nation and people.

On behalf of the Presidium, I declare the First National Assembly's 14th Session open. [applause]

Report on 4 Feb Morning Session
BK040536 Phnom Penh Domestic Service
in Cambodian 0430 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] The 14th session of the PRK National Assembly, first legislature, continued its work according to the agenda on the morning of 4 February.

At this morning's session, the participants listened attentively to the report on the balance of the 1986 state budgets, the financial situation of the 1987 state budgets, and the financial targets of the 1988 state budgets read by Comrade Chhay Than, alternate member of the party Central Committee and minister of finance.

The National Assembly deputies also listened to the draft resolution of the National Assembly concerning the report on the balance of the 1986 state budgets, the financial situation in 1987, and the financial targets of the 1988 budgets read by Comrade Men Chhan, chairman of the National Assembly's economic and budget affairs commission.

The deputies also heard a report on the the construction of the defense line along the Cambodian-Thai border during the past 3 years read by Comrade Nhim Vanda, vice chairman of the committee for the construction of the Cambodian-Thai border defense system.

In conclusion, Comrade Koy Buntha, member of the party Central Committee and minister of national defense, read a report on the military situation in 1987 to the session.

The session adjourned temporarily at 1100 [0400 GMT] and will resume this afternoon.

Report on 4 Feb Afternoon Session
BK041446 Phnom Penh Domestic Service
in Cambodian 1100 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] On the afternoon of 4 February, the PRK First National Assembly's 14th session busily continued its work in accordance with the agenda.

On the evening of the second day of this session, National Assembly members listened to a report by the Council of State on the request to ratify [words indistinct] the vice chairman of the Council of [words indistinct], a decree on the task of a minister read by Comrade Chan Ven, General Secretary of the Council of State.

The audience also heard a report on the task to ensure political security and social order in 1987 read by Comrade Ney Pena, member of the Political Bureau of the party Central Committee and Interior Minister, and a report by the Central Proselytization Commission read by Comrade Un Dara, Permanent Vice Chairman of the Central Proselytization Commission. Finally, Comrade Dit Munti, Deputy Foreign Minister, read a report on foreign affairs activities to members of the National Assembly.

The session adjourned at 1630 [0930 GMT] and will resume its work tomorrow 5 February.

Thai 'Violations' for Week Ending 21 January
BK031242 Phnom Penh SPK in French 1147 GMT
3 Feb 88

[Text] Phnom Penh, 3 Feb (SPK)—During the week ending 21 January, Thai planes of the L-19, F-5, F-1B, F-16, and B-52 [as received] types on 18 occasions violated Cambodia's airspace above the sectors of the Cambodia-Thailand-Laos common border; Phnum Bak, north of Anlung Veng; and Phnum Kingkuok in Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province; the border regions of Pursat and Koh Kong Provinces; and Phnum Malai in Banteay Meanchey Province.

On the ground, Thai gunners fired a total of 2,700 shells on regions in Pursat, Preah Vihear, and Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Provinces.

Meanwhile, Cambodian border guards, in close cooperation with Vietnamese volunteers, put out of action 162 Khmer reactionary infiltrators crossing the border from Thailand for sabotage purposes.

Lizichev, Soviet Delegation Arrive for Visit
BK041348 Phnom Penh SPK in English 1130 GMT
4 Feb 88

[Text] Phnom Penh SPK February 4—A delegation of the General Political Department of the Soviet armed forces led by General A.D. Lizichev, member of the

CPSU Central Committee and chief of the General Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy, arrived here Tuesday for a 3-day official friendship visit to Kampuchea.

The delegation was warmly welcomed on its arrival at Pochentong Airport by El Vansarat, member of the PRPK Central Committee and chief of the General Political Department of the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces of Kampuchea.

E. Bazeyrev, counsellor to the Soviet Embassy, and Tran Phuoc and Simuang Vannasi, Vietnamese and Lao military attaches to Kampuchea respectively, were also present.

Leaders Sending Delegation To See Sihanouk
BK040022 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 3 Feb 88

["Message from His Excellency Khieu Samphan, president of the Democratic Kampuchean faction and vice president of Democratic Kampuchea in charge of foreign affairs; and His Excellency Son Sen, vice president of the Democratic Kampuchean faction, minister in charge of the CGDK Coordinating Committee for National Defense, and commander in chief of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea [NADK], to Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, president of Democratic Kampuchea"]

[Text] Respectfully to Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, president of Democratic Kampuchea, Beijing:

The two of us have learned from successive reports by His Excellency Chan Youran, DK ambassador to the PRC, that the samdech has resigned from the post of president of Democratic Kampuchea. We thus invited a number of responsible cadres to discuss this matter on the night of 31 January. The meeting unanimously decided, on behalf of the Democratic Kampuchean faction and the NADK, to request that the samdech remain president of Democratic Kampuchea in order to further lead the CGDK, the patriots and the Cammodian people in the struggle against the Hanoi Vietnamese aggressors and race exterminators until our beloved Cambodia is liberated, thus enabling our Cambodia to enjoy independence, neutrality, freedom, and peace.

We are convinced that the samdech is the most outstanding patriot. We always remember the samdech's statement to us. The samdech often said: We have long been struggling jointly and we will continue to combine forever.

On 5 January 1988, the samdech and neak moneang [Sihanouk's wife] graciously received and conversed with Their Excellencies Thiounn Prasith and Uk Sakun during which the samdech reiterated this statement.

We have decided to send His Excellency Khieu Samphan, vice president of Democratic Kampuchea, to see the samdech in Beijing this week, that is on Saturday, 6 February 1988.

Please, Samdech, accept our highest and most esteemed regards.

[Signed] Khieu Samphan, president of the Democratic Kampuchean faction and vice president of Democratic Kampuchea in charge of foreign affairs;

Son Sen, vice president of the Democratic Kampuchean faction, minister in charge of the CGDK Coordinating Committee for national defense, and commander in chief of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea

[Dated] Democratic Kampuchea, 1 February 1988

VOK Cites XINHUA on Sihanouk Talks in PRC
BK040757 (Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer in Cambodian 0500 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] The Chinese news agency XINHUA yesterday reported that Samdech Norodom Sihanouk has canceled the third round of peace talks with Hun Sen and that he wants to hold direct talks with Hanoi leaders instead. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk said at a meeting last Monday with Zhao Ziyang, CCP leader, that there was no progress at the second round of peace talks with Hun Sen in Paris last January because Hun Sen is not a fully independent leader. The Chinese news agency also reports that the samdech said he will return to the negotiating table if Hanoi takes part in the talks and that he would not object if Hun Sen were also to take part in it with Vietnam.

At the second meeting with Hun Sen, Samdech Norodom Sihanouk requested that Vietnam pull out all its forces from Cambodia by the end of this year or next year at the latest, the dissolution the Democratic Kampuchean Government and the PRK regime, the setting up of a provisional quadripartite government to coincide with the arrival of international peace-keeping forces, and free elections to be organized under international supervision. However, Hun Sen did not agree with the request for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops in a short period of time and the dissolution of the PRK regime.

Son Sann Addresses Nation on KPNLF Duty
BK031113 (Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer in Cambodian 0500 GMT 3 Feb 88

[Message to the nation by Son Sann, president of the KPNLF and prime minister of the CGDK; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] First of all, I would like to thank the radio Voice of the Khmer for making it possible today for me to express my views to all compatriots in Cambodia.

I have informed you, dear compatriots, on quite a few occasions that the Vietnamese aggressors are now in a very difficult situation because the international community—all countries without exception—are forcing it to withdraw troops from Cambodia, while in Cambodia all of us Khmer as well as the Vietnamese themselves are well aware that no one wants the Vietnamese aggressors to stay. In addition to this, the Vietnamese aggressors are experiencing insoluble economic problems at home. For this reason, many of our friends, including those in the Eastern bloc, realize that Vietnam needs to find a solution to the Cambodian problem.

Nevertheless, Vietnam is still seeking new ways to stay on. For this reason, we would like to quote a friend from the eastern bloc who said that if Vietnam did not really want to settle the Cambodian issue, and if it was not in a really bad fix, it would not have sent Mr Hun Sen to the talks. And if not for the purpose of finding a solution to the Cambodian problem, then what were these talks for? Many of our friends, and I myself, too, agree with this. One of our friends, Mr Sarasin of the Thai Foreign Ministry, said that Vietnam is not entirely sincere. It wants to solve the Cambodian problem, but this must be in a way favorable to it. In other words, Vietnam is not sincere about really settling the Cambodian problem; it only wants to protect the Heng Samrin-Hun Sen regime which it has installed in power. In particular, Vietnam wants to divide our coalition government.

For this reason, I would like to appeal to all our brothers within our Khmer resistance movement to force Vietnam to come to the talks and to oppose all its tricks. Despite all the dire difficulties it is experiencing, Vietnam has tried to avoid being branded the aggressor in Cambodia and has thus refused to join the talks although Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and Mr Hun Sen have already met and although all of us have insisted that Vietnam must join the negotiations before we join. Twice already I have waited in France to see whether Vietnam would come to the talks so that I could join them, too. I also asked the Vietnamese to send a letter to the UN secretary general [pledging to withdraw from Cambodia], but they refused to do so. We can thus see clearly that Vietnam does not really want to talk and settle the Cambodian problem according to the UN resolution. Vietnam is still seeking to resort to tricks as I have just mentioned, namely: first, to shore up the Heng Samrin-Hun Sen regime; and second, to split the coalition government and weaken the support of our friends.

At this point, we must do whatever necessary to force Vietnam to come to the negotiating table, prevent it from resorting to any new tricks, and bring it to negotiate in an international conference with the tripartite coalition government, with [words indistinct], with the five powers in the United Nations, and with other countries willing to help us find a solution. And what would the talks be for? First, they should discuss a cease-fire. When there is a cease-fire, our people in the country will regain hope and will no long worry about the fighting. Second,

they should settle the question of the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. How and when the troops should be pulled out would be discussed at that international conference.

Because we understood that Vietnam wanted to avoid being condemned as an aggressor by the United Nations, we put forward an eight-point proposal promising Vietnam that in the future we would not join any bloc, that we would become genuinely neutral, and that we would not allow any foreign military bases or military forces to be set up in our country to threaten our neighbors. We also promised Vietnam that we would sign a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with it. We have shown our sincerity to have independence and neutrality so that we can rebuild our country according to the aspirations of our compatriots by letting the latter decide Cambodia's destiny themselves. We demanded that Vietnam withdraw all its troops from Cambodia. This is the only authentic solution to the Cambodian problem.

Now I would like to inform you about the unambiguous position of the KPNLF.

To all parties, not only the three parties currently in the coalition government, our purpose in forming the coalition government is to fight the Vietnamese and jointly endeavor to liberate our country from the Vietnamese aggressors. However, we need the solidarity and cooperation of all countrymen in Cambodia, for as you all know, the KPNLF's policy is to help, serve, and protect the people. Whatever we do, we keep in mind that the people are our master, our superior. Now, our Khmer people both in Cambodia and abroad have unanimously agreed that Vietnam must withdraw its troops. All our compatriots in Cambodia, be they in the ranks of Mr Heng Samrin's army or the people in Phnom Penh, only wish to see Vietnam withdraw all its troops from Cambodia and see the millions of Vietnamese settlers go home. Therefore, the Vietnamese troops and Vietnamese settlers must go. I would like to affirm this to all parties—the Khmer parties in the coalition government as well as all parties of all compatriots in Cambodia. How can I say this? It is because the KPNLF serves the interests of the Khmer people. Whatever the Khmer people want, we abide by it. Now, all our Khmer people, including those living abroad, along the border, and inside the country, want to see Vietnam withdraw all its troops from Cambodia. For this reason, we will obey this wish. We also know that all Khmer brothers in the interior support our position.

With regard to the Vietnamese aggressors, [words indistinct] they continue to experience hardship. Every day Vietnamese continue to flee their country by boat. Many have been drowned in their flight. The Vietnamese people are miserable. We have nothing against them personally. [Words indistinct] said that he did not want to see Vietnamese youths come and die in Cambodia. He wanted to take Vietnamese youths back to Vietnam to help build the country. This is a good idea to withdraw

all Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. But a better idea is also to take home those millions of Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia so that they can help rebuild Vietnam and restore its economy. As for us, we will make efforts to rebuild our own country. Whenever we have the opportunity [words indistinct] to hold free general elections under the supervision of the United Nations or any other international organization, we will express our decision on the destiny of Cambodia. We have already told the Vietnamese once, and I would like to tell them again today, that when we regain our independence we will become neutral, we will not join any bloc or alliance, we will not permit any countries to set up military bases to threaten our neighbors, and we will establish friendly relations with all neighboring peoples, including the Vietnamese and Lao peoples.

In conclusion, as a duty of members of the KPNLF, I would like to appeal to all brothers to fully carry out their tasks as the servants, helpers, and protectors of all Cambodian people, especially those in the country who are suffering so much from the occupation and oppression of the Vietnamese aggressors and who want to see Vietnam withdraw all its troops from Cambodia together with the millions of Vietnamese nationals. Therefore, all of us in the KPNLF have the greatest duty to serve all our people, be they at (Prey Tuk) and Sok San along the border or inside the country. Since our people want to see the Vietnamese troops withdrawn, all of us must join hands to obey this wish, for all of us are Khmer fighting for national liberation. I would like to stress again to all brothers not to forget your duty as fighters for national liberation. We are not liberating the nation in order to split ourselves. It is Vietnam which wants to split us. As Khmer, we must join hands and close ranks to fight Vietnam's desire to stay on till 1990. We must do anything that will bring pressure to bear on Vietnam, forcing it to agree to negotiate in an international conference according to our eight-point proposal, which requests that the Vietnamese aggressors join the negotiation and withdraw troops before 1990. This is our duty.

Laos

Report on Continued Fighting With Thai Troops *BK031450 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao* 1200 GMT 3 Feb 88

[Text] Regional reports from Boten District said that at 1000 [0300 GMT] yesterday [2 February], the Thai ultrarightist reactionary troops fired artillery shells against Ban Mouang Phe, a village located on the bank of the Nam Heuang River south of Na Banoi canton, inflicting damage on the people's homes and property.

According to additional reports from Boten District, in the past 2 days—1 and 2 February—the Thai troops used all kinds of artillery in coordination with air strikes to support large-scale assaults by Thai infantry forces on various hills in the area of Na Banoi canton, Boten District. The assaults were carried out from 0600 to

1700. On 2 February, they fired artillery salvos against and used aircraft to wantonly drop bombs on various unspecified targets. In particular, on 1 and 2 February, the Thai side sent 15 sorties of warplanes to bomb the area where fighting was going on and on other areas where there was no fighting. They even dropped 250-kg bombs as well as cluster bombs, the use of which is banned by international law, in areas where there was no fighting.

In addition, they also fired 130-mm artillery shells against unspecified targets some 30 km inside Lao territory. Ban Mouang Phe, which is located in Na Banoi canton, was hit by Thai shelling that caused heavy damage to the lives and property of the local inhabitants.

The reports also said that from 0600 on 3 February to this afternoon, the Thai infantry launched large-scale attacks against many hills in Na Banoi canton under the support of bombardment by all kinds of artillery and aircraft. However, the armed forces and people of Boten District heroically put up stiff resistance and repulsed each wave of attacks by the enemies, inflicting heavy casualties on them. At present, the opposite side still continues trying to capture many positions by even more violent means. More reinforcements have been sent into the area.

The Thai Army commander in chief has disclosed that he would employ the eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth method to seize the territory in Na Banoi canton in the next 2 days.

In light of this tense development, the armed forces and people of Boten District must heighten vigilance and be prepared to fight to resolutely repulse the aggression of the opposite side so as to mete out even more suitable punishment on them. We are imbued with a sense of justice and the rear renders strong support to us. The just fight for self defense by the armed forces and people of Boten District will score brilliant victory.

Boten Forces Defend Postions

BK040519 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao
0430 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] According to a local news report from Boten District, beginning 0600 yesterday [3 February], the Thai reactionary troops fired over 1,000 artillery shells of various types into Lao territory. Their F-5 aircraft flew several bombardment sorties to support two ground assaults against positions of our regional armed forces in the vicinity of Na Banoi canton in Boten District, Sayaboury Province. Our regional armed forces strongly counterattacked the enemy inflicting heavy casualties and forcing them to retreat.

It was also reported that until 1600 hours on the same day, our regional armed forces were still able to defend their positions which has proved that the statement of the Thai Army command headquarters broadcast by

Thai television and radio last night [3 February] on the recapturing of various positions in the area was merely groundless propaganda aimed at boosting the morale of their soldiers. The people of all races and combatants in the whole country wholeheartedly praise the determination and heroic spirit of the combatants of Boten District's regional armed forces, who have strongly resisted and repulsed the invasion of the Thai reactionary troops.

Nonaligned Office Informed of Border Problem

BK041114 Vientiane KPL in English
0935 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] Vientiane, February 4 (OANA-KPL)—Lao charge d'affaires to the UN, Mr Alounkeo Kittikhoun, recently informed the coordinating office of the Nonaligned Movement [NAM] in New York about the situation in Boten District, Sayaboury Province.

The violent situation, caused by the attacks and annexation of Lao territory by Thai rightist Army, is getting more and more intensified, said the Lao charge d'affaires.

He, on this occasion, demanded the Thai Government to take a positive response to the Lao Government statement issued on January 25 for solving Lao-Thai problems by peaceful means.

He hoped that members of the NAM would voice support and sympathy to the Lao people, and will follow closely the situation.

Paper Criticizes Thai Border Dispute Rallies

BK041210 Vientiane KPL in English
0925 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] Vientiane, February 4 (OANA-KPL)—Commenting on the various prompted mass rallies which have taken place in the last three days in Thailand especially in the northeastern Thailand populated originally by the same stock of people known as "Lao", PASASON today says this current anti-Lao campaign of hatred is being orchestrated for the interests of a handful of ultra-rightist Thai leaders.

Talking about the unbecoming behavior calling down curses upon the Lao nation and people, burning of Lao leaders' effigies, among other despicable acts unfitting for a civilized people to indulge in, PASASON criticizes that such manifestations aimed at marring the dignity of the Lao PDR, in fact, damage the dignity of each and every one who has "Lao blood" in his veins. The commentator adds in this connection that indications point to the fact that this undesirable behavior can only be directed by certain individuals in the ruling circles of Thailand, and in which one can detect the personal involvement of Sitthi Sawetsila.

Giving some historical facts to the current border dispute, the paper says that in its relations with Thailand, previously known as "Siam" the Lao nation and people were victims of the expansionist pan-Thaist policy. The case in point, the commentator gives, is the great loss in terms of land, citizens, and priceless heritage of the Lao Lan Xang Kingdom to Siam. However, the paper says, the present Lao nation accepts the status quo as it is what it was, let it be passed. The rest of the Lao people, amounting to just over three million now, need nothing more than to be let alone and rebuild the nation in peace, in an atmosphere of friendship and peaceful co-existence with its neighbors in particular.

But it is regrettable that the current relations with Thailand is day-by-day deteriorating thanks to the self-centered doing of the ultra-rightist reactionaries in Thailand. These individuals, adds the paper, in their determination to implement the pan-Thaism, are stepping up tension along the Lao-Thai border in Boten District Sayaboury Province. They have been resorting to ways to evade the chance to solve and normalize the relations of good neighbors by peaceful means as proposed by the Lao Government, and this campaign of hatred for the Lao people, fanned by the Thai ruling circles, is among attempts to put the blame on Laos.

In this connection, the paper adds, the Thai people, especially the northeastern Thai people who share the blood with the Lao people should be aware of the dark scheme of the culprits. They should give a chance for the time honored good relations between Laos and Thailand to survive.

'Top Leaders' Send Messages to Sihanouk

BK041207 Vientiane KPL in English
0902 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] Vientiane, February 4 (OANA-KPL)—Lao top leaders, Souphanouvong and Phoumi Vongvichit, have recently sent messages to Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

President Souphanouvong, in his message says:

"I am glad to write and convey to you my fraternal salutations and sincere thanks for your kind words transmitted to me through Premier Hun Sen of the P.R. of Kampuchea who had just concluded his working visit in Laos during which Premier Hun Sen had informed me about the fruitful discussion on the Kampuchean issue with your excellency. I appreciate your friendly regard having for me and other Lao leaders.... Borne out of this still cordial sentiment on your part, vivid memorials of our meetings in Phnom Penh, in the former liberated zone of Laos, in Hanoi, in Guangzhou etc... your excellency, personally immediately come back to me. I myself and other Lao leaders were of the opinion that how sad it was to witness the upheaval inflicted upon your country due to genocidal forces. The Kampuchean problem has been met with a stalemate over nine years now.

However, thanks to your firm determination and that of Premier Hun Sen, your meeting in Fere-en-Tardenois has been crowned with success.

I believe that your excellency is aware of our position and firm support of our government and people to the result of this first meeting. I, therefore, wish that the next round of talks will score new and more fruitful results in order to meet the strong aspiration of the people of Kampuchea, for the efforts of national reconciliation and peace, thus contributing to the cause of peace in Indochina and in Southeast Asia.

I avail myself of the opportunity to express my warm expression of friendship and high regard of my own and of my wife, Viangkham, to Your Highness Princess Monique.

Mr Phoumi Vongvichit, in his message, writes:

While paying a work visit to Laos, His Excellency Premier Hun Sen of the P.R. of Kampuchea told me about your excellency's best regards of myself.... I am deeply touched by your kindness and still keep the best souvenirs of our meeting and working sessions.

His Excellency Hun Sen also kept us informed about the positive results of his meeting with your highness in France. This meeting was an important step in the search for a political and peaceful settlement to the Kampuchean issue.

It is our ardent desire to see the Kampuchean people, with whom we have millennial historical link, live in peace and unity through national reconciliation thus contributing to peace and stability in Southeast Asia. Thanks to your firm determination, it is our hope that new important progress will come in this direction.

Avail myself to express my most cordial respect to your highness and please convey to Princess Monique best regard of mine and that of my wife.

Lizichev-Led USSR Military Delegation Arrives
BK041050 Vientiane KPL in English
0932 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] Vientiane, February 4 (KPL)—A high level military delegation of the USSR led by General Aleksey Dmitriyevich Lizichev, member of the CPSU CC, member of the Supreme Soviet, head of the General Political Department of the Armed Forces and Navy chief commander of the USSR, arrived here this morning for an official friendship visit at the invitation of the Lao People's Army.

Welcoming the delegation at the airport were Major General Osakan Thammatheva, member of the LPRP CC, deputy minister of national defence, head of the General Political Department of the Lao People's Army and other high ranking army officers.

Also on hand at the airport were Soviet Ambassador to Laos Yuriy Mikheyev, and Soviet Military Attache Lt Col Nikolay I. Gololobov.

Philippines

Aquino Sends Message to USSR's Gorbachev
BK040829 Manila PNA in English 0748 GMT
4 Feb 88

[Text] Manila, Feb. 4 (PNA-OANA)—Philippine President Corazon Aquino has sent a message of gratitude to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and praised him for taking a leading role "at achieving positive changes in the present international situation."

The president sent the message to Gorbachev on behalf of the heads of government of the six-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) who recently held a summit meeting in Manila.

Mrs. Aquino, who was the chairperson at the two-day ASEAN meeting, expressed gratitude to the Soviet leader for the greeting he sent to the heads of ASEAN which groups Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei.

In her message released in Moscow last Wednesday, Aquino said the heads of government of ASEAN welcomed the signing of the INF (intermediate nuclear forces) Treaty by Gorbachev and U.S President Ronald Reagan.

She expressed the hope that the treaty will lead to a new agreement in the field of strategic nuclear arms and multi-lateral disarmament.

President Aquino's message also said ASEAN has addressed the Kampuchean problem by calling for a just and lasting settlement so that the people of Kampuchea could exercise their right to self-determination and thereby facilitate the turning of the country into a neutral, independent and non-aligned state.

"We all know about your leading role and efforts directed at achieving positive changes in the present international situation, including the Third World countries and their struggle for political and economic independence," the president said.

Noting that Gorbachev was named by TIME magazine as man of the year, the president said it was absolutely fair and really well deserved. "That is why I would like to join many others in sending you my sincere congratulations and wishes," she added.

Conclusion of Manglapus Interview on Bases
HK040829 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY GLOBE
in English 3 Feb 88 p 5

["Excerpts" of interview with Philippines Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus by GLOBE editor Yen Makabenta and staff writer Julius Fortuna "last week"; location not given—conclusion]

[Text] GLOBE: From the public's point of view, it's obviously important that we discuss options and approaches in this review. What are the alternatives available?

Manglapus: There are those who suggest that we do not compare ourselves to only one country but to all countries in Europe. Why? As I pointed out in a lecture before I became a senator, which I repeated before I became foreign secretary and which I have not repeated since, we are the only country in Southeast Asia that is willing to host these facilities. The others won't even talk about it with the exception of Singapore. In that lecture I asked the question: if a European prime minister were to stand up in his Parliament and say, "Gentlemen, we are going to host American bases" and somebody stands up and asks "Why?" "We are here for the protection of Europe" and then somebody stands up immediately and asks where will the American bases be. And the prime minister will say "Nowhere else, only here." And they will say, "Why are we the ones who will host the bases that will protect the whole of Western Europe?" I said, in half an hour, the government and the prime minister will be dissolved. [sentence as published] And yet for 40 years, we have been the only country in Southeast Asia hosting the bases allegedly for the protection of the entire region.

GLOBE: One option that has been weighed in public discussions goes this way: We can't force the Americans out anyway, so why not make the best of the situation?

Manglapus: That obviously rationalizes one of the options. I will add to that. You know that it has been said that the Vietnamese are not happy about the Soviets there but they don't seem able to do anything about it. And even more dramatically, Cuba has an American base on its soil. In Greece, Papandreou when he campaigned for prime minister promised the people to kick out the bases. When he was elected, he negotiated another five years with the Americans. So there are all these interesting instances around the world which seem to support this option.

Insofar as my own personal view is concerned, however, the most persuasive argument for the elimination of the bases is not the nuclear exposure. I think that there are certain responses that somehow effectively block the argument. It is not even the so-called sovereignty issue. To me it is the peculiar history of the Philippines vis-a-vis the United States. We are the only country in the world that used to be a substantial U.S. colony with a spillover of the mentality of dependence on the father

image. That is something that cannot be compared to any country in the world. Forget about the money part. Imagine, where do you find a country in the world where there is a movement to become a state of the United States? There is still that enchantment which I think is abhorrent. People think that when you are in trouble all you have to do is run to the U.S. This mentality will remain unless we take away these bases. We have to view these bases in the total context of their presence.

GLOBE: One of our noted political scientists has said that as long as the bases are here with us, they will serve as a distorting factor in our political life.

Manglapus: That is so not because we are any less independent-minded or less capable but because of our history. In the case of the Italians, the Germans, what do they care about U.S. bases on their soil? Except for the extreme left, they don't have that sensitivity to the U.S. presence. They do not say that the Americans are here, we cannot act on our own. That is because they never experienced in their history being under the Americans as we have.

GLOBE: In the making of our foreign policy, what exactly is the relationship between the executive and the legislative?

Manglapus: There is some debate about the extent of the participation of the legislative in the foreign policy making under a presidential system. There is no doubt, of course, that the Senate has a preeminent position in foreign policy making in view of its treaty ratification powers. But that by itself does not give the Senate exclusive legislative participation, because even in the House of Representatives, there is a committee on foreign affairs.

There is in essence already a current which shows you how powerful this intervention can be, (as we saw in the Sahah question).

In the forthcoming review of the bases agreement, we are making sure that the legislature would also be represented in the preparatory committee, so that the views of both houses would be heard and included in the position to be taken by the Philippines in this review, although the review itself will not constitute a treaty requiring the ratification by the Senate.

GLOBE: In the meeting of the preparatory committee then, are we to understand that all these options you have discussed will be thoroughly considered and weighed?

Manglapus: I certainly hope so. I personally assure you that once we enter into discussion with our panel, I will bring up these views.

NPA Leader Says U.S. Intervention 'Inevitable'
*OW040705 Tokyo KYODO in English 0620 GMT
4 Feb 88*

[Text] Manila, Feb. 4 KYODO—Direct American intervention in squashing the communist insurgency in the Philippines is "inevitable," according to a leader of the left-wing rebel army who called on supporters to "prepare for the coming fiercer struggle."

Fidel Alinea, identified as the supreme commander of the communist New People's Army (NPA), said the United States would resort to direct intervention "as a reaction" to rebel attacks on American nationals and installations.

"This (intervention) is one thing that is inevitable as our struggle advances. We know that the Philippines is important both to regional and global U.S. interests," Alinea said in an interview over the rebel clandestine "Radio Sierra Madre" over the weekend.

Rebel representatives sent transcripts of the interview to news agencies here Thursday after the broadcast was interrupted several times Saturday night.

"The Reagan government or any government in Washington would not just let go of its control over our country," Alinea said.

The NPA commander said once the U.S. Government feels that their military and economic interests are endangered and that their "local puppets cannot handle the situation anymore, there would be no hesitation on their part to intervene directly against our struggle."

In the same interview, Alinea reiterated a standing rebel policy of punishing anyone directly involved in the U.S.-directed counterinsurgency program, including U.S.-owned installations used in such types of activities.

Last October, three Americans including two U.S. servicemen, were killed by communist hitmen in separate but simultaneous attacks near the U.S. Clark Air Base, north of Manila.

Spokesmen of the NPA's Alex Boncayao Brigade in Manila said U.S. Ambassador Nicholas Platt is "being considered" as a target but will be given ample warning before he is hit.

They said British, Australian, and Israeli nationals working for or supporting the Central Intelligence Agency in the government's antiinsurgency campaign are also targets.

Interview With New Armed Forces Chief De Villa
*HK031421 Quezon City GMA 7 Radio-Television
Arts Network in English 1430 GMT 2 Feb 88*

["Live interview" with Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff General Renato de Villa on the television program "Viewpoint," hosted by Ric Puno]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Puno] General de Villa, what I did not say in that brief introduction is that since that you belong to the class of 1957 of PMA [Philippine Military Academy], your date of retirement really should be 1 April 1988, which of course, brings up the question of how long are you going to serve as chief of staff?

[De Villa] That is correct, Dong [refers to Puno]. Our class will complete our tour of duty on 1 April because that is the date that has been set by the latest law on retirement wherein our class was actually part of the transition process. However, in view of my appointment as chief of staff, as mandated by the Constitution the tenure of office of the chief of staff is 3 years, and we have verified this. The intent of the constitutional commission, from the proceedings of the constitutional commission, had very clearly stated that the interpretation of this provision is that it is a term of office.

Now as to how long I will stay in that office, that question is a matter of prerogative for the president. I could be out of that position by tomorrow, by next year, or 3 years from now. So, in terms of how long, the term is 3 years, but like any other chief of staff, the term of office actually depends on the prerogative of the president.

[Puno] Okay, earlier this week, one of the most interesting things that came out in the press was that apparently there have been some insurgents that have been going around with radio stations that apparently are clandestine and have been making certain announcements to the effect that their number has increased so much that there is now something like 30,000 armed regulars that they claimed. They are also claiming that they have something like 80 battalions that are ready to be committed to open engagements with the Armed Forces of the Philippines [AFP]. Now, first of all, are those reports credible from your point of view?

[De Villa] If I were on their side, I would do the same and perhaps make more announcements. But you have to understand that part of the insurgency problem that we have, or part of the efforts of the CPP [Communist Party of the Philippines]-NPA, is the conduct of a massive propaganda. Therefore, I say that if I were on their side, I would do the same. This is taking it from the propaganda point of view.

Certainly, they don't have 80 battalions, and certainly they cannot mount any massive attacks against any urban centers anywhere in the country right now without taking a very high risk of suffering high casualties from

our own forces, the government forces. But with respect to their estimated strength, I must say that we can only make an estimate of their strength based on intelligence reports and our own analysis of their capabilities and actual number. This has been placed lately by our intelligence community at a figure between 23,000 to 25,000.

[Puno] Does this worry you, that this classical guerrilla tactics writing which says you must maintain a proportion of something like 10 to 1 in order to be effective against a guerrilla force that is mobile and can choose its targets at will. Does that kind of number worry you when you look at the size of the AFP that you are commanding now?

[De Villa] That number system of requiring or saying that you would require so many, say 7 to 10 soldiers for every guerrilla that is fighting you out there in the field, I think, is a western doctrine. But it is not really the number that counts, Dong, because in counterinsurgency operations, very much of the effort, the success of your effort, depends upon how the population supports you, how is the [word indistinct] working in, and your own capability to track down and pin down guerrillas and then engage in a combat.

In actual experience, there is a lot more time that is being spent by our forces in the field looking for them than fighting them. Fighting them is the easiest part of the problem. The hardest part is how to locate them, how to pin them down, and how to get them engaged in combat.

[Puno] Okay, let us break down various aspects of that policy a little later in the discussion, but one of the things that worries people is that of late, it seems that they have become more visible again. The insurgents, for instance, have taken to parading down the streets of some of our provinces, like for instance in Mexico, Pampanga, where there was a report that in the burial of one of their comrades, they paraded down the streets of the town. Again, we see reports of renewed emphasis on some sparrow attacks and a lot of these isolated attacks on certain detachments where the casualties seem to be pretty high. Is this an indication that they are stepping up their efforts again?

[De Villa] They have not really let down their activities in this regard. You see, a guerrilla force operates on the basis of availing itself of any given opportunity to strike, and therefore, if there is any area where they can strike, they will strike.

With respect to the Sparrow killings in Metro Manila, it has been off and on, really. We have experienced about three waves of this already in the past. But every time they are able to do this, we launch counteraction measures to include an appeal for public support because this is really not being received by the public very well, in terms of the violence that is being committed in our streets. They pull back a little and everytime they have

the opportunity, they go into it. But since we are engaged in a counterinsurgency war with the NPA, our soldiers and our policemen understand that this can happen at any time to anybody because we cannot hide. We have to be exposed. We have to perform our duties and we have to take the risk every day, knowing pretty well that one or two or three or a team would be around, just waiting for the opportunity to strike.

On the whole, I would say that their activities now are a little lower than in October or September last year, right after the attempted coup, when they immediately took advantage of the problems that we had with the group of Honasan and seized the opportunity. But when we were able to recover from the situation and took care of the problem, they fell back again.

[Puno] You were quoted today in a press conference today for the defense press corps and you did say that you would take a much firmer view, much firmer strategy against the insurgents. In fact, the correct quote is that you will crush the insurgents as quickly as possible. Is this an indication that the AFP is going to get even tougher in its drive against insurgents?

[De Villa] Yes, that is correct, Dong. I said some time in a press conference this noon that it is not enough that the Armed Forces, together with the police, just maintain peace and order. They have to go out and destroy the enemy.

[Puno] How do you propose to do this?

[De Villa] Well, first of all, I would like to say that we would look at our own capabilities all over again and make adjustments to make the Armed Forces more capable of deploying themselves everywhere and anywhere where we need to deploy them quickly enough and mount continuous campaigns to put pressure on the NPA, because it is only by a daily offensive action that you can keep them from getting together, massing their forces, raiding a town or a police station, or launching a major ambush against our troops. I believe that when I said that it is not enough that we maintain peace and order, this is precisely what we want to do. We want to bring the fight to where they are and to wherever they are.

[Puno] Does this represent a change in present policy? Is this different from your predecessor's approach to the problem?

[De Villa] I am talking only of the military side of the effort because there will be—through the peace and order councils—there will be other efforts. But I don't think that this is a radical change from what has been done by the Armed Forces in the past. But I only want to

emphasize that we really have to go after them, anywhere, in force, so that we can force them to break their guerrilla front. I am sorry, Dong, but I cannot deal on the specifics and the details of this because it would not be right for me to do so.

[Puno] I understand that, but I think...[changes thought] Basically, what I want to point out here is: Is this kind of tactics new, or is it something that has been practiced before? Because the question is, if that has been the tactics all along, how come the insurgency seems to be going?

[De Villa] Well, the thing that I have seen is that the Armed Forces is spread far and thin, we are all over the place. When you do this, in a way, it is correct because you are able to protect communities and installations and facilities. But then you lose the mobility and offensive capability of larger body of troops that you have.

Now we will have to solve the problem of who will protect the communities and who will protect the lines of communications, the installations, the centers of populations, and be able to do this in some way, and gather our Armed Forces and use these forces to run after the NPA. This is what I want to do.

[Puno] So, does that mean that we will be seeing a lot more emphasis on volunteer groups? I don't want to call them vigilantes because according to the papers, we should no longer be calling them vigilantes.

[De Villa] In our meetings with the peace and order council members chaired by Secretary Santos, we have given them the CVO label, which means Civilian Volunteer Organizations. I would encourage Civilian Volunteer Organizations in NPA-affected areas because, you will note, Dong, that in many of the NPA-affected areas, when the civilians and the citizens themselves volunteer to rise and address the problem themselves, with the help of the Armed Forces, then the NPA simply have a very hard time or they simply vanish from the scene and avoid these areas. [passage omitted]

[Puno] As objectively as you can, from the point of view of one who knows the resources that you are fighting with, and who is presumed to know, from your intelligence sources, the resources of the enemies, how can you rate the possibility of an NPA takeover in the near future?

[De Villa] I would rate it at a very, very low possibility at this point in time because I have dealt with some of their personnel who have been captured by us, and I have talked extensively with one of their top leaders last year. And he admitted to me the fact that they are still very, very weak compared to us.

On the other hand, the Armed Forces of the Philippines is solidly committed to dealing with them in the way that we are trained to do so. And for as long as the Armed

Forces is committed to preserve democracy in this country, I think that thing will not happen in the near future. The final factor, however, will be the people. For as long as the people are willing to support their armed forces and willing to go along with the efforts that the government is doing, then I think this country will never go communist.

[Puno] We have a question from former Under Secretary of Defense Wilson Gamboa.

[Gamboa] The insurgency problem has gotten worse since the advent of this administration. No less than the former secretary of national defense, Rafael Ileto, admitted such conditions. If you will recall the issue of the FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, it appears that indeed that the number of armed insurgents has escalated during the last 2 years, and it appears that they are getting bolder and open in their challenge to the authorities.

[Puno] Well, some people say the same thing. How do you respond to that kind of view?

[De Villa] Well, Dong, I think that kind of statement usually comes from those who are not in government, have been politicians or formerly in government, but are now outside the government.

But let us look at it from a total viewpoint. In their strategy, they are relying very heavily on armed struggle. As a matter of fact, they admitted publicly that this is their primary approach to grabbing political power in this country. And you must understand that the Armed Forces is there at this point in time to stop them. And we can also build up the Armed Forces. Understand, Dong, that we have not even called out our reserves yet. We have not even been partially mobilized. And all that we are relying on are the standing forces that we have, plus every now and then, civilian volunteer organizations, or in the past, we used the CHDF.

Now, if the whole government machinery, supported by the people, will be mobilized and address this problem squarely, then I don't think the NPAs will last very long hiding from us.

Now the other factor that must be considered is that our country is not like other countries which were overrun by the communists who attacked from neighboring sanctuaries across borders. In this particular case, the Philippines is an insular country. Therefore, it is very difficult for them to bring in war materials.

[Puno] Do you not believe these reports that there had been foreign assistance in terms of arms and ammunition?

[De Villa] The newest effort of the CPP is the creation of what they called the National Commission for Overseas Work. This is an attempt on their side to mobilize

foreign support in terms of, first of all, political support or political solidarity with communist parties across the world. Secondly, moral support. Then thirdly, material support, perhaps in terms of publications and other materials, and, lastly, financial support. But up to this point in time, this is still a new thing to them and whatever support they are getting from the outside are in the form of funds and, perhaps, political connections with other communist parties. But so far that we know, there is no government support coming anywhere else in the world.

[Puno] I take it you are monitoring these activities?

[De Villa] Certainly.

[Puno] Prof Martinez from the University of the Philippines and the Far Eastern University asked about your program to crush the insurgency. Do you have a timetable? In how many years are you going to eradicate the insurgency?

[De Villa] That will depend on how much support we will get from the people, the government, and in terms also of equipments and material that we will need to do this. All I say today is that we will go all out, master the resources within our control in the military, and to do our part of the job, but I would like to inform the public, Dong, that the military is only part of the whole system that must address this problem.

You see, this is a classic communist revolutionary war, which consists of a political component, a psycho-social component, an economic component and a military component. We are only handling the military aspect of this. And a lot will depend on the government's economic efforts to improve the people's lives.

[Puno] But on the military side, can you honestly say, as a military man, that the situation has stabilized, that, at least, the stage that some people claimed the communists are very close to coming, which is a strategic stalemate, is far from coming true, this in spite of the situation in Bicol and other provinces?

[De Villa] They have been trying to reach what they call the strategic counteroffensive, which is the last stage of their strategic defensive stage. And they have been trying to do this for 2 years, Dong, but in our assessment, despite all the media releases that you can see and all the pictures of NPAs here and there, moving about in the mountains, I would say that while they have the capabilities to strike at small detachments, municipalities and police stations, they do not have the capabilities to do this in large scale, and hold whatever they are attacking because that will open them to annihilation from our counterattacking forces.

[Puno] What about disruptive activities, like it is popular wisdom that they are in the cities now?

[De Villa] They do have disruptive capabilities, but then if the people are with us, that would be easy to handle. Certainly, a guerrilla has always, no matter how small and no matter how large, the capability to strike at a time and place of his choosing. Our Armed Forces is not that big to cover every place in this country.

That is why, I was saying before that we will have to devise new approaches to protect our population centers, our lines of communications, our installations, and our communities, so that the larger part of the Armed Forces, which is now more or less stationary and doing a protective effort in this particular area, could be released from such kind of deployment, and used for more offensive action on a sustained basis so that we can keep the guerrillas from their targets. [passage omitted]

[Puno] We have another question from former Under Secretary Gamboa on the fractiousness of the military. [passage omitted] That is the concern of a lot of people. We know that the factions are there and we know that there is real need for a more unified military to go after the insurgents. The question is: Is the military unified?

[De Villa] The factionalism that the former under secretary is talking about is the factionalism created by Honasan and his group when they organized a certain segment of the Armed Forces to go against this government, take over and do their strategies and courses of action with respect to insurgency and I don't know what. But that attempt of August 28 has been addressed by us squarely, and most of them are in custody right now. The others deserted the Armed Forces and they are on the outside.

This is the major crack or divisiveness that the Armed Forces suffered from. But since we had gotten over that and we have consolidated the Armed Forces, I think the Armed Forces is more unified and stronger now than what many outsiders could give it credit. To be certain, the Armed Forces is solid in its stand against communism in this country.

[Puno] A lot of people asked whether the concerns advanced by Colonel Honasan have been taken care of by the military? Of course, a lot of people may not agree with his methods, his basic inclinations, but a lot of people remembered what he talked about, in terms of promotion, favoritism in the military. Have all these concerns been addressed?

[De Villa] Yes, all of these concerns have been addressed, except for one, which is the central issue of Honasan. And this is for the military to intervene and actually run the government by forming a military junta as an answer to insurgency. We disagreed with this, and we believe that a strong democracy, with good government leaders, will be the real answer to insurgency.

[Puno] A lot of people are making judgements on what constitutes a good government, so I guess the question that I will ask you is: Are there any circumstances in your view under which the military can ever intervene in a civilian government?

[De Villa] Well, I suppose that when something like what happened in EDSA [Epifanio de los Santos Avenue] in 1986 develops again over a period of time and the people themselves rise up to change the government, I suppose that will be the only time. But you must remember that the last revolution in the country from the EDSA was in 1986.

[Puno] When some of the reformists in the military were talking about good government, what were they saying? Were they saying that the military had its own idea of what good government was, and that idea of good government could be imposed on the civilian authorities?

[De Villa] I think good government, whoever so defines it, means the same thing, but perhaps what they really wanted was power. I interviewed the major officers in that coup right that evening after they surrendered to us or we had captured them. And I asked them: What do you intend to accomplish? And they said: Sir, we hope to take over and establish a military junta. And then I said: Who are people you are going to put in the junta? And he said this, this, and this. How about chief of staff, do you want Honasan to become chief of staff? And he said: We are going to put a general there and we are going to reorganize. And what are you people going to do, you who led this coup? And he said: Sir, we will be staying there and watching, and if it does not work, then we will do it again.

[Puno] The big question, what is happening to Colonel Honasan? Is there any chance that he will be given amnesty?

[De Villa] Amnesty is beyond my level. It is a political act, as far as I know. Insofar as the military is concerned, he will be charged and tried by a general court martial. When that is finished, the results will be reviewed by higher authorities, by the secretary of defense and the president.

[Puno] It is only under conditions that, if he is somehow exonerated of the charges, it is only under these conditions that he will be allowed to come back to the military. Or is there no possibility that he will come back to the military?

[De Villa] He has actually been dropped from the roster of the military, and if he ever will have to come back to the military by an act of a superior authority, then he will have to be recommissioned into the Armed Forces. Commissioned again to the Armed Forces and called to active duty.

[Puno] Two of the officers that the people keep asking about, Aguinaldo and Abadilla, were victors in the last elections. How do you view that? Do you view that as some kind of confirmation that what they are saying or doing are acceptable to some part of our populace?

[De Villa] We cannot treat them on the same basis. Dong. Abadilla, for instance, is very well-known in his province. I suppose his province mates consider him as some kind of hero to them. Now with respect to Aguinaldo, he was viewed by the Cagayanos as a very strong anti-communist leader. And since the people of the Cagayan Valley has been suffering from the depredations of the NPA continuously for many years, I would assess that they see in him an opportunity to have a leader who will go all out against the NPA.

Consider also the fact that what probably happened in Cagayan Valley is a repetition of what happened in Rizal, in Batangas Province, in Negros Oriental, in Bukidnon, wherein old names and old faces were dropped by the voters, and they picked up new ones.

[Puno] Neither of them are in the military now?

[De Villa] In the case of Abadilla, he was dropped from the roll and therefore he is a civilian. In the case of Aguinaldo, he was not dropped from the roll, he was not a renegade. He was actually performing duty as a small task force commander in eastern part of Cagayan when elections came. And at the moment he filed his certificate of candidacy, by our regulations, he became a civilian. [passage omitted]

[Puno] Gen de Villa, what about the feeling in the military before that the civilian government harboured a lot of leftists? Is that still the feeling in the military right now?

[De Villa] It will depend on who you are talking to, because the Armed Forces is composed of persons who are exposed to different information and who formed differing opinions. But by and large, I think they agree that we have a government that has been put there by the people. They have seen that the commander-in-chief has been reorganizing her team towards a more effective government, including a more effective counterinsurgency program.

[Puno] Graft and corruption within the military, what do you intend to do about it?

[De Villa] Well, there have been actual reforms that have been started by my predecessors to address this particular problem. And investigations have been conducted on a continuing basis by the antigraft board created under retired General Flores which was then a part of the

PCGG [Presidential Commission on Good Government]. Quietly, these investigations have been going on and, when necessary, charges are filed, and in many cases, charges have been dropped as decided by the board.

Internally, within the military, I would like to announce that I will hold commanders all the way down the line accountable for stopping malpractices within the organization. This has got to be recognized by every commander as a major portion of his responsibility to run his unit effectively and efficiently.

[Puno] Finally, since we are running out of time. You have also been characterized sometimes in some media reports as being a Ramos clone [de Villa laughs] in that you are just another copy of General Ramos and you are a very close associate of his and, therefore, people think you are not going to be any different. Meaning that the policies you will follow will just be a carbon copy of your predecessor. How do you intend to be different? How do you intend to make your own mark in history?

[De Villa] I have been used to it, Dong. A clone, a carbon copy, a xerox copy or whatnot. I will admit that I have been very closely associated to General Ramos because right after I graduated from the Asian Institute of Management, he picked me to be part of his staff and, except for the times wherein I was a field commander, I was in his staff. However, we are two different persons. We are looking at the situation and from our respective points of views, and certainly it is not necessarily so that when he looks at a problem and thinks of a solution, that will automatically be my solution.

But let me emphasize that there will much better teamwork now, between the Department of Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, since we thoroughly understand each other. This does not mean that the Armed Forces will just be reflecting....

[Puno] Are you confirming the animosity between the....[Puno chuckles]

[De Villa] No, I am not saying that, Dong. I am saying that at least the teamwork will be stronger this time, and I can foresee that we can settle our differences in dialogues and conferences, if there are any that will develop. But I just ask you to watch how I will do.

[Puno] And we shall do that, sir, in the next several years of your 3-year term. I think we have run out of time. I would like to thank you very much, General de Villa, for being with us this evening on your first one-on-one interview on Philippine television. I hope that on all these points that you have raised, we could come back to you again, perhaps in the near future, and see whether they have worked and whether the performance matches the objectives, which everybody sympathizes with. Good

luck, and we hope to be talking to you again in the near future. Thank you, sir, and thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for being with Viewpoint this evening. Until next week, bye.

Military Captures 2 Top Communist Leaders
HK041227 Hong Kong AFP in English 1223 GMT
4 Feb 88

[Text] Manila Feb 4 (AFP)—Two top leaders of the communist underground and 18 other insurgents have been captured in a massive military sweep in Manila and its suburbs, the government announced Thursday.

Armed Forces chief General Renato de Villa said that Tomas Dominado and Nicolas Ruiz, who he described as suspected members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) policy-making body, the central committee, had been arrested during the past 36 hours.

Eighteen other leaders or members of the CPP, its guerrilla army the New People's Army (NPA) and the rebel coalition National Democratic Front (NDF) had also been detained, he added.

"We believe that we have broken the communication nerve center of the CPP-NPA in the national capital region," Gen. de Villa told a news conference, adding that sophisticated communications systems had been seized in the raids.

"We have organized a legal task force composed of the JAGO (the military's Judge Advocate General's Office) and the department of justice to prepare charges against these people," the general said.

He said they were being well cared for and would be allowed to see their lawyers.

Gen de Villa said the military dragnet was continuing.

Observers said the arrests had dealt a massive blow to the insurgency, coming at a time when the rebel leadership had been planning to escalate the 19-year-old conflict to attain what it called a "strategic stalemate" with government forces.

The arrests also came two days after Gen de Villa vowed that the military would "seek and destroy" the communist insurgency.

Rodolfo Salas, who the military has described as the chairman of the CPP, was captured outside a Manila hospital in September 1986.

The operations against communist safehouses in and around the capital began Wednesday, when the paramilitary constabulary raided a house containing rebel documents and medical supplies in suburban Quezon City and detained a woman.

The military also found sophisticated hospital facilities in a raid on a house in another district of Quezon City before dawn Thursday.

Military spokesmen said the two facilities were used by the Alex Boncayao Brigade, an NPA assassination unit blamed for the murder last year of more than 100 soldiers, policemen and government officials.

Five of those captured were ranking regional officials of the communist underground, the military said.

Mr Ruiz was a former Roman Catholic priest, and so was another one of those captured, Rustico Tan, the military added.

Gen de Villa said the military had seized "a coded list" of rebel supporters, both foreign and local. He did not elaborate.

Earlier Thursday, the Dutch Embassy here denied having links with the Philippine rebels following reports that the mission's address was found on a box during Wednesday's raid in Quezon City.

The international headquarters of the insurgent NDF is located in Utrecht in the Netherlands. The military earlier said the NDF raised eight million dollars in cash, firearms and material aid from private organizations abroad last year.

Meanwhile, NPA guerrillas raided a town in nearby Quezon province Wednesday and seized eight automatic rifles, a radio communications set and office equipment, military authorities said in the capital of Lucena City Thursday.

The state-run PHILIPPINE NEWS AGENCY (PNA) said the rebels killed the police chief of San Francisco town and another policeman and kidnapped two soldiers in the raid. Military spokesmen in the area could not confirm this.

Raids NPA Manila Hideout

HK031427 Hong Kong AFP in English 1425 GMT
3 Feb 88

[Text] Manila, Feb 3 (AFP)—Security forces raided a suspected communist guerrilla hideout in suburban Manila late Wednesday and detained a woman, television stations said.

Government television and the private station GMA said security forces found ammunition, medical supplies and communist documents in the house, some of them contained in a box bearing the address of the Dutch Embassy in suburban Manila.

Netherlands Denies Links With Communists
HK040421 Hong Kong AFP in English 0346 GMT
4 Feb 88

[Text] Manila, Feb 4 (AFP)—The Dutch Embassy here Thursday denied any links with the Philippine communist insurgency following reports that the mission's address was found on a box during a raid on a suspected guerilla hideout here.

Security forces, meanwhile, raided another suspected hideout of urban guerrillas of the communist New People's Army (NPA) Thursday as part of a major tactical shift ordered by the new military command.

"I have read about it. I have no comment. We don't know about it," Dutch Embassy spokesman Peter van Leeuwen told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE when asked about Wednesday's raid.

"The Dutch Government does not support the (communist) insurgency," he said when asked about earlier charges linking his government to the rebels.

Television stations here said bullets, medical supplies and communist documents had been found during the raid, adding that some of the items were found in a box bearing the address of the Dutch Embassy in the Makati district.

The international headquarters of the National Democratic Front (NDF), the umbrella organization of the Philippine communist insurgency, is located at Utrecht in the Netherlands.

Mr van Leeuwen said this was "another thing" and stressed that the Utrecht-based NDF international representative, Luis Jalandoni, was in the Netherlands because he had acquired Dutch citizenship a few years ago.

Intelligence agents, meanwhile, raided a suspected clinic for wounded urban guerrillas Thursday in the same Manila suburb where Wednesday's raid occurred.

Police said no one had been arrested but the agents had found fresh blood in what looked like an operating room in a residential bungalow, said to be owned by a physician, in Quezon City.

They declined to give more details.

Radio reports from the scene quoted neighbours as saying that the house had been visited occasionally by the doctor and men who arrived in different vehicles, some without licence plates.

The raids were launched after new Armed Forces chief of staff General Renato de Villa announced Tuesday that the security forces would not only maintain peace and order this year but would also "go out and destroy the enemy."

A woman, Reglinda Reyes, was detained during Wednesday's raid, which followed a tip off from a captured member of the Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB), an NPA unit operating in Manila, the television stations said.

The ABB has been blamed by the military for the slaying of more than 100 policemen, soldiers and civilians in the Manila area last year.

Cardinal Disbands 'Infiltrated' Church Group
*HK040911 Hong Kong AFP in English 0900 GMT
4 Feb 88*

[Text] Manila, Feb 4 (AFP)—A Roman Catholic Church group in the Philippines has been placed under tighter control after being infiltrated by leftwingers who had channelled its funds to communist rebels, Jaime Cardinal Sin said Thursday.

He also defended President Corazon Aquino's human rights record and warned of a communist takeover if her government failed.

The church's National Secretariat for Social Action (NSSA) which worked on organising and educating communities for self-help was "infiltrated, highly infiltrated, because the money comes from abroad," Cardinal Sin told a press luncheon.

He gave no estimate of the funds channeled to the underground but said NASSA handled millions of pesos in funds and that the money channeled by infiltrators was being used to "buy weapons and strengthen and develop" the communist New People's Army (NPA).

He said the rechanneled funds came from European groups, but gave no further details on the organisation's funding.

✓ All but one of the more than 100 members of the Catholic Bishops Conference decided last month to restructure the NASSA, turning it into a foundation registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

✓ It is now managed by two radical bishops who know how the left infiltrates organizations, Cardinal Sin said.

Cardinal Sin also defended President Aquino from charges of mounting human rights abuses, and said "the people must now join hands in a common effort to achieve the goals of the government," warning that if it failed, communism, "a new dictatorship," would follow.

"All the institutions that are needed for a workable democracy are now in place," he said, adding that the new Congress, a revamped judiciary and the presidency constituted a "fully operational" system of checks and balances.

He said that with a democratic government now in place, he and other churchmen would now retreat to the background to concentrate on spiritual matters and help the poor, speaking out occasionally when necessary.

Cardinal Sin, the 59-year-old spiritual leader of this largely Roman Catholic nation, was a central figure in the peaceful revolt that toppled former president Ferdinand Marcos and installed Mrs. Aquino in power in February 1986.

He displayed irritation when pressed about charges that security forces and government-backed vigilantes were abusing the rights of civilians in trying to reverse the nationwide insurgency led by the NPA.

Cardinal Sin said human rights abuses had been minimised under Mrs. Aquino and blamed the legacy of 20 years of authoritarian rule by deposed president Ferdinand Marcos for the excesses.

He reiterated his support for the countryside vigilantes, some of them armed, who help the military locate and fight the 25,000-strong NPA, likening them to groups that fought Japanese occupation forces in World War II.

"But we condemn violence. We cannot tolerate it," he added.

He also disowned Task Force Detainees, a church-based agency monitoring human rights which is controlled by the Vatican, saying it was twisting facts and castigated the foreign press for allegedly slandering the Philippines by carrying the group's reports. ✓

Cardinal Sin called on Washington to boost its aid to Manila, saying Filipinos were "resentful" because "we are being taken for granted."

He refused to take a stand in the current debate here on whether the U.S. Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base should be allowed to stay beyond the end of their lease in 1991, but suggested that the only problem with the facilities was their "very meager" annual rent of 180 million dollars.

Interview With Communist Party Founder
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[Interview with Jose Maria Sison, ex-detainee and founding chairman of the Communist Party of the Philippines, by Homero Buenviaje]

[Text] "These accusations are pure nonsense," Jose Maria Sison, ex-detainee and founding chairman of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), said with a

naughty grin and a wave of his hand when informed that Aquino government officials had again alleged that he and Luis Jalandoni, National Democratic Front (NDF) international representative, have been collecting funds in Europe to buy arms for shipment to revolutionary guerrillas back home.

"I have been very busy lately lecturing, researching and writing," he told this correspondent, who interviewed him for nearly three hours one wintry morning in November in a small but noisy cafe in Cologne, Germany, just a stone's throw from the city's magnificent Gothic cathedral.

"I wish I could do more for the movement, but my time has been really limited," Joema (his now internationally known pet name) went on, with a hint of sadness in his voice.

Right after the interview with Sison, I called up the NDF International Office at Utrecht, the Netherlands, for a reaction. Jalandoni was out of town, but his deputy, Byron Bocar, a MABINI [Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity, and Nationalism Incorporated] lawyer who had been forced into exile by Marcos repression, read me a prepared statement over the phone which he had minutes earlier telexed to Manila and the European papers.

Bocar categorically denied any truth to what he called "the old and incredible tale" about the NDF receiving huge amounts of money and arms from well-known international NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations].

Their office does not deal in arms and observes national and international laws outside the Philippines, he said.

He reiterated an earlier statement by Dutch Foreign Minister van den Broek that his government found nothing wrong or illegal in the status and activities of the NDF office abroad.

Mrs Aquino has merely "refurbished an old and favorite tactic of Marcos and many past fascists who had become insecure in their rule: that of finding a scapegoat," he read from his prepared press statement.

She needs a scapegoat to blame for her obvious failures in governance and divert public attention away from her government's inability to suppress a growing popular movement for change and to quell mutinous officers of her own Armed Forces.

Mrs Aquino and her government have surely better things to attend to, such as arresting and punishing her rebel military officers and disbanding the death squads responsible for a string of assassinations and other gross human rights violations, he suggested.

She and her officials had better attend to these rather than "concentrating on dredging up mud in international waters to sling at the NDF and at Luis Jalandoni," Bocar concluded.

You and your wife, Julie, have been away from the Philippines for over a year now. I recall you left about a month before the assassination of Partido ng Bayan [PNB—People's Party] and Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU—1 May Movement] head Rolando Olalia in November 1986. Do you have any plans of returning home, as Mr Ruben Zamora and other leaders of the Frente Democratico Revolucionario (FDR) in El Salvador recently did?

Of course, I plan to return home. But I still have to fulfill certain commitments for quite some time. I have accepted a fellowship in a European university and I am helping out in the formation of a center for Asian studies. I am also busy working on a book A VIEW FROM WITHIN THE PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION, which is an attempt to present the Philippine revolutionary movement through my experiences, circumstances and ideas. I am also expected by my publishers to update PHILIPPINE CRISIS AND REVOLUTION, the series of 10 lectures which I delivered at the Asian Center of University of the Philippines soon after my release from detention; and to supervise the selection of my works for a book publication.

Because of these three book projects, I have slowed down in the lecture circuit. I need the time to attend to these.

How do you react to the Philippine authorities' repeated accusations, including that made recently by Defense Secretary Ileto, that you and NDF international representative Luis Jalandoni have been busy going around, especially in Europe, collecting funds to buy arms for shipment to the revolutionary movement in the Philippines?

These accusations are pure nonsense. As I already said, I have been so busy lecturing, researching and preparing my three books for publication. I wish I could do more for the national democratic movement, but my time has been really limited.

But I think that the national democratic movement is entirely entitled to political and material support from the peoples of the world. As far as I know, it is the Aquino regime which is depending on the material support of foreign powers, especially the United States, despite the large amounts of funds it has already received to use for further oppressing and exploiting the Filipino people. It would like to monopolize for itself foreign assistance from institutions and organizations abroad for its own fake NGOs.

If I were in the Philippines the CIA and the likes of General Ileto would certainly like to have me killed, like (Partido ng Bayan and Kilusang Mayo Uno leader)

Rolando Olalia and (BAYAN [Bagong Alyansang Makabayan—New Nationalist Alliance] secretary-general) Lean Alejandro. But even while I'm abroad, they like to hound me and keep on imagining wildly what I could be doing.

How would you assess the main characteristics and problems of the Cory Aquino government? Do you still think she won't last more than two years, as you were quoted saying in an article not long ago?

Since the beginning of the Aquino regime, I have described it mainly and essentially as a pro-U.S. and reactionary government of the comprador big bourgeoisie and the landlord class. For some time, this regime showed a tendency to be liberal democratic in terms of restoring the formal rights of the individual in the abstract and the system of check-and-balance among branches of the Manila-based government. But this tendency was merely secondary to the essentially pro-imperialist and reactionary character of the regime. Eventually, the bourgeois-liberal and nationalist human rights lawyers in the Aquino cabinet would be wiped out.

There can be no doubt that Aquino is no different from Marcos insofar as she is the chief political agent of U.S. imperialism and the local exploiting classes. She may not have stepped into any of Imelda's shoes but she has certainly stepped into the shoes of Marcos. She has failed to satisfy even only the anti-fascist demands of the people. She has declared total war against the progressive forces and endorsed the death squads and vigilante groups. The rate at which human rights violations are being committed is now higher than it was during the Marcos regime.

Because her anti-people and rabid anti-Communist position has now fully unfolded, Aquino will go, like Marcos, into the dustbin of history, and she will stink more quickly because of the lesser resources at her command, graver human rights violations and ceaseless worsening of the socio-economic and political crisis. But I never said that she wouldn't last more than two years. I was misquoted. What I said clearly before was that the threat of a coup will become more serious and imminent in the medium term of two or three years from 1986.

Indeed, the August 28 coup attempt was the first serious coup attempt, though it still carried the aspect of a mere show d'etat or mere pressure play. This occurred even before Aquino could finish two years.

There are five possibilities for Aquino. One is that a coup d'etat will take place. Two is that she will be assassinated by followers of Enrile or Marcos. Three is that she can stay in power up to 1992 or the end of her term. Fourth is that she will resign before 1992. And fifth is that she will be compelled to call for new presidential elections.

All these possibilities are still open. That is a problem for her even as she tries to meet all demands of the U.S. and the reactionary classes to which she belongs and which she tries to serve well.

The ruling system is in the process of disintegration. The biggest gain of the revolutionary movement from the downfall of Marcos is the aggravation of the split among the factions of the reactionary classes. After the brief euphoria over the ascendance of Aquino to the presidency, the truth is so clear that the new regime, which is another puppet regime, can only aggravate the crisis, and the reactionary factions are so well-armed against each other and are poised to unleash violence against each other.

What do you think of Aquino's "get-tough" speech last October before business leaders and the publication later of some 25 legal organizations which have been alleged by military intelligence to be "communist fronts"? Do you think this would lead to a declaration of some kind of a state of emergency by the President or maybe a general crackdown against the revolutionary movement and the progressive legal organizations?

The "get-tough" speech of Aquino before the leaders of big business further exposes the persistence of fascism behind whatever is left of the "democratic" facade of the regime. Aquino herself further lays bare her own increasing tendency to play the fascist game of the fallen Marcos regime. The only thing preventing Aquino from openly declaring a state of emergency or martial law is the fear that she herself would be swallowed up by the whirlpool of fascism. She would be less capable than Marcos of keeping a firm hold on the Armed Forces of the Philippines [AFP].

But regardless of her subjective capabilities and wishes, the crisis of the ruling system is ceaselessly worsening and the trend is towards increased use of violence against the aboveground and underground progressive forces, whether a state of emergency is declared or not.

The United States and the Aquino regime are seeking to destroy the progressive forces even while they make hypocritical claims about democracy. But the revolutionary movement can hit back and deliver crippling blows against the U.S. and the entire system. To defend themselves, the legal progressive forces can use the strength and experience that they gained in the struggle against the outrightly fascist U.S.-Marcos regime.

It is probable that Aquino would declare a state of emergency in connection with the increasing violent contradictions among the reactionary factions and the intensified conflict between the reactionary and the revolutionary forces.

You have always followed the moves of the U.S. in the Philippines. Do you think the U.S. government, or certain of its agencies or armed forces, have been involved in the

series of coup attempts since July 1986? U.S. Ambassador Platt has several times indirectly confirmed that he and his men were in contact with Honasan during the August 28 aborted coup, and recently both houses of Congress have announced an "investigation" into alleged U.S. involvement in that incident. What do you think is the real U.S. "game plan" vis-a-vis the Aquino government and how does it intend to meet the growing Communist-led armed struggle?

There were no serious coup attempts up to August 28. There were only shows d'etat and coup rumors for pressure effect on Aquino. The U.S. was behind these to effect the removal of the human rights lawyers from the Aquino cabinet, extract from Aquino the pledge to extend tenure of the U.S. military bases, push compliance with policy dictates of the IMF and the World Bank and push the low-intensity conflict scheme.

The Manila Hotel incident of July 7, 1986, was encouraged by some U.S. agents to obtain direct positive benefits for the U.S. expose Marcos assets in the AFP and play up Aquino as a heroine who can remain only at the pleasure of the U.S.

The coup threats of the Enrile faction from August to November 1986 resulted in a bonanza of benefits for the U.S. and also for Enrile, who appeared to lose when he was dropped from the Aquino cabinet but who got the Philippine Legion Award and final assurances that he could keep the wealth that he had amassed while in office.

The Channel 7 incident of January 23, 1987 was some kind of a replay of the Manila Hotel incident to draw attention away from the Mendiola massacre and play up Aquino as a heroine. This was a show d'etat directly favorable to the U.S.-Aquino regime.

Even the August 28 incident still carried the aspect of a show d'etat encouraged by the U.S. military attaches and the CIA Manila station. The Honasan group overstepped by bringing troops close to Malacanang but obviously had no determination to carry a coup d'etat through to the end.

The American handlers of the Honasan group had to step in to control damage when things started getting out of hand.

The real U.S. game plan at the level of the White House and the National Security Council is to keep Aquino in place, make sure that she follows the line, and junk her if she does not follow the line or if the situation worsens even as she follows the U.S. line.

Coup rumors will continue to be floated to make Aquino appear as one deserving of public support and to shield her from responsibility for the assassination of the leaders of the progressive legal organizations in the urban areas and the massacres in the countryside.

Aquino is being used by the U.S. as far as possible against the revolutionary movement. But the U.S. also keeps its options open, including that of junking her if she proves to be an ineffective tool after all. The further growth of the revolutionary movement can result in the U.S. putting all the blame on Aquino.

As is widely conceded, the U.S. military bases remain the key strategic interest of the U.S. in the Philippines—as well as the "stickiest" problem in the Aquino government's foreign policy. How do you think this problem will be eventually resolved?

As early as the morning of November 10, 1986, Aquino had pledged to the U.S. through Philip Habib the retention of the U.S. military bases beyond 1991. This was part of the compromise deal ostensibly between Aquino and Enrile. In the afternoon of November 12, 1986, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Gaston Sigur secretly met Aquino in Tokyo and gave her Washington's seal of approval for the deal.

You do not even have to know such details of Aquino's skulduggery to be convinced that the U.S.-Aquino regime is determined to retain the U.S. military bases beyond 1991. The Aquino constitution reveals the way the U.S. military bases would be retained.

A treaty will be negotiated by an executive shorn of such cabinet members as Joker Arroyo and Rene Saguisag, and will be ratified by a Senate which is more than two-thirds in favor of retaining the U.S. military bases. Actually, most of the 12 senators being pictured as critical of the bases are actually pro-U.S. bases and wish merely to raise the compensation price for their retention.

The essential act of ratification will be done by the Senate. But a referendum might still be called as a sort of icing on the cake. The U.S. and its stooges will not be satisfied with the manipulation of public opinion through the mass media, which are biased in favor of the bases. It will go so far as to rig the voting process to prove that the people approve of their own chains.

The swindling process has started, with Manglapus differentiating his previous anti-bases position as his personal opinion from his current position as foreign affairs secretary. He is now making propaganda in favor of the U.S. bases by soliciting the opinions of the other ASEAN members. Subsequently, he will be drumming up the so-called threats from Cam Ranh Bay and the Soviet Union.

The Aquino regime will certainly justify the extension of the U.S. military bases beyond 1991 by saying that the Philippines is in financial distress and is in need of the compensation package. Within the present system, the

arguments against the U.S. bases will not have as much chance of being aired as those in favor. The people can hope to remove the U.S. military bases only through the revolutionary movement.

How do you assess the development of the armed and unarmed opposition to the Aquino administration since she came to power? Do you still estimate, as you did earlier, that the revolutionary forces can attain a "strategic stalemate" with the government's forces in three to five years' time? Won't this estimate be upset in the event that the U.S. decides to intervene directly in terms of combat troops and more sophisticated armaments?

✓ The estimate that the revolutionary forces can attain strategic stalemate in three to five years' time (from 1986) is actually a conservative estimate. There are those who think more optimistically that it is possible in two to three years' time.

Consider that the ruling system is in a process of disintegration, with major political factions of the exploiting classes having considerable armed followings maneuvering against each other.

Then consider the present balance of forces between armed revolution and the counter-revolutionary state.

NPA strength
mass base
There are now 10,000 full-time guerrilla fighters with automatic rifles, augmented by 20,000 other guerrilla fighters; some thousands of militiamen trained for combat; and several tens of thousands of militiamen capable of support work. The mass base is 10 million people under organs of political power and in mass organizations.

The other side has 40,000 combat effectives in 86 maneuver battalions augmented by 120,000 support troops, 50,000 policemen and 50,000 paramilitary personnel. The legal fiction is that the counter-revolutionary state has the loyalty of 58 million people although the fact is that this state does not have the deep-going loyalty of the exploited classes.

To reach the strategic stalemate, it is enough for the revolutionary forces to have even only 25,000 full-time guerrilla fighters armed with automatic rifles and other high-powered weapons. This level of strength would allow the NPA to operate in 1,000 out of the 1,500 towns and cities of the Philippines.

As I said before, to move up from 10,000 to 25,000 is no longer a dream. The growth of the armed revolutionary movement is cumulative.

The U.S. cannot stop the armed revolution from reaching the stage of strategic stalemate. What it can probably do is to try to prolong the strategic stalemate and delay the strategic offensive with the use of U.S. aggressor troops, especially after the failure of the low-intensity conflict strategy.

But we must recognize that the U.S. relative to other international factors, has declined greatly from its level of strength at the time of the Vietnam war. And I do not think that the American public is as willing as before to allow its rulers to waste thousands of American lives in the multiplying guerrilla fronts in the Philippines.

Is it correct to say that the stage of strategic defensive is still in the process of maturing? Will not a combination of the low-intensity conflict scheme and some kind of Marshall Plan of two billion dollars cut short the advance of the revolutionary movement?

You are correct in saying that the stage of the strategic defensive is still in the process of maturing. Upon maturation, this stage leads to that of the strategic stalemate and further on to that of the strategic offensive. To speak of these stages is to conceive of the most probable course of development.

I do not think that the low-intensity conflict scheme will succeed. The idea of the U.S. is to use Filipinos to kill Filipinos and wipe out the cadres and mass base of the revolutionary movement; and extensively use psychological warfare, including assassinations and massacres, to intimidate the people.

The revolutionary cadres and forces are not exposed to the enemy and cannot be destroyed. The killings and forced mass evacuations will only discredit the puppet regime and will persuade more people to join the revolutionary movement.

It is the counter-revolutionaries who expose themselves to the revolutionaries and are themselves more vulnerable to counter-action. Arms distributed to paramilitary forces eventually fall into the hands of the revolutionaries. The anarchy encouraged by the reactionaries among their paramilitary forces will fuel the internal strife among the reactionary factions.

A Marshall Plan of two billion dollars for the Philippines is a big joke in the face of the fact that the U.S. cannot tolerate even the suggestion of a selective cancellation of foreign debts and the Aquino regime cannot borrow enough even only to pay the yearly interest on the accumulated foreign debt. The yearly debt service is now more than three billion dollars.

Because of huge budgetary and trade deficits, the United States is under pressure to cut down its expenditures. Although Aquino is already committed to the extension of the U.S. military bases beyond 1991, she is under the threat of a coup d'etat so as to deter her from upping the price for the bases.

Uncle Sam is not Santa Claus. New loans under a so-called Marshall Plan will only extract more wealth from the country and aggravate the crisis.

So long as the revolutionary leadership continues to be on the correct road, the U.S. cannot cut short the advance of the revolutionary movement.

✓ The CIA station in the Philippines has 10 million dollars more for long-term surveillance, spywar and funding vigilante groups and death squads. How would the revolutionary movement respond to the CIA covert operations?

Because of the deadly CIA covert operations in the Philippines, which have already resulted in the killing of leaders and members of the legal democratic organizations at various levels, the national question comes to the fore and the revolutionary movement is being obliged to respond to the tendency of the U.S. to turn the civil war into a national war against U.S. armed intervention and aggression.

✓ The U.S., especially the CIA and the Pentagon, wants to wipe out the revolutionary movement by killing activists of the legal mass organizations and alliances.

The logical response of the revolutionary movement is to strengthen the underground and absorb activists who can no longer work aboveground; to let the legal democratic movement preserve and strengthen itself; to expose the rottenness of the system; and to hit back at the imperialists.

The armed revolutionary movement can attack U.S. military personnel, offices and facilities because in the first place the U.S. is bent on preserving the gains of perpetuated aggression and directing covert operations to kill even unarmed leaders and members of progressive legal organizations.

The armed revolutionary movement is conscious of the fact that the U.S. government because of public pressure decided on withdrawing from Vietnam only after U.S. troops suffered a casualty rate of 50,000 dead and hundreds of thousands injured.

The military and paramilitary forces directly supervised by the CIA and Pentagon agents, with the blessings of the White House and the National Security Council, are very much ahead in killing patriots and progressives. It is therefore logical and just for the armed revolutionary movement to hit back at the U.S.

The American people must demand that the U.S. stop the carnage inspired and supervised by its agencies.

As the armed revolution moves into the strategic stalemate, will not the U.S. escalate its intervention to the point of an all-out war of aggression as in Vietnam in the past? How can the revolutionary movement counter this?

The U.S. is already escalating its armed intervention in the Philippines. It is delivering more military supplies to the AFP; increasing the number of U.S. military advisers and trainers; and beefing up the CIA network.

It is probable that the U.S. will launch a war of aggression. The revolutionary movement has to prepare against the worst to be able to hope for the best.

Let us assume the worst. The U.S. comes in with maneuver regiments and with plenty of tanks and airplanes.

The response of the revolutionary movement to the mere possibility of this is to multiply its platoons and companies on a wide scale, maintain mobility, deprive the foreign and puppet enemy of any safe rear, and inflict heavy casualties on U.S. troops as soon as possible.

The American public does not want U.S. troops fighting and dying in a foreign country several thousands of miles away.

As regards the tanks and armored personnel carriers, the revolutionary movement has started to use land mines and seek other anti-tank weapons. As regards helicopters and other aircraft, these are very expensive and can be shot down by far less expensive weapons. In addition to high casualty rates, the U.S. can be forced to withdraw by the high cost of planes shot down.

The escalating armed intervention of the U.S. has pressed the revolutionary movement to expand and develop its international relations and seek all possible moral and material support from abroad.

While preparations against the worst have to be made, the people and the revolutionary movement have to recognize the decline of the U.S. since its defeat in the Vietnam war. Little Nicaragua is proving to the world that it can stand successfully against the imperialist behemoth.

Are you aware of certain ideas circulating that the short cut to total victory of the revolutionary movement is through armed urban uprisings and that protracted people's war is passe? One idea is to emulate the Nicaraguan uprisings. And the other is to conduct parliamentary struggle as the main form of struggle under the Aquino regime and then go for uprisings when there is a restoration of fascist rule. What do you think of these ideas?

Whether we like it or not, the people's war in the Philippines is protracted. It has been going on for 18 years.

To rush to armed urban uprisings with only 10,000 automatic rifles as a hard core is to beg for the annihilation of the armed revolutionary movement. It is wrong and disastrous to overreach.

The fact is that many guerrilla fronts have already expanded to the point of covering town centers, provincial capitals and cities or portions of cities. Armed city partisans are already operating in many urban areas.

Armed urban uprisings should not be counterposed to the theory and practice of encircling the cities from the countryside over a protracted period of time. Some elements can now suggest that armed urban uprisings be launched only because there are firearms accumulated through protracted people's war.

But are the firearms in the hands of the NPA already enough for it to seize and keep political power in the cities? These are not enough. In due time, however, there will be enough. The arms can be accumulated only by winning tactical offensives whether possible over some more years.

The ruling system is conspicuously in a process of disintegration. But the problem is that the revolutionary movement does not yet have enough means with which to seize and keep political power in the cities. Will the opportunities provided by the deterioration of the ruling system be lost? No! The process of disintegration will continue and is guaranteed to continue with the firm advance of the armed revolutionary movement.

The revolutionaries in El Salvador tried to emulate the Nicaraguan success. But the U.S. and local reactionaries were already prepared to foil armed urban uprisings. In the Philippines, the U.S. and local reactionaries have always been alert. An impulsive action led by a hardcore of only 10,000 guerrilla fighters has no chance of winning. Revolutionaries have to do some more hard work. They should be happy that the NPA has grown from only nine automatic rifles in 1969 to 10,000 today.

As regards the idea of making parliamentary struggle the main form of struggle in preparation for armed uprisings, I would say that the armed revolutionary movement will never be in a position to conduct armed urban uprisings successfully if it does not continue to accumulate weapons through tactical offensives.

When it is said that armed struggle is the main form of revolutionary struggle, it means that it is the most important and effective way to perform the central task of seizing political power. It does not mean restraining legal forms of struggle. These can go as far as possible and these are helpful to the advance of the armed revolutionary movement. But to bring about the seizure of political power, legal forms of struggle cannot suffice.

Local polls have been set for January 18. In the light of the legal Left's "failure" in the legislative elections, what do you think should be the position of legal mass organizations this time? How about the revolutionary underground, the NDF, CPP and NPA in particular? What stance do you suggest for them vis-a-vis these elections?

Such revolutionary organizations as the CPP, NPA and NDF should stand above voting exercises staged by the counter-revolutionaries. They can describe these as farcical because after all the class enemy can still rig

elections in most areas in the country. They should not debate and divide the house on whether or not to participate in these exercises.

The revolutionary organizations are creating a revolutionary government. Also, the counter-revolutionary government. Also, the counter-revolutionary government prohibits them from participating in its elections.

But revolutionaries can let alone legal progressive parties in participating in reactionary elections in the same way that progressives and even revolutionary cadres can work in reactionary organizations and institutions.

There must even be more flexibility with regard to mass organizations and alliances. The revolutionaries should avoid splitting these organizations because of reactionary elections. Positions on electoral candidates and issues can be so formulated as to consider the uneven consciousness of the mass members and the independence and initiative of member-organizations in alliances and at the same time seek to raise the level of consciousness, organization and mobilization of the mass organizations and alliances.

In conducting elections, the reactionaries seek to create the illusion of democracy and to split and isolate the revolutionaries. This is their counter-revolutionary dual tactics.

As far as I am concerned, Partido ng Bayan can take part in the forthcoming local elections. However, it has to study well ways of overcoming the cheating and terrorism of those in power.

The inability of Partido ng Bayan to translate the progressive mass base into electoral votes in the last legislative elections should not be too discouraging. The candidates of Partido ng Bayan did not do well, not only because of the dearth of campaign money, the lack of mass media facilities, special CIA funding for certain reactionary candidates, reactionary church propaganda and the accumulated effects of state terrorism, but also because of Marcos-style rigging of the registration and voting records and processes, the declaration of 695 municipalities as trouble spots, and the intensified military operations and terrorist act against Partido ng Bayan candidates, campaigners and mass base.

The U.S.-Aquino regime had been so worried about Partido ng Bayan that it used methods of overkill previously used by the U.S.-Marcos regime. These methods were so carried out that the Enrile and Marcos factions were also harmed. The cheating was actually the main igniting factor for the Honasan coup attempt.

The last election has not made for a peaceful mode of settlement among the reactionary factions but on the contrary has aggravated their violent contradictions.

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The participation of Partido ng Bayan has not only given it a chance to promote the line of national freedom and democracy but has pushed the reactionaries into more violent contradictions.

There have been recent reports that the National Democratic Front would soon attain recognition of its status of belligerency in the international community, and even that it has plans to set up some kind of provisional coalition government. Can you comment on this?

Recognition of the status of belligerency in the international community can only proceed from the successful homework of the revolutionary movement. In due time, the National Democratic Front or the people's revolutionary government will have its status of belligerency recognized.

Since early 1969, the revolutionary forces have been building organs of political power at the barrio level. These committees of people's government are the base of the National Democratic Front.

The NDF has been doing well in paving the way for the committees of people's government from the municipal level upwards. At the same time, it has been doing well in building up international solidarity in support of the Filipino people's struggle and in preparation for the negotiations abroad that will bring about recognition of its status of belligerency.

As far as I can gather, NDF has been developing relations abroad with governments, pertinent offices of governments, national liberation movements, united front organizations, parties and mass organizations.

The Manila-based reactionary government keeps on taking prisoners, and torturing and killing quite a number of them. It would be just and reasonable for the revolutionary movement to arrest, detain and try counter-revolutionaries. In any war, it is a matter of course that the two sides take prisoners and exchange them at certain times.

Fifty-nine guerrilla fronts can hold hundreds of prisoners even only with an average of 10 prisoners each. The reactionary government will not be able to ignore the pleas for a negotiated exchange of prisoners.

At some point, there could be negotiations abroad at least for the exchange of prisoners. The negotiations and agreement can result in the recognition of the status of belligerency.

Usually, the recognition of the status of belligerency is the outcome of there being a foreign government acting as mediator and provider of a venue for negotiations and the reactionary government agreeing to negotiate and sign an agreement.

The most important legal and political effect of the recognition of the status of belligerency is that the NDF or the people's revolutionary government will be able to have transactions with foreign governments and international organizations without them being accused of interference.

There should be no more negotiations held in the lions' den. There are too many pitfalls in holding negotiations in Manila.

From your vantage point, and projecting what you see as the significant trends in the country today, where would you say is the national situation headed in terms of political and economic changes?

Within the pro-imperialist and reactionary framework, the Aquino regime is incapable of solving the root problems of the people and the socio-economic and political crisis.

It is absolutely clear that the Aquino regime is not interested in asserting national independence, solving the land problem and doing away with fascists and corrupt bureaucrats. On the other hand, the regime is determined to follow the dictates of the U.S. perpetuate big comprador-landlord rule, favor a new set of crooks, breed more fascists and escalate counter-revolutionary violence against the people.

The socio-economic crisis will continue to worsen. There is no way out for the increasing number of unemployed. The raw-material exports of the country will continue to be depressed. The foreign debt will weigh heavier on the people. The imperialists, big compradors, landlords and corrupt bureaucrats will continue to loot a deteriorating economy.

The political crisis will mean a greater propensity among the reactionary factions to arm themselves and use violence against each other; the escalation of counter-revolutionary violence against the people; and the accelerated growth of the armed revolutionary movement.

The U.S.-Aquino regime is now a far weaker opponent than the U.S.-Marcos regime from 1972 to 1983. Aquino has fully unmasked herself as just another oppressor and exploiter of the people. She uses the same slogans and tactics that Marcos used. And yet she does not have as much resources to play with, and no matter how hard she tries to oppress and exploit the people her fellow reactionaries who are also her political rivals will never be satisfied with her.

Thailand

Foreign Minister Announces Jet Downed by Laos
BK040715 Hong Kong AFP in English 0655 GMT
4 Feb 88

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Feb 4 (AFP)—Laotian forces shotdown a Thai F5E jet fighter early Thursday in heavy fighting in a remote border area, Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila said here.

Mr. Sitthi said the pilot of the downed jet parachuted to safety after his aircraft was hit. "We are not sure whether the plane was hit by a SAM missile or a MiG-21," he said.

Mr. Sitthi said Bangkok had ruled out any talks with Vientiane until all Laotian troops had withdrawn or had been expelled from the disputed territory some 430 kilometers (172 miles) north of Bangkok.

He was speaking to newsmen here after attending the first meeting of the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Commission.

The Thai foreign minister accused Laos of escalating the dispute although "we are quite definite that the area is ours." Thai and Laotian forces have traded fire in the disputed area for several months.

Mr. Sitthi said that Thai military officials had concluded that "a third country" was aiding Lao troops, adding "Vietnam has troops in Laos," when asked to identify the third nation involved.

Vietnam has an estimated 50,000 troops stationed in Laos.

Mr. Sitthi said his government's claim to the disputed territory was backed by French and Soviet maps, adding: "They (Laos) cannot argue against facts."

He said that Soviet bloc diplomats would be taken to the disputed region Friday in an attempt to prove Bangkok's case.

Mr. Sitthi said he believed the Thai military operation to push out Laotian forces would be completed within a few days, adding that a strategic Hill 1428 had been partly reoccupied by Thai forces.

"We will do our best to defend our country. The Thai military will do everything possible to expel the intruders," he said.

Gives Terms for Talks

*BK040749 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English
0741 GMT 4 Feb 88*

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Feb 4 (BERNAMA)—Thailand will talk with Laos, with which it is engaged in a border dispute, only after it has dislodged Laotian troops from the disputed remote border region, Thai Foreign Minister Air Chief Marshal Sitthi Sawetsila said Thursday.

We will focus on talks only after forcing them out, he told reporters after the close of the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Commission meeting here.

There had been three previous attempts for talks between the two countries but all fell through, he added.

Both Thailand and the communist government in Laos, which is supported by some 40,000 Vietnamese troops, say an 80 sq km area in the Ban Romklao area is on their territory.

Sitthi said Thailand lost an F-5E fighter bomber this morning when it was shot down by a SAM missile, but its ground forces had gained several strategic hills.

He denied Laotian accusations that Thailand was using chemical weapons and cluster bombs to clear inaccessible areas, saying the claim was ridiculous and mere fabrication.

Thailand never uses (chemical weapons), he stressed.

Military Reports on Border Clashes With Laos

Territory Retaken

*BK031434 Bangkok Army Television Channel 5
in Thai 1300 GMT 3 Feb 88*

[Unattributed "announcement" dated 3 February read by Colonel Praphat Sukantanak of Bangkok Army Television Channel 5]

[Text] The LPDR, some of whose leaders have become tools of a foreign country, has been sending forces to violate Thai sovereignty at Ban Romklao in Chat Trakan District of Phitsanulok, as has been widely reported. Since 1 February Thai forces, consisting mainly of Army soldiers, Ranger volunteers, border patrol policemen, and civilian volunteers, with air support from the Air Force, have launched heavy attacks against targets occupied by Lao forces inside Thai territory along the border.

Thai forces have been able to attack and drive back the Lao forces, which have suffered heavy casualties. Thai forces recaptured Hill 1370 at about 1500 [0800 GMT] on 2 February and Hill 1146 at about 1000 on 3 February. Thai troops were able to recapture part of Hill 1428, an important target, by 1500 on 3 February 1988. Troops remain mobilized to launch heavy attacks to recapture the entire hill as soon as possible.

Thai forces are operating to expel the Lao intruders from an area about 10 km northeast of Ban Romklao. Morale among the Thai forces is excellent. All have fought boldly and are ready to sacrifice their lives for their nation. The Thai people living near Ban Romklao have done their utmost to assist the military. Everyone is firmly united and will not permit Lao forces to occupy a single inch of Thai territory. Morale is low among the Lao soldiers who have surrendered to Thai authorities in the fighting. These Lao soldiers have admitted that foreign forces forced them to occupy Thai soil. The 3d Army Region will continue operations to expel Lao troops from Thai territory as soon as possible.

The public is hereby informed.

[Dated] 3 February, 1988

Aerial Bombing Resumes

BK040225 Bangkok THE NATION in English
4 Feb 88 pp 1, 2

[Text] Thailand yesterday resumed aerial bombing against Laotian intruders in the disputed border area in Phitsanulok and a senior army official declared that Thai forces were expected to dislodge the Laotians and recapture a strategic hill last night.

Gen Sunthon Khongsomphon, the armed forces chief-of-staff, said yesterday's air strike on Lao positions in Chat Trakan District was more extensive than those in the previous two days.

Army Spokesman Maj Gen Narudon Detpradiyut said the army would have "some good news to announce in two days."

He did not elaborate but said that the army was working around the clock to crush the Laotian resistance.

While Thailand has intensified its military pressure, the Lao side has noticeably been "silent", said Sunthon.

"I expect that our soldiers will recapture Hill 1428 tonight (last night)," he said.

Narudon said Thai troops have retaken several positions on the steep Hill 1428—the major base of the Laotians.

Sunthon said Thai soldiers "are ready" for future possible intrusions by Laotian troops "at any point" of the Thai-Lao border, a statement repeated by Narudon and Permanent Secretary for Interior Phisan Mulasatsathon.

However, Thai security authorities discussing the border situation in Bangkok yesterday didn't decide yet whether the border with Laos should be closed.

Phisan said major border check-points can still be allowed to open, "but we have to keep a close watch on strategic goods." Some minor border passes in Loei province have been closed.

Suwit Suthanukun, secretary general of the National Security Council, said the question of Thai-Laotian trade was discussed during his meeting with representatives from the army, Interior Ministry, Foreign Ministry and National Intelligence Agency.

Suwit said the authorities debated the pros and cons of closing the border.

There are currently three official border passes—two of them in Nong Khai and another one in Mukdahan.

"But there was no conclusion today. We will have another meeting on the matter," Suwit said.

In Loei, security forces yesterday morning clashed with an unknown number of Laotian intruders in an area near Chat Trakan District, officials said.

Casualties of both sides were not known, but the officials said the Laotians were believed to have suffered heavy losses following the two-hour confrontation.

Backed by artillery, the Laotian troops intruded into the area near Hill 1146—some two kilometres inside Thailand—at around 10 am, the officials said.

Thai artillery returned fire as Thai soldiers clashed heavily with the Laotian forces, many of whom were believed wounded or killed by explosions of landmines planted by the Thai side at the border area, said the officials.

'Intruders' Reportedly Retreating

BK040730 Bangkok Domestic Service in Thai
0530 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] Thai forces have nearly completed their mission to retake Hill 1428. Thongchai Tangcharoenkun, a public relations officer in Phitsanulok, reports:

[Begin recording] [Thongchai] Thai forces are near success in the fighting at Ban Romklao in the Chat Trakan District of Phitsanulok Province. They have been able to steadily drive back Lao soldiers and those of a third country. The enemy forces have suffered a loss in morale and their supply lines have been cut. Thai soldiers could see that Lao troops were chained to their artillery pieces to prevent their flight. Bodies of seven Lao soldiers were found at their positions yesterday. Thai forces have moved close to and have encircled Hill 1428. The Thai forces are expected to accomplish their task soon.

Lieutenant General Siri Thiwaphan, commander of the 3d Army Region, reported at about noon today to the Phitsanulok public relations officer on the battle situation. He gave assurances that enemy troops will be driven out of Thai territory soon.

[Siri] The fighting of the past 2 or 3 days has been intense. As I reported earlier, Lao forces have received support from a third party. Such support, which has consisted of personnel, weapons and ammunition, and advisers, has further intensified the fighting. We have orders from our superiors at every level to bring the battle to an end as soon as possible. This is the desire of the 3d Army Region as well. We have mobilized our forces to mount intense operations against the intruders for the sake of the Thai people's morale. Our forces are now on the offensive, and the Lao forces are retreating. The Laotians have suffered heavy casualties, necessitating reinforcements by helicopter.

Lao soldiers have been forced to wage this operation by a third country. Lao troops have been compelled to man their gun positions. Thai forces have continued to

advance steadily, but I cannot divulge their positions at this time. I can only say that our troops have made good progress since my earlier report. I can assure you that the morale of our soldiers is good. Every agency concerned has cooperated. The Phitsanulok and Uttaradit provincial administrations, which are responsible for control of the rear line, have performed very satisfactorily, enabling our frontline soldiers to operate without concern and to advance steadily on Lao positions. I feel that if the battle situation continues as it has and if Lao reinforcements do not exceed their current levels, we will be able to accomplish our objective soon.

[Thongchai] What progress have we made on Hill 1428 and other hills?

[Siri] We are now on the offensive and are very close to success. I don't think it will be long before we will accomplish that. [end recording]

Envoy to U.S. Comments on Bilateral Relations
BK040123 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
4 Feb 88 pp 1, 3

[By Phonphimon Kanchanalak in Washington]

[Text] The United States and Western countries should stop talking and start making a genuine effort to resettle refugees from Thailand, the Thai Ambassador to Washington said yesterday.

Ambassador Asa Sarasin, who will leave the Foreign Ministry next month, also complained that the US is always asking for action from Thailand on things such as intellectual property protection, but rarely responds to Thai requests for changes, such as in the US Farm Act.

However, he said, there is a lot of goodwill for Thailand in the US, in both the public and private sectors. "The Americans have been our ally and friends throughout history. The people are generally compassionate and sincere. They are not villainous."

The ambassador made the comments in an interview with the BANGKOK POST on Thai-US relations and why he will leave the Foreign Ministry to join Phadaeng Industry Co Ltd in April of this year.

Mr Asa said Thailand should make it clear to the US that "our cooperation goes only as far as our mutual interests go.

"The US can no longer take Thailand for granted. They cannot expect us to vote with them on every major issue at the United Nations. Thailand now has a wide spectrum of interests and the US must learn that there comes a time when Thai and US interests do not coincide. They cannot always come around and scream at us," the ambassador said.

He said that as long as they do not come into conflict with Thailand's interests, there is always room for Thai-US cooperation.

Ambassador Asa said that US foreign and trade policies which unintentionally hurt Thailand are an extension of domestic US politics.

"It has been a rather difficult time for the US because of their huge budget and trade deficit. We have to understand US policy in this context.

"For example, in view of US budgetary constraints, Thailand cannot expect US security assistance to increase."

But he said, "More than 60 percent of US military assistance goes to Israel and Egypt. The \$50 million the US is giving Thailand is just peanuts for the US. The US cannot use their assistance as a reason to demand anything from us.

"At the same time Thailand should not think that we can lean on the US. We have to be able to stand on our own feet," said Mr Asa.

Stressing that these were his personal views and not those of the Thai Government, the ambassador said Thailand should not be in a position where it has to answer constantly to the US for its refugee policy.

"Thailand has borne the refugee burden for over 40 years. Instead of only paying lip service, the US and Western countries should make a genuine effort to accept more refugees immediately.

"The long-term plan must be to stop the influx of these refugees by strengthening the Orderly Departure Programme (ODP) and through other means."

The Thai ambassador complained that the US is always making demands, but when Thailand expresses grievances or makes requests—such as its repeated outcry that the Farm Act be changed—the standard response from US officials is: "I have already written on your behalf in support of your position."

On Washington's recent removal of Singapore's GSP [Generalized System of Preferences] privileges, the ambassador said, "The benefits we can gain, from the programme are real and Thailand should capitalise on it."

He said damaging US trade legislation is not aimed at Thailand, but is rather a manifestation of US frustration in the handling of its own economic problems.

Mr Asa's only regret about his years as Thai ambassador to Washington was that Thailand's trade efforts with the US have been mainly defensive. He said, he would rather put more weight on attempts to expand Thailand's share of the US market.

On his decision to leave the Foreign Ministry, Mr Asa said: "The decision was absolutely personal and was not by any means politically-motivated."

He said one reason for his decision was his long-time interest in economics, which was an important part of his diplomatic duties.

"I look at diplomacy as a way to promote tangible things. It is the job of an ambassador to assist businessmen in such things as foreign investment, joint ventures and contacts with their foreign counterparts.

"When I was director-general of the Economics Department, I took a deep interest in these issues.

"Another job of an ambassador is to promote the country's exports, to expand existing markets and to find new ones to increase foreign exchange earnings."

Another reason for his departure was what he felt his foreign service career had to offer in the next eight years.

"As a government official, I have come as far as I could in the Foreign Ministry. There were two alternatives for me after being ambassador to the United States.

"One would have been to return to my post as permanent secretary. But one should not monopolise any post. Opportunities should be open for other people.

"The other alternative would have been to assume several other ambassadorial posts over the next eight years. That would be a lot of packing and unpacking."

Commenting on his future as president of Phadaeng Industry Co Ltd (PDI), the ambassador said, "They made me an offer. But my association with the company dates back to the late '70s-early '80s when I was ambassador to Belgium.

"I was promoting business investment in Thailand when Vielle-Montagne S.A. and Mechim S.A. companies (now shareholders in PDI) told me they were interested in joint ventures in Thailand.

"At that time, Atsawin Khongsiri casually asked me if I would consider the job. I was interested then, but did not take up the offer.

"Later, PDI president Kritsana Siwakritsakun asked me when he and I were travelling with the Prime Minister—this time in the presence of Foreign Minister Sitthi (Sawetsila).

"The Foreign Minister told Mr Kritsana not to try to 'snatch' his man away. But when they offered me the job this time, it seemed very challenging," he said.

Mr Asa will leave Washington on March 23 or 24 and will take up his new job on April 1.

He added that he does not consider his job at PDI a "stepping stone" to politics.

"A lot of people have raised the question of my political ambitions. I say that if one wants to enter the political arena, one has to go through the election process.

"It is not my intention at this point to go into politics."

Assembly's Ukrit Receives PRC's Chen Pixian
BK031055 Bangkok ZHONG HUA RIBAO in Chinese 2 Feb 88 p 4

[Text] Assembly President Ukrit Mongkhonwain received a delegation of the Chinese National People's Congress [NPC], led by NPC Standing Committee Vice Chairman Chen Pixian, at the National Assembly building on the morning of 1 February. The two sides held very friendly and cordial talks. Chen Pixian conveyed the cordial and kindred regards of Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, and Zhao Ziyang, as well as NPC Standing Committee Chairman Peng Zhen, to Assembly President Ukrit.

Ukrit gave the visiting NPC delegation a warm welcome. He also asked the delegation to convey his best regards to Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, and Peng Zhen.

Ukrit said that he is happy and satisfied with the smooth development of Chinese-Thai relations in recent years, and hopes that this good relationship will continue to develop. He said that both countries' national assemblies have cooperated in a friendly manner, not only in bilateral affairs but also in the work of the IPU. He also expressed his hope that this cooperation will grow stronger.

Chen Pixian thanked Ukrit for the invitation and cordial reception extended to the delegation by the Thai National Assembly. Chen Pixian also praised the Thai people's great achievements in their country's economic development. He said that Thailand's economic achievements have impressed every member of his delegation.

During the meeting, Chen Pixian gave Ukrit a letter from NPC Standing Committee Chairman Peng Zhen. In the letter Peng Zhen stated that his meeting with Parliament President Ukrit in China in 1985 had made a deep impression. Peng Zhen also used his letter to invite Ukrit to lead a Thai parliamentary delegation on a visit to China whenever it is convenient. In addition, Peng Zhen said he hopes to jointly promote friendly Chinese-Thai relations and to further strengthen cooperation between both countries' national assemblies in bilateral affairs and in the IPU. Ukrit then replied that he is looking forward to meeting with Peng Zhen again in the near future.

The NPC delegation also laid a wreath at the statue of King Rama VII on the morning of 1 February.

Soviet Official on New Foreign Trade Policy

BK040259 Bangkok *THE NATION* in English
4 Feb 88 p 25

[By Sinfa Tansarawut]

[Excerpts] The Soviet Union will import less agricultural produce and more manufactures from Thailand because of a new foreign trade policy and the creation of a new ministry, Soviet Trade Commissioner Yuriy Mikhaylov said.

The move is underscored by the arrival soon of four Soviet trade directors in Bangkok to participate in the first Thai, Soviet and Japanese joint venture, part of Moscow's new effort to establish more consistent trade flows with Thailand and to invest in joint ventures.

Mikhailov said that the new policy aims to cut imports of agricultural goods that the Soviet Union can produce, but to increase imports of modern machinery that will boost Soviet productivity.

At the same time, he said, the Soviet Union wants to sell more of its own machines and tools to increase the Soviet share of global machinery trade. He said machinery constitutes 15 percent of Soviet exports but 30 percent of world trade.

Last month, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, responsible for exports and imports, and the State Committee for External Economic Relations, in charge of providing technical assistance to socialist and other developing countries, were merged into a new Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.

The new ministry would also encourage foreign investment in the Soviet Union and Soviet ventures abroad, said Mikhailov who is to leave Bangkok to take up a post at the new ministry soon. [passage omitted]

Among manufactured products the Soviets could import are canned food and garments, he said. Tractors, cranes, front-end loaders, and oil tanks are among the products the Soviets want to export to Thailand.

Thai exports to the Soviet Union have mostly been agricultural products. The bilateral trade balance has been in Thailand's favour, but Thailand's surplus plunged from US\$108 million in 1986 to \$13 million in 1987 because of steep decreases in the main export items, rice, tapioca and sugar.

Mikhailov said the Soviet Union bought only 200,000 tons of rice, instead of the originally intended 400,000 tons, because of Thai high prices.

Soviet demand for sugar was low last year, while no tapioca was imported from Thailand because it was more expensive than US maize, a substitute ingredient for animal feed.

Mikhailov said the number of Soviet government agencies allowed to trade directly with foreign countries has increased to about 100 since January 1, 1987 as part of the liberalization effort.

Thai partners for the Soviets are also increasing. He said only 35 Thai companies traded with the Soviet Union in 1982 while the number jumped to 70 in 1987.

"This is a good sign," he said, adding that more Thai companies have been interested in business deals with the Soviets. [passage omitted]

Paper Notes 'Compromise' in Trade With SRV

BK310258 Bangkok *THE NATION* in English
31 Jan 88 p 11

[By Somphong Kittinaradon]

[Text] More than 9 years after the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, the Thai government is still trying to keep international economic pressure on Hanoi.

But like it or not, the economic boycott has eased recently, partly because of repeated calls from businessmen for a change in policy.

As a result, the Foreign Ministry has mapped out—and only very recently decided to unveil—a set of policy guidelines intended to govern the private sector's trade with Vietnam.

The guidelines were almost set a few years ago following the controversy over Singapore's growing trade with Vietnam. But until Jan 5, when senior Foreign Ministry officials displayed the guidelines before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the authorities apparently thought it wiser to keep the official stand ambiguous.

The lack of clear rules in the past has led most businessmen to interpret that the Thai Government does not want them to do business with Vietnam at all.

Policy shift—apparent or real? [subhead]

The spirit of the guidelines seems to show that Thai authorities are still sticking to ASEAN's overall strategy of economic isolation against Hanoi until it withdraws all troops from Kampuchea.

But in the final analysis, the policy boils down to a compromise between the two extreme ways of dealing with Vietnam.

In clarifying earlier this month the official stand on the private sector's dealings with Vietnam, Political Department Director General M.R. Thep Thewakun and Economic Department Director General Danai Dulalapha made the following points:

—The government does not oppose "normal trade" (i.e. trade based on cash payment or usual commercial credit).

—Fishing cooperation—where Thai fishing trawlers in Vietnamese waters are licensed and their hauls are shared with the host country—is classified as normal trade.

—Joint ventures or investment in Vietnam worry the authorities because they transfer capital, technology, and knowledge to the Vietnamese, thus helping them develop their economy while continuing their military occupation of Kampuchea.

—Joint ventures or investment can send wrong signals to Thailand's friends, hurting the strategy of isolating Vietnam economically and politically.

—Danai, wanting to discourage private investment in Vietnam, said Thai businessmen may be too optimistic about business prospects there. Thais made a similar miscalculation when they overrated investment opportunities in China a few years ago. As it turned out, he said, doing business in China is not as rosy as expected, despite the Bank of Thailand's policy to promote Thai investment there.

—M.R. Thep urged that Thai businessmen should keep in mind the "overall picture", such as the ASEAN strategy of isolating Vietnam, and national security interests. He quoted Josef Stalin as saying that the bourgeois are hungry for everything, including the rope to hang themselves.

—The government cannot endorse or support any business deals, be they in the first or second category.

—But on the other hand, Thai businessmen have the legal right to do business with any country—socialist or capitalist—in accordance with Thai laws. On investment, however, Thai prospective investors have to go through the Bank of Thailand, which regulates the flow of capital out of the country.

(M.R. Thep added that South Africa is the only exception because the Commerce Ministry and the Finance Ministry have issued regulations banning business with the country, which is under UN economic sanctions for its apartheid policy of racial discrimination.)

On the one hand, it is clear from the officials' version that the authorities do not want business to hurt efforts to solve the Kampuchean conflict and that the policy of pressuring Vietnam still stands.

But on the other hand, the authorities made clear that they want the private sector to have their own guidelines. Although the senior officials want to discourage private investment and joint ventures, the guidelines have no legal binding.

The senior officials said they would not mind normal trade, but then the authorities refused to recognize it. By logical extension, the refusal reflects the ideal approach that economic pressure should include trade sanctions.

In this, committee member Prasop Butsarakham (Social Action Party, Udon Thani), referring to normal trade, remarked on Jan 5: "It was heartening to learn that the authorities have met half way with the private sector."

Unlike Thailand, the United States banned wheat sales to the Soviet Union to pressure Moscow into pulling out troops from Afghanistan, he said.

Options in dealing with the Vietnamese in this context vary depending on what one defines as economic pressure. By the amount of pressure, the options can be outlined as follows:

—Economic and trade sanctions. Both government and private sectors have no business with Vietnam at all.

—The government does not deal with them. The private sector is allowed to trade with Vietnam but not to invest or have joint ventures.

—Similar to the second option, joint ventures and investment are only discouraged, and not banned.

—The government has no economic cooperation and business deals with Vietnam, but the private sector can trade and invest there.

No red light, and yet no green light. [subhead]

Perhaps the most controversial part of the policy guidelines is that the government will neither support nor ban private business deals.

The controversy has grown following a recently-published report that the Foreign Ministry refused to respond to a letter from Sirichai Fishing Co Ltd owner Wichan Sirichai-ekkawat, seeking to know the official position on his plan to enter a fishing agreement with Vietnam.

The letter, dated Oct 9, was addressed to Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila, who passed the matter to Danai. The director general raised the issue during a meeting with other director generals within the Foreign Ministry, who applied the policy guidelines to Wichan's case.

They agreed that fishing under a licensed system would do no harm, but a joint venture in fishing which involves the transfer of capital and technological know-how should be discouraged.

According to the published report, an official letter responding to Vicharn's question about the two levels of fishing cooperation had been drafted but never made it to the company, causing some to suggest that it was withheld by "conservatives" in the Foreign Ministry.

Speculation has it that authorities in the related government agencies are split into two schools of thought over ways to deal with the Vietnamese. The first group, dubbed conservatives, stand firm on keeping economic pressure on Vietnam. The other, branded progressives, advocates liberalizing trade and business to a certain degree. Somehow, the National Security Council [NSC], viewed as conservatives also, has become linked to the conflict, some say.

Reacting to the report that the ministry failed to respond to Vicharn's inquiry, Foreign Ministry officials said the Economic Department told the fishing company about the director generals' views before the company team left for

Vietnam a few months ago. The team left for Vietnam a few months ago. The team later concluded an agreement to fish in Vietnamese waters under a license system.

Yet, the Foreign Ministry officials admitted they were worried that a "careless move" on their part could play into the hands of the Vietnamese propaganda machine.

As some officials interpreted Vicharn's approach, the president of the Overseas Fishing Association of Thailand might want an official blessing for his business deals with Vietnam.

"We understand the private sector's concerns that dealing with the Vietnamese is risky. But we are not in a position to recognize any private deal," an official source commented.

They are afraid that a private deal could turn into a Vietnamese claim that Thailand is deviating from the strategy of maintaining economic pressure on Vietnam, official sources said.

"We do not switch on either the red light or the green light because a green light can hurt our efforts to maintain the West's economic pressure on Vietnam," commented a highly-placed source who asked not to be identified.

'Conservative' versus 'progressive'? [subhead]

Foreign Ministry officials also dismissed the so-called conservative-progressive split as an "exaggeration". Commented one official: "As I see it, if there are conservatives and progressives in that sense, then by all indications the Foreign Ministry is dominated by the conservatives."

He added that NSC Under Secretary General Suwit Sutthanukun has actually kept a low profile in the Kampuchean affair. Suwit told THE NATION he sees eye to eye with the Foreign Ministry on the question.

"All related government agencies discussed the issue quite a while ago and we came to a consensus on the present approach," he said.

He said Thailand had normal trade and economic relations with Vietnam until the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978.

The Vietnamese occupation, which posed a direct security threat to Thailand, prompted the Thai government to stop government-to-government trade and economic ties with Vietnam, he said. "We took this position not because Vietnam is a communist country, but because of its unacceptable action in Kampuchea," Suwit added.

In fact, if there is any actual difference between the NSC and the Foreign Ministry, then it is in their different emphasis. In this context, the NSC could be dubbed liberal and the latter called conservative, and not the other way around, remarked a well-informed observer. Most believe, however, that their views differ mainly because of their unique bureaucratic roles.

Understandably, the Thai diplomats' role is to persuade friendly countries to keep economic pressure on Vietnam. Because of this job, the diplomats must convince allies that Thailand—including its private sector, if possible—is sticking to its strategy in the Kampuchean conflict. Sitthi himself urged Tokyo to restrain the Japanese private sector from giving long-term credit to Vietnam last year.

The NSC, on the other hand, is a policy-making body, where members of various agencies meet to discuss their respective bureaucratic views and formulate a common policy.

Thus, the NSC chief, by the nature of his work, must try to harmonize divergent views as well as interests of the private sector. And certainly the NSC chief's own thoughts and personality are a factor.

Informed sources familiar with NSC thinking believe that the NSC sees the need to ease restrictions, partly because more and more friendly countries have begun to slowly adjust.

Apart from Japan and some European countries, the U.S. government, for example, has given an official blessing to humanitarian aid to Vietnam, while the private sector in Singapore continues to trade, with Indonesians trying to do the same.

A highly-placed government source commented that he believes Thailand can remove the security risk from the policy adjustment by ignoring business deals.

He said that Thai business "will have no significant impact on developing the Vietnamese economy", whereas U.S., Japanese and European aid will. "So we have to stick to our official policy of sustaining the economic boycott," said the source, who asked not to be named.

Is the Thai attitude of tolerating private deals a sign of concession or weakness? Will it hurt ASEAN's collective stand?

It depends on how you look at the situation, said the source. He added that ASEAN can claim that its strategy worked; otherwise, Hanoi would not have admitted that its economy has been weakened by the conflict, and it would not have pledged to withdraw all its troops by 1990.

The present Thai ambiguity is probably intended to balance national security interests with economic interests. Moreover, the source predicted, the ambiguity will likely remain until the conflict has been settled.

Vietnam

Foreign Ministry on Cambodia, Other Issues
BK041034 Hanoi International Service in English
1000 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] A spokesman for the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry says the resignation [by Sihanouk] for good of the post of president of the self-styled Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea creates more favorable conditions for Prince Sihanouk to contribute to seeking an appropriate settlement to the Kampuchea issue.

Speaking at a regular press conference in Hanoi on Thursday [4 February] Mr Trinh Xuan Lang stated that Vietnam fully supports the meeting between Prince Sihanouk and Chairman Hun Sen to settle the internal affairs of Kampuchea. On the relations between Vietnam and China he denounced China's slander against Vietnam of shelling Chinese territory and the Chinese press attacks against Vietnam, causing tension between the two countries. These, he said, are not beneficial to the improvement of the relations between the two countries and not suitable to the common trend for dialogue to solve all disputes through peaceful negotiations.

The Vietnamese spokesman also condemned recent statements on Kampuchea by Assistant to the U.S. State Secretary Gaston Sigur during his recent tour of Southeast Asia. He described them as negative and warned the U.S. to adopt an attitude more suitable to developments of the situation and make practical contributions to seeking an appropriate solution to the question of peace and stability in Southeast Asia including the Kampuchea issue.

[Hong Kong AFP in English at 1021 GMT on 4 February adds: "Vietnam has ruled out any meeting with Prince Norodom Sihanouk until all Cambodian parties involved in the conflict reach an agreement, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Trinh Xuan Lang said Thursday. 'The Cambodian parties must first get together to resolve the internal problems of Cambodia,' Mr Lang told a press conference here. 'Vietnam and other countries concerned, will then take part in a second round of "cocktail party" talks and an international conference to guarantee agreements reached by the Cambodian parties,' Mr Lang said."]

1968 Tet Offensive Commemorated in New York
BK040747 Hanoi VNA in English 0702 GMT
4 Feb 88

[Text] Hanoi VNA Feb. 4—The Vietnam Veterans Against the War organized a meeting in New York recently to commemorate the 15th anniversary of the signing of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam and the 20th anniversary of the 1968 Tet offensive.

Present at the function were a large number of veterans involved in and then opposed to the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam, and activists who took part in the anti-war movements in the United States. Also on hand were representatives of the Vietnamese and Nicaraguan missions to the United Nations.

At the meeting held under the theme, "Veterans Raise Their Voice for Peace and Justice", speakers came out against the continued U.S. hostile policy toward Vietnam and called for improvement of the U.S.-Vietnamese relations. The participants also demanded that the U.S. Administration cut off its aid to the Contras in Nicaragua in order to avoid another Vietnam.

Nguyen Van Linh Receives USSR Army Delegation
BK031527 Hanoi VNA in English 1507 GMT
3 Feb 88

[Text] Hanoi VNA Feb 3—Party General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh received on Tuesday General A.D. Lizichev, member of the CPSU Central Committee and chief of the General Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy and head of a delegation of the department, during an official visit to Vietnam.

Nguyen Van Linh warmly welcomed the visit which, he said, would further develop the militant solidarity between the Soviet and Vietnamese Armies, thus helping maintain peace in Southeast Asia and the rest of the world.

For his part, Gen Lizichev expressed his sincere gratitude toward the Vietnamese party, government, people and army for their hospitality. He informed Nguyen Van Linh of the results of the visit.

Earlier, the Soviet delegation was received by Pham Hung, Political Bureau member of the CPV Central Committee and chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Chairman Pham Hung expressed sincere thanks to the party, the government and the armed forces of the Soviet Union for their great and effective assistances to Vietnam in its struggle for national liberation in the past as well as its national construction and defence at present. He voiced full support for the Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of the medium- and shorter-range missiles. The Soviet guests left for home also on Tuesday.

Delegation Concludes Visit
BK031016 Hanoi VNA in English 0705 GMT
3 Feb 88

[Text] Hanoi VNA Feb 3—The delegation of the General Political Department of the Armed Forces of the USSR led by General A.D. Lizichev, member of the CPSU Central Committee and Chief of the General Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy, concluded a 5-day friendship visit to Vietnam on February 2.

While here, the delegation paid tribute at the Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum and visited the late president's home and office. It also laid a floral tribute at Lenin Monument and made a tour of the army museum. The delegation attended a meeting sponsored on January 30 by the General Political Department of the Vietnam People's Army in its honor, and called at the Tien Phong (Vanguard) Division, a special force unit of the command of the 7th Army Region and some naval units. The Soviet guests called at the offices of the party and people's committees of Ho Chi Minh City. They had working sessions with the commands of the Vietnam People's Air Force and Navy.

The Soviet Army delegation was received by General Le Duc Anh, defense minister, who warmly welcomed the delegation's visit, describing it as contributing to strengthening the solidarity, friendship, and close cooperation between the two nations.

Cuba Signs Film Cooperation Agreement

BK040146 Hanoi VNA in English 1504 GMT
3 Feb 88

[Text] Hanoi VNA Feb. 3—Vietnam and Cuba have signed in Havana a memo on cooperation in cinematography for the 1988-1990 period.

The document was concluded during a recent official visit to Cuba by Nguyen Thu, director of the Cinematographic Department.

Under the memo, the two sides continue to further their close cooperation in this field.

While in Cuba, Nguyen Thu and his party were received by Judio Garcia Espinosa, head of the Cuban Institute of Arts and Cinematographic Industry.

Article Cites Thai Papers on Relations

BK040949 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
0015 GMT 4 Feb 88

["Article" from the "International Topics" program]

[Text] In the past several days, newspapers in Bangkok have repeatedly urged the Thai Government to study and readjust its foreign policy, especially with regard to its relations with Vietnam and the other Indochinese countries.

Under the headline "Thailand's Dilemma Toward Vietnam Only Harms Thailand Itself," the paper PRACHACHAT said: Despite concern by the Thai Government, many Thai traders have visited Vietnam for trade and to establish joint ventures. In 1987, many Thai traders came to Vietnam for this purpose. There are two main groups of traders who have established trade relations with Vietnam: One is led by Mr Wong Phonnikon, former Thai deputy foreign minister; the other is led by Mr Wichan Sirichaiekkawat, chairman of the Thai Fishing Association. The paper said: Like it or not, Thai traders will continue to trade with Vietnam even without any assistance from the government. Some Thai businesses have cooperated with Singaporean traders to establish organizations to export Thai consumer goods to Vietnam to avoid difficulty caused by the government. Sooner or later, with a vast market like Vietnam, not only traders from Thailand but also from other countries will try to approach this market.

The same newspaper also carried an article entitled "Thailand Will Miss the Train," saying: We cannot speak of an ASEAN common policy relating to the Cambodian issue when Thailand advocates a trade

embargo on Vietnam while Singapore is a trade partner of this country. The Thai Government's concern over Vietnam-Indonesia trade relations cannot reverse the developing economic trend between Vietnam and non-communist countries. Even the United States has ignored ASEAN's appeals to boycott Vietnam. From mid-1979 to 1985 Thailand exported to Vietnam goods valued at \$41.9 million; Indonesia, \$3.7 million; Singapore, more than \$494.6 million. Vietnam's exports to noncommunist countries during this period increased on an average of 19% annually. These figures indicate that the Western trade embargo on Vietnam has been a failure. Despite pressure exerted by their governments, Asian trade circles have decided to trade with Vietnam. A Thai business has set up an office in Ho Chi Minh City. If other corporations do not follow suit, Thailand might lose an opening market.

The paper SIAM RAT said: An announcement made by U.S. Democratic Congressman Chester Atkin after his recent visit to Vietnam and Laos stated that Vietnam is paying more attention to establishing trade relations with western countries and that Vietnam will withdraw its troops from Cambodia in 1990 regardless of any political solution which may or may not be reached; these are new factors that should encourage Thailand to reconsider its relations with Indochinese countries and promptly readjust its current policy in order to avoid losing its position.

The paper concluded: The fact that Hun Sen held talks with Prince Norodom Sihanouk is an initial step toward a solution of the Cambodian issue. It is noteworthy that Sihanouk is fed up with efforts to solve the Cambodian issue carried out under ASEAN protective umbrella. These two signals are a reminder to ASEAN, especially Thailand, that confidence should not be totally placed on the United States and that ASEAN should quickly find a way out for its policy toward the Indochinese issue.

Army Paper Marks Lao Army Anniversary

BK030813 Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese
20 Jan pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "39 Years of Fighting and Growth of the Lao People's Army"]

[Text] The LPA has undergone 39 years of struggle and glorious victory. It has, together with people throughout the country, carried out two wars of resistance leading to the great victory that liberated the country and established the LPDR on 2 December 1975, thereby ushering in a new era—an era of national independence, freedom, and progress toward building socialism.

During the past 13 years, the LPA has experienced and overcome numerous difficulties in the struggle to protect revolutionary gains and consolidate the people's administration, thereby making itself worthy as the core force in the cause of national defense. In the new revolutionary era, the LPA has developed the tradition of heroism

and, together with the Lao people, has striven to carry out the two strategic tasks, heal the wounds of war, consolidate and strengthen its force, promptly foil all forms of sabotage and aggression of the reactionary forces at home and abroad, firmly protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and ensure political security and social safety. The Fourth LPRP Congress set forth the directive for building and defending the fatherland and clearly charted the advanced path of the Lao revolution that is to carry out socialist industrialization using agriculture and industry as a base for developing national economy, thereby gradually leading the Lao nation toward socialism. The congress resolution stressed: "The entire Lao party, people, and Army must consistently heighten their vigilance, strengthen their capability in all aspects, combine economic with national defense and vice versa, establish military rear services, and strengthen the general strategic position of the nation." Under the beacon of the Fourth LPDR Congress resolution and profoundly realizing the lofty obligation of patriotism, the LPA and people throughout the country are enthusiastically participating in emulation drives to increase labor productivity and contribute to socioeconomic development. The LPA officials and combatants have been trained consistently, thus enhancing their technical and tactical capability and heightening vigilance for combat readiness and for fighting triumphantly.

Developing its glorious tradition, during the days of the new year the LPA has fought persistently, scored outstanding military exploits, repulsed dozens of land-grabbing operations by Thai troops, and firmly maintained strongholds on Hills 1428, 1370, and other heights west of Boten District, Sayaboury Province. The Lao Ministry of National Defense has conferred the Order of Heroism on 17 officials and combatants and 5 battalions of the district armed forces for their achievements in combat. The recent victory of the Lao Army and people has manifested the rapid maturity of the fraternal Lao Armed Forces in defending national sovereignty.

The Vietnamese people and armed forces are very proud to have these faithful and heartfelt Lao comrades in arms and consider the glorious victories scored in combat and construction by the fraternal LPA as their own. Implementing the SRV-LPDR Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, we are determined to work shoulder to shoulder with the Lao people and armed forces to fulfill the glorious international obligation. The militant solidarity between Vietnam and Laos as well as among Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia will be brilliant and firm and is invincible to any hostile force.

Commemorating the 39th founding anniversary of the LPA, an unshakable and faithful comrade in arms of the VPA, we are very happy to see great victories and the rapid growth of the Lao Armed Forces. The Vietnamese people and armed forces warmly wish the Lao Armed Forces and people success in implementing the Fourth

LPRP Congress Resolution, in fulfilling the 5-year socioeconomic plan, in foiling the enemy's schemes and acts of sabotage, and in firmly defending the border and maintaining national security.

Paper Marks 58th Anniversary CPV Founding

*BK031047 Hanoi VNA in English 0725 GMT
3 Feb 88*

[Text] Hanoi VNA Feb 3—Marking the 58th anniversary of the Communist Party of Vietnam today, NHAN DAN, organ of the party Central Committee in its editorial calls upon all party members to take the lead in the renovation campaign now under way in the whole country.

The paper says:

"The Sixth Party Congress set forth the task of renovation in all domains, especially in the economy. The party is the initiator and leader of this renovation effort. The congress pointed out that the party has to renovate itself in all fields, first of all in thinking, personnel work, and working style and to raise the quality of party cadres and members. Developments in the past more than 1 year show that renovation can achieve good results only if the party itself is really renovated." It goes on: "Realities have shown that democracy is the prerequisite of any renovation. This demands the broadening of two-way information to take the party policies to the people and inversely, to take the people's aspirations to the party.

"Renovation of thinking must go along with stepping up theoretical work and summing up experiences with a high level of generalisation in order to draw exact conclusions from practice," the editorial says.

It notes that together with the renovation of thinking, to renovate personnel work has become an urgent demand which will exert a great influence on renovation in other fields.

The paper goes on:

"An extremely important task of decisive significance is to build a firm contingent of cadres with a high determination and capacity to renovate. This demands, first of all that the party renovate its thinking in the personnel work, especially in the appraisal of cadres according to the principles of democracy, collectiveness and openness, considering the capacity to accomplish the political task as the first criterion to judge a cadre's quality and capacity.

"Besides, it is necessary to renovate the style of work in the contest of democratization and openness in all activities of the party, the state machinery, and mass organizations.

"All these tasks must be done alongside the raising of the capacity and revolutionary quality of party cadres and members during the present campaign to purify party ranks and heighten the combat strength of the party organizations and the state machinery, make social relations wholesome, and realize social equity."

The paper reports that so far many provinces and cities have engaged in a (? mobile) campaign to upgrade the combat strength of the party organization and the state machinery, make healthy all social relations and effect social equity.

Ho Chi Minh City Admits New Party Members
BK040549 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
0500 GMT 2 Feb 88

[Text] Last year, the Ho Chi Minh City party organization admitted 4,350 new party members, 61% of whom were members of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union; women and workers accounted for 30 and 14% respectively; and 62 of them were emulation heroes. Since liberation, the city party organization has admitted more than 30,000 party members. This is an important factor enhancing the strength of the party organization. The city party committee has always paid attention to promoting the party building task among youths and workers at small industrial and handicraft establishments, hospitals, schools, suburban areas and in the tax, trade, and import-export sectors.

The party building task has not satisfied the requirements for the new situation, yet party chapters have recruited more members than in previous years. The quality of new members has been correctly enhanced at courses to foster the knowledge of would-be members, especially their knowledge of the party and their awareness of the need for renovation in thinking and in maintaining morals, and in skills of specialized professions. In addition to perfecting organization, enhancing the leadership capability of basic party chapters, and recruiting new party members, various party organizations have expelled many degenerate and unqualified members from the party.

In 1987, the city took disciplinary action in more than 1,000 cases and expelled 233 members from the party. Some 40% of basic party chapters, however, could not admit any new members during the past year because most of them were weak chapters. Such negative phenomena as narrow-mindedness, bureaucratism, and negligence in fulfilling the plan norms for the party building task prevailed in some places, leading to the admission of unqualified persons to the party and indecisive action on the prompt expulsion of degenerate members. About 20% of the members on probation were not officially granted membership status.

Paper Comments on 'Malpractices' by Cadres

BK031415 Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
in Vietnamese 23 Jan 88 p 1

["Saturday Forum" column article by Phuc Nguyen: "Sounding the Alarm Over the Lack of Democracy in Rural Areas"]

[Text] The press has reported numerous cases, and letters and denunciations have continued to be sent to the press complaining about cadres of the party, administration, and cooperatives who violate the law and disregard the right to mastery of the people in the rural areas. Some people from distant provinces have even traveled to Hanoi, bringing with them rice balls to eat along the way, and called at organs of public opinion and legal authorities, requesting that necessary measures be quickly taken to stop the evil practices of oppressing and persecuting the masses that have occurred, not so infrequently, in the rural areas. Some hamlet and village cadres have acted in a manner no less deplorable than the dreaded local tyrants of old; but they are, of course, more sophisticated in their practices. They misappropriate collective property, seek personal riches, and even dip into the money, paddy, and work credits of cooperatives and their members. Not a few key cooperative cadres have built imposing houses, ride Honda Cub motorbikes, and have furnished their homes entirely with expensive imported luxuries. The limerick of yesteryear has now become reality in many localities. It says:

"There was a cooperative where

"It was declared to be just and fair

"For one person to do

"The duties of two

"So the chairman could buy imported wares Questions raised by the people are ignored; and those who dare voice criticism had better be prepared for the worst! Reprisal may come in a multitude of forms.

Feasts and drinking parties have been organized more frequently. Some relatives of mine told me that many village cadres rarely dine at home with their families. Pork comes from hogs raised by the cooperative, good quality rice is also available from the cooperative's store, fine wine can be distilled by themselves...everything can be had "for free." The people's comments only fall on deaf ears! There are countless reasons to cite for throwing big bashes! Besides, no records are kept of expenses and revenues; and even if they were, who would ever come to inspect them anyway!

The practice of land grabbing has become fairly widespread. At a certain cooperative, land which was publicly taken away from cooperative members during 1980-82 has now been "commandeered." It was thought at first that the cooperative might have come up with some new plan for business, but it turned out that some cadres needed land to build houses.

To facilitate their actions these cadres build up their own factions. They approach birds of the same feather and fill up local positions with their own relatives, both close

and distant, to make village affairs "top secret" and keep them from being known or discussed by the masses. They have ways at their disposal to neutralize righteous people who want to expose negative practices. Those who "play into their hands" will receive assistance in cash and kind in time of need; and those who go against them will face relentless persecution and repression.

With a poor understanding of the law, they hold that "royal edicts are second to village customs" and act in excess of their authority and in violation of the law. Not a few cases have been reported in which people were arrested, paddy confiscated, and property seized illegally. In some localities, cadres even had some people beaten up, causing serious injuries and, in some instances, even death. What is more, they also resorted to despicable acts of reprisal such as uprooting trees and cutting down rice plants planted by cooperative members, refusing to permit their children to attend school in the municipality or go to the provincial hospital....

Not only people of the "older generations" wielding power in the localities have acted in excess of their authority; even those of today's younger generations holding positions and power (they exist in fairly large numbers in various villages and city wards at present) are also being rapidly corrupted by such practices of patriarchalism and despotism and by the pursuit of special prerogatives and privileges.

What is the cause of this situation? It is insufficient training coupled with poor political awareness and a sketchy knowledge of the law and professional expertise. It is also laxity in leadership by the direct higher echelons, failure to promote the movement for democracy in the countryside, and the all too scanty dissemination of information about renovation and democratization.

Some 80% of our country's population live in the rural areas. Agriculture is the primary front; and the three major economic programs, including the program of grain and food, are our pressing objectives. If the aforementioned situation is allowed to continue, not only will our peasants' confidence in the party, the state, and the

system be eroded, but production will also slow down and decrease and production relations as well as social relations in the countryside will be distorted. Let me sound another alarm over the serious violation of the laboring people's right to mastery in the rural areas; and in order to check this malpractice it is suggested that the provincial and district echelons uphold their exemplary conduct and tighten control in firmly grasping the situation in the countryside and guiding efforts aimed at resolutely overcoming the various negative aspects that are weighing down heavily on the life of the peasantry. Let us not act like an ostrich burying its head in the sand and feel satisfied that "the rural areas have now flourished" and that "our peasants have a very high material and spiritual standard of living" without seeing the fact that there are now countless things that must be done immediately in the countryside so that the people will not only lead a happy and prosperous life but will also eagerly and enthusiastically do their best to build and defend the fatherland.

Briefs

Air Link to Bangkok

Hanoi VNA Feb.4—Beginning from February 1988, Vietnam Airlines and Thai International will open regular flights from Ho Chi Minh City to Bangkok and vice-versa, the Vietnam Airlines announces today. There will be two flights weekly, on Tuesday and Thursday from Tan Son Nhat Airport in Vietnam, and on Tuesday and Friday from Don Muang Airport in Thailand. In initial period from February to March 1988, there will be only one flight by Thai International a week on Friday. [Text] *[Hanoi VNA in English 0722 GMT 4 Feb 88 BK]*

Soviet Freighter Delivered

Hanoi VNA Feb.4—Vietnam has received a 3,200-ton cargo ship as gift from Ministry of Merchant Marine of the Soviet Union. The ship named "P. Zalexki" was handed over to the Vietnamese side at a ceremony recently held in the Haiphong Port. Later it was renamed "Tri An" and put under the Vietnam Ocean Shipping Company. [Text] *[Hanoi VNA in English 0708 GMT 4 Feb 88 BK]*

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But the largest opposition party eventually agreed to shelve the problem and accepted the resumption of the budget committee session.

The government comment came in response to JSP Secretary-General Tsuruo Yamaguchi's request to seek consultations with the United States under the treaty to check U.S. military ships' bringing of nuclear weapons into Japan.

A Foreign Ministry official said Wednesday evening that Tuesday's government comment does not necessarily deny Japan's right to discuss such matter at consultations under Article 4 of the treaty.

He indicated the Article 4 consultation, which can be requested by either Japan or the United States, could become an opportunity for Japan to inquire that country about its observance of Japan's non-nuclear principles.

As the U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise visited Japan in 1983, the official said, then Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe called U.S. Ambassador Mike Mansfield to the ministry and reminded him of Japan's non-nuclear principles.

The meeting could be interpreted as a consultation under Article 4, he said.

Paper Views Results of Washington Summit
OW011948 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS
in English 30 Jan 88 p 2—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

["Nagatacho Currents" column by Katsunobu Shiibashi:
"Was 'Ron-Noboru' Summit a Success?"]

[Text] Praising the establishment of a "Ron-Noboru" relationship, the Japanese government pronounced the U.S.-Japan summit in Washington a success.

Besides this establishment of a personal-level relationship between Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita and President Ronald Reagan, the government pointed to the fact that no significant confrontation arose during the meeting.

Careful prior consultation enabled the two leaders to deftly avoid any outright clash of opposing views on such controversial issues as the lifting on restrictions on the import of 12 agricultural products into Japan and the participation of U.S. companies in Japanese public works projects.

The Japanese government also pointed to the yen-dollar exchange rate, which calmed to some extent following the meeting. They claimed that concrete measures proposed by the two leaders had contributed to the stabilization of the exchange market.

However, the question remains as to whether such a meeting can in fact be deemed a success merely on the strength of the government's optimistic appraisal.

Firstly, summit meetings, particularly initial meetings of national leaders, are destined from the start to appear successful, at least superficially.

The apparent success of this summit can also be credited to President Reagan's skill in hosting visiting dignitaries.

As a rule, diplomatic authorities, concerned about the effect of a summit meeting on domestic politics, make thorough preparations to avoid any visible confrontation.

In fact, the then newly appointed prime minister had an opportunity to visit the U.S. in November. The Japanese government passed on this plan, claiming insufficient time to make thorough preparations.

During the ensuing period of preparation for Takeshita's January trip, the Japanese government repeatedly emphasized the importance of establishing a personal relationship of trust between the two leaders in dealing with protectionist pressures in their respective countries.

They stressed the necessity of concentrating on establishing a relationship paralleling the one that developed between former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and President Reagan, characterized in Japan as the "Ron-Yasu" relationship. Substantial negotiations over specific problems must be avoided at all costs.

Believing that Takeshita's first meeting as prime minister with Reagan would be considered a litmus test of his abilities and would ultimately determine the course of his administration, the government authorities wanted to avoid anything which held the remote possibility of ending in failure.

Despite the efforts of the Japanese diplomatic authorities, however, President Reagan was forced to insist that specific issues be brought to the negotiating table, including the contentious problem of a complete opening of the Japanese market to U.S. beef and oranges.

Yet, some U.S. congressmen still expressed their dissatisfaction with the results of the negotiations, accusing the President of being unable to procure any specific agreements with the Japanese leader.

And this year, a presidential election year in the U.S., Prime Minister Takeshita will face even stronger pressure from Congress to open the Japanese market to U.S. products. This will even include the Japanese rice market, long regarded as the "sacred" province of Japanese farmers.

To help the U.S. rebuild its economy, the prime minister will also be forced to present specific timetables for reducing Japan's enormous trade surplus, increasing its defense budget, and further expanding ODA to developing nations.

The Japanese media, meanwhile, has been vociferous in arguing that close relations between the two countries do not necessarily mean that Japan must automatically give

in to all U.S. demands. Included among such voices were the NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN and SANKEI SHIMBUN, traditionally regarded as being extremely close to Japanese government and business.

The media made the point that criticism by the public will continue to grow if Japan continues only to compromise without any ideas or strategies of its own.

In carrying out diplomatic negotiations, the principles are required to have the ability to find a line of compromise while coping with such domestic problems as opposing legislative interests and protectionist pressure applied by domestic industry. This becomes particularly difficult in a major election year.

When strong leadership is required, Takeshita's time-consuming consensus-building politics is only likely to cause further discontent and irritation in both the U.S. and Japan.

Domestically, Prime Minister Takeshita faces the tough task of carrying through a sweeping tax reform program. On the international front, he faces the likewise challenging task of coming to terms with the U.S. and alleviating the critical strains that have developed in the two countries' relations.

Deputy Cabinet Secretary Ichiro Ozawa, a close aide to the prime minister, declared that Takeshita's first visit to the U.S. as prime minister proved that he is good at dealing with foreign affairs as he is with domestic politics.

And while Ozawa stressed that Prime Minister Takeshita is the most desirable leader for the country during a time when foreign policy and domestic politics have become closely interwoven, only time will tell whether this judgement is an accurate one, or merely an optimistic exaggeration.

Editorial Urges Takeshita To Reveal Views
OW022349 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS
in English 1 Feb 88 p 5—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[ASAHI SHIMBUN 30 January editorial: "P.M. Must Reveal Own Views"]

[Text] As expected, tax reform turned out to be the main subject of the parliamentary exchanges that followed Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita's administrative policy speech. In particular, the heads of opposition parties criticized the government for virtually scrapping its unified view, presented by former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, that it will not introduce an "all-embracing large-scale indirect tax."

Opposition leaders also raised questions about the government's perception of the international situation. They said, in effect, that Japan was blind to changes in world politics and thus falling behind the times. Japan, they argued, does not have its own foreign policy, although "it

is willing to make global contributions." Their statements varied in tone, of course, but they reflected a common sense of irritation over the lack of clarity in the prime minister's foreign policy.

Arguments by the Japan Socialist Party and the Clean Government Party (Komeito) were similar on this score. These may be summarized as follows:

—Japan should not take a hands-off attitude now that the superpowers have signed a historic treaty banning INF nuclear missiles. This country should make its own efforts toward disarmament.

—The Japanese government, however, is pushing ahead with a military buildup, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, putting the principle of "self-defense only" in jeopardy. Japan's buildup runs against the trend of world politics. It should keep defense spending within one percent of the GNP.

—The improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations provides Japan with an opportunity to improve its own relations with the Soviet Union. Now is the time to make greater efforts to remove the distrust between Tokyo and Moscow.

The Democratic Socialist Party said the prime minister was "too passive" during his trip to Washington, and called for a change in the bilateral relationship in which "Japan merely reacts to U.S. demands." The Japan Communist Party said Japan should take the lead in eliminating nuclear weapons because it is the only atom-bombed country in the world.

These criticisms are reasonable. Many Japanese have apprehensions about defense policy, particularly about the growing defense budget, now exceeding ¥3.7 trillion, and stepped-up defense cooperation with the United States. Japan's neighbors such as China and South Korea are also critical of the Japanese defense buildup.

The prime minister's replies were not convincing. He said the defense budget has been increased "after taking comprehensive account of various circumstances." Closer defense cooperation between Japan and the United States is needed to "maintain deterrent power," he said, adding that Japan will "promote the effective implementation of the security treaty on the basis of its own judgment."

On relations with the Soviet Union, Takeshita said Moscow's position on the territorial issue remains unchanged, and Tokyo is waiting to see how the other side moves on the pending visit here by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Asked whether he would attend a U.N. disarmament conference, he gave only a qualified answer, saying that he would go if his schedule permitted.

These statements indicate that the prime minister is looking at the world through the monocular of the Japan-U.S. relationship. No doubt that relationship is the "linchpin of Japan's foreign policy," but Japan will not be able to keep

pace with changes in the multipolar world as long as it thinks and acts in the framework of America's global strategy. That, we believe, is the basic reason why opposition parties are irritated by Takeshita politics.

Another disappointment is that the prime minister replied to questions by reading from memos prepared by bureaucrats. So his statements sounded painfully monotonous. He also left the audiences wondering what his own views were. Takeshita is no longer chairman of the Diet Policy Committee nor secretary-general of the ruling party, but the prime minister of Japan. In that capacity he should have spelled out his basic and long-range views and frankly expressed his beliefs in his own words.

A JSP interpellator, citing a prewar Japanese prime minister, Osachi Hamaguchi, who was killed by a rightist assassin as a result of his signing the London disarmament treaty, declared, "We should recall the great courage and resolve with which he tried to limit the growth of the military budget in order to overcome fiscal difficulties." Indeed we should.

ASAHI Editorial Questions Takeshita Promises
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[ASAHI SHIMBUN 26 January editorial: "PM Must Speak His Mind"]

[Text] Statements like "I don't believe in rocking the boat" and "I have no intention of overextending myself in carrying out my duties" typify Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita's personality.

He certainly "lived up" to his personal philosophy in his policy speech of Jan. 25. Instead of using the occasion to elucidate the overall policy plans of his new Cabinet, Takeshita merely rattled off totally uncontroversial observations in textbook bureaucratese. Of course he didn't rock the boat; there was no way he could with this sort of speech.

It is obviously part of Takeshita's personality to act demure and meek. that's fine in itself. Still, there are occasions where he must show more backbone and substance. He is, after all, the top leader of this nation. the people deserve to know what is in his mind and how he intends to steer the nation.

Takeshita has three pet slogans—"Japan, a contributor to the global economy," "true affluence" and "harmony and vitality." He says it is his job as prime minister to realize these goals.

Takeshita has already made an international and official promise of the first slogan. During his Washington visit, he told the Americans that this was one of Japan's four fundamental foreign policies. It is a promise on which he must deliver. But how?

The government has decided to boost Japan's official development assistance (ODA) in next fiscal year's budget. But what the people are really waiting to hear is Takeshita's honest world view and philosophy concerning overseas economic assistance and market liberalization. Nobody wants explanations in the vague and incomprehensible language of bureaucrats, thought Takeshita excels in doing just that. On the issue of farm trade liberalization, for instance, Takeshita's comment was that he will "take appropriate measures." This is no answer to the question many Japanese farmers are asking: Why do we have to open up our markets?

And what position is Japan to assume in global politics? Takeshita insists that Japan is a peace-seeking nation, and that it has no intention of becoming a military superpower.

But watching his way of handling politics, we have our doubts. Has he done anything that will prevent Japan from becoming a military power? Every since his predecessor scrapped the defense spending limit of less than 1 percent of the gross national product (GNP) last year, our Asian neighbors have been growing nervous. And the Takeshita Cabinet has given the green light to a joint Japan-U.S. study that is meant to expedite the dispatch of U.S. support forces to Japan in an emergency.

We had hoped that Takeshita's policy speech would include some in-depth comment on what he thought was Japan's proper responsibility as a nation that does not believe in using armed forces in global politics,. But we were led down.

As for "true affluence," the great majority of Japanese are acutely aware of its absence. And although Takeshita says he is set on easing the excessive congestion and overcrowding in Tokyo by dispersing some of the functions of the capital city to other parts of Japan, the first set of measures he announced recently are anything but adequate.

As for his promise to radically revise the tax system, which he says he will undertake in the light of society's steady "aging" and its need to become more open to the rest of the world, there is no question that this is his biggest political task this year. Takeshita must do everything in his power to induce a consensus in the Diet and among the public, not only within his own Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP).

And "harmony" is the slogan Takeshita has chosen to describe his regime. In this there is an obvious influence of former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato who stated in his first policy speech as premier in November 1964: "I consider it my foremost responsibility to try to understand exactly what each Japanese citizen expects of my new Cabinet, and act accordingly."

Takeshita was the deputy chief Cabinet secretary at the time. He must have taken part in the drafting of Sato's speech. We hope he has not forgotten these words.

END

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